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Introduction

few people envied David Kaczynski. In 1996, he found some old writings by

his brother Ted that were similar in tone and content to a manifesto submitted to newspapers in 1995 by a feared terrorist, known to law enforcement
agents as the Unabomber. David was then faced with an agonizing choice
about whether to disclose his discovery to federal investigators. He ultimately revealed Ted’s name, believing that he had assurances from federal
authorities that they would not pursue the death penalty against his brother,
whom David believed to be mentally ill. When Attorney General Janet Reno
decided, nonetheless, to pursue a capital case, David was devastated.1 Later,
Ted Kaczynski pled guilty to charges that carried a life sentence.2 Subsequently,
David Kaczynski became an anti-death penalty advocate.3
David Kaczynski is perhaps the best-known example in recent years of a
family member who provided law enforcement officials with the critical
information that led to the arrest of a loved one.4 Bernie Madoff ’s sons’ recent
choice to turn in their father for his giant investment fraud is another headline-grabbing instance of this conflict between family loyalty and public
duties. Unsurprisingly, many family members confronted with a dilemma
like David Kaczynski’s make an entirely different choice.
Consider the Sheinbein family, for example. In 1997, a high school senior
named Samuel Sheinbein was charged with murder after police found the
burned and dismembered body of an acquaintance in the garage of a vacant
house in Maryland.5 But Sheinbein was never brought to trial in Maryland
because he fled to Israel within days of the murder, and Israel subsequently
refused to extradite him.6
So how was a seventeen-year-old able to get to Israel so quickly? Prosecutors
alleged that, after learning that his son was a murder suspect, Samuel’s father,
Sol Sheinbein, brought Samuel, who was then hiding in New York, his passport,
some clothing, and a ticket to Israel. Sol also drove his son to the airport,7 and, a
few days later, followed his son to Israel, where he continues to live and work.8
Prosecutors in Maryland subsequently filed a misdemeanor charge against him
xi
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for obstructing a police investigation. But because of the nature of the charge
and his status as an Israeli citizen, Sol also could not be extradited.9
After Samuel Sheinbein pled guilty before an Israeli court and was
sentenced to twenty-four years in prison,10 Sol gave his first interview to an
Israeli newspaper. In defending his actions, Sol, a practicing lawyer, stated:
“I did some simple soul-searching and I came to the conclusion that with all
due respect to the law, I am first of all a father and only after that a citizen.”11
Samuel Sheinbein’s mother, in an earlier statement, claimed, “any parents
would go and would do what we are doing.”12
The choices David Kaczynski and Sol Sheinbein made arise virtually
every day in every jurisdiction, where family members have the opportunity
to facilitate or obstruct enforcement of the criminal law. Indeed, the media
recently reported stories about fugitives whose family members created
alibis (including reporting the death of the fugitive) for them;13 criminals who
perpetrated their frauds with the assistance of family members;14 and whitecollar criminals whose spouses offered testimony or other evidence in
exchange for a reduction of the criminal liability they themselves faced.15
The conflict between duties as citizens and loyalties as family members has
long been explored in literature—most prominently in Antigone, Sophocles’
play about a young woman’s decision to defy the ruler Creon in favor of
affording her brother Polynices a proper burial. Nonetheless, it is a relatively
uncharted area in legal scholarship.16 This is especially so with respect to how
this classic tension manifests itself within the criminal justice system.17
∗∗∗∗∗
One goal of this book is to expose how family members and their interests
intersect with what we often refer to as “the American criminal justice system.”18
For instance, we find that the state does not always impinge upon family members in the course of investigating or prosecuting crimes. Indeed, sometimes
legal institutions and actors defer to the decision of family members to prioritize their duties to family over their duties as citizens. Examples of these
accommodations include evidentiary privileges that enable family members
to avoid furnishing evidence against their loved ones and exemptions for family
members from laws prohibiting the harboring of fugitives. We characterize
these state policies that treat defendants better because of their family status
as family ties benefits—and there are many of them. For several reasons that
we hope to explore in this book, we generally oppose conferring family ties
benefits in the criminal justice system. This is a controversial stance because it
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might enable our critics to characterize us as “anti-family.” But we think that,
in many circumstances, there are simply too many normative costs to the
criminal justice system when it gives special benefits to defendants based on
their family status.
In contrast to family ties benefits, sometimes the state imposes extra burdens on defendants on account of their status as a member of a family.19 In
these situations, but for family status, a person would not be found liable of a
crime. Examples include vicarious criminal liability imposed on parents for the
crimes of their children and “omissions liability,” that is, criminal liability
imposed on family members for failing to rescue their kin from harm. Because
these laws impose punishment on account of one’s familial status, we call these
family ties burdens.
We believe that these burdens stand in need of substantial justification.
Some of these criminal liabilities appear to be attempts to protect the vulnerable in relationships of voluntary caregiving. We think it is relatively easy to
protect that interest without resorting to the current laws’ discrimination
against caregiving arrangements that differ from the structure of an idealized
traditional family unit. It is one thing for the law to recognize how citizens
organize themselves into close circles of affection; but it is another for the
criminal law to take a stance on how citizens ought to organize themselves—
and to discredit and disadvantage those who choose to draw their circles of
intimacy differently.
With an understanding of both family ties benefits and burdens, we can
stand at the crossroads between the family and the criminal justice system
and see two distinct questions about the facial treatment of familial status,
each of which has been given spare and insufficient attention until now. First,
how does the criminal justice system in this country approach the issue of
family status? Second, how should family status be recognized, if at all, in a
criminal justice system situated within a liberal democracy committed to
egalitarian principles of nondiscrimination?
Because of the different dynamics involved in family ties benefits
and family ties burdens, we largely address them in separate parts of the
book. Thus, the first half of the book canvasses and analyzes family ties benefits; the second half focuses attention upon family ties burdens. Before providing a quick summary of how the rest of the book will proceed, a few
clarifications are in order.
∗∗∗∗∗
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This book integrates legal analysis, political theory, and public policy.
Thus, we are not merely describing doctrine but suggesting an analytical
framework for thinking about the way the criminal justice system grapples
with questions of family status. We are hopeful that public policy makers,
lawyers, and legislators will learn from our approach to this diverse set of
rules within the criminal justice system—and that they will begin to see how
these seemingly independent laws need to be understood in light of their
contribution to privileging and punishing family status. Although we realize
that each benefit and burden exposed here must ultimately be analyzed on
its own terms and from within its own context, we think revealing the multifarious ways our society goes about privileging and punishing family status
will contribute to each of those separate inquiries. We cannot analyze each
benefit and burden exhaustively; our hope is that developing a normative
lens through which to view each of these intersections can illuminate the
policy debates about each of these practices. And, at the very least, the
descriptive side of our project should show just how pervasive these practices are within the criminal justice system.
Many earlier books have studied the economic and cultural effects of
criminal justice policy on families. Some have even considered the impact of
incarceration on families, focusing on the devastating impact that the
incarceration of relatives can have on the family members left behind.20 One
study has considered how the corrections system copes with the issues
related to the reproductive or family-raising aspirations of its offenders.21
And another focuses on the issues related to prisoner reentry into society
and family life.22 There is no doubt that many of the criminal law’s policies
and practices disadvantage families in many ways—and without attention to
this sort of disparate impact on families, policy designers risk tearing our
social fabric at the seams. We agree that this lens is a critically important one
in evaluating criminal justice policies. Nevertheless, this lens tends to track
the indirect results of other policies. For example, although lengthy sentences
for minor drug crimes result in the tragic situation of too many children
growing up without access to a parent, the primary objective behind drug
sentencing laws is generally not to separate children and their parents.
Our focus is different and has yet to be sufficiently addressed by the
community of scholars interested in how the criminal law intersects with
families. Here, we examine the distinctively purposeful practices that consciously target defendants for special privileges or burdens on account of
their familial status. Scholars have been successful in analyzing the effects of

Dan Markel-FM.indd xiv

2/27/09 12:14:44 AM

introduction

xv

certain criminal justice policies and practices on the family. But most scholars have not recognized the panoply of laws expressly drawn to privilege or
disadvantage persons based on family status alone. Some have addressed
singular instances of the larger phenomenon we chart, but we are the first to
offer a synthetic approach. It seems important and necessary to pause and
think through how and why our laws intentionally target family status and
how the underlying goals of such a choice might better be served in some
cases. This book clears that ground.
Although we have chosen here to focus on explicit legislative or judicial
choices to privilege or burden individuals with family relationships, there are
no doubt many other ways in which persons enjoy informal benefits or burdens; for example, if a police officer makes an on-the-spot decision not to arrest
a domestic violence offender precisely because the assault was committed on
a family member rather than on a stranger; or if a juror refuses to convict in a
marital rape case because he believes a husband is entitled to his wife’s sexual
services. These kinds of subterranean choices are weighty and important, but
our focus here is different. We believe policymakers need to reflect upon the
explicit choices they have made, choices that have been insufficiently analyzed
in a synthetic manner by academics before this project. Once we have a framework for analyzing the explicit family ties benefits and burdens, one might be
able to apply elements of that framework to the unstated and more obscured
informal benefits and burdens. But to develop that framework in the first
instance, we focus on facial benefits and burdens.
∗∗∗∗∗
As mentioned earlier, in the first half of the book we address how the
criminal justice system “privileges” family status. The first chapter provides
an overview of the multiple sites in which a defendant’s family status is used
as a basis for extending a benefit to that person within the criminal justice
system. We first explore how jurisdictions offer evidentiary privileges and
other exemptions affecting evidence gathering that constrain the state from
intruding into familial relationships. We then describe the efforts by some
states to shield from prosecution family members who harbor fugitives from
law enforcement officials. Additionally, we survey family ties benefits associated with violence in the family, pretrial release, sentencing, and prison
administration.
Chapter 2 then takes a normative turn and offers a framework for assessing family ties benefits within the criminal justice system. We assess the
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costs that they are likely to exact and explore why these benefits should generally be rejected absent a substantial state interest. We begin with an appreciation of the important role families play in securing the conditions for
human flourishing.23 We also note the ambivalent relationship the state has
with the family. On the one hand, the state depends on the family to prepare
individuals for their role as citizens; on the other hand, the state must compete with the family for the loyalty of individual members. That discussion
serves as a springboard for our critique of family ties benefits in the realm of
criminal justice.24
Chapter 2 also articulates four distinct normative concerns that may arise
when extending special accommodations based on a defendant’s family
status in the criminal justice system. We recognize that not each family ties
benefit will implicate all of these concerns. We therefore begin with only a
presumption of caution toward family ties benefits, rather than unmitigated
disapproval. First, the historical context in which the family’s relationship to
the criminal law has evolved reveals that many family ties benefits often
served (and in some cases, continue to serve) to perpetuate norms of patriarchy, gender hierarchy, or domestic domination. Our second concern is that
accommodations to families might impede the realization of criminal justice
understood as the effective and accurate prosecution of the guilty and the
exoneration of the innocent.25 Our third reservation stems from the way that
family ties preferences can disrupt norms of equality that should otherwise
prevail in an attractive regime of governance that does not discriminate on
the basis of morally arbitrary characteristics. On this view, criminal investigations and prosecutions should treat citizens’ interests with equal concern
and without fear or favor. The extension of special privileges to persons
simply because of their family situation bears an onus of justification, especially because the policy that extends such privileges will often have a negative and discriminatory effect on those without family ties—some of whom
never made actual choices to avoid family ties. Fourth, we note that some
family ties benefits can have the unsavory effect of incentivizing more criminal activity—and more successful criminal activity at that. To the extent the
law effectively signals messages to the public, some family ties benefits
encourage family members to keep their criminal enterprises in the family.
For example, if sentencing policies serve to create a class of persons who are
immune from incarceration or who receive heavy discounts in their prison
terms, then those persons will be the most sought after to serve in criminal
enterprises—or they themselves might seek out criminal activity.
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We think these four considerations, taken together, suffice to create a presumption against family ties benefits in the criminal justice system. We do
not make the constitutional claim that family status is a suspect classification
worthy of strict scrutiny when the criminal justice system discriminatorily
benefits or burdens individuals on the basis of family status. But we do
believe that, as a policy matter, the government should view the use of family
status skeptically. Thus, policymakers, whether in the legislature or elsewhere, should consider our framework for analyzing family status.26 To use
the language of equal protection analysis without making the constitutional
claim, the objective of the government should be at least “important” and
perhaps “compelling,” and the means adopted to pursue that objective should
be “narrowly tailored” to achieve that objective, looking especially to see
whether alternative measures might be as effective.
In the context of family ties benefits, a presumption does not entail eliminating all accommodations of family ties. Instead, we propose that such benefits undergo a set of searching inquiries. First, to what extent does the family
ties benefit in question contribute to one of the four normative costs often
associated with family ties benefits? Second, assuming the benefit implicates
one or more of these concerns, to what extent does the benefit vindicate a
substantial state interest that justifies the use of the benefit in the criminal
justice system? Finally, are other less troubling means—means that can be
crafted in terms that are neutral to family status—available to protect the
interest underlying the benefit? To be sure, this kind of scrutiny will not
resolve all questions: we will inevitably have disputes about the strength of
competing claims. But it will do some important work in helping us think
more clearly about the problem before us and, in close cases, will alert us to
some of the potentially hidden costs of family ties benefits.
In Chapter 3, we apply the normative framework developed in Chapter 2
to assess some of the benefits we identify in Chapter 1. We find good reason
to eliminate or curtail substantially some benefits, including evidentiary
privileges, exemptions from prosecutions, and sentencing discounts in most
cases. In other instances, where there might be good reasons to extend the
benefit, we suggest policies neutral to family status that can be used to
achieve the underlying goal of facilitating caregiving without encroaching on
the core values of the criminal justice system—and we demonstrate how
those policies could work in particular instances. We conclude this initial
inquiry into family ties benefits with some reflections relevant to future
theoretical and empirical work in this area and then turn, in the second half
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of the book, to an analysis of how the criminal justice system punishes persons on account of their familial status through family ties burdens.
Family ties burdens are the special burdens placed on defendants within
the criminal justice system on account of their familial status. Thus, to parallel the inquiry in the first half of this book, we first ask which of the burdens
in the criminal justice system imposed on individuals are attributable to
their familial status and then, second, we ask whether such burdens can be
justified, and if so, under what conditions?
Chapter 4 surveys particular examples of family ties burdens. We focus on
efforts by states to impose criminal liability on individuals for crimes if an
element of the crime is a defendant’s family status. Examples of these substantive crimes include parental responsibility laws (based on vicarious and
strict liability theories of failure to supervise); filial responsibility laws (duties
to support indigent parents); omissions liability (duties to rescue family
members); bigamy; incest; adultery; and nonpayment of child support.
Once we identify the practices properly characterized as family ties burdens, Chapter 5 presents a normative framework for analyzing whether such
burdens can be justified. We first address whether and to what degree the
normative considerations we identified earlier—patriarchal domination,
inaccuracy, inequality and discrimination, and crime creation—apply to the
context of family ties burdens. As it turns out, some of these considerations—crime creation and inaccuracy—are generally inapplicable in the
context of the burdens. In other words, unlike family ties benefits, burdens
rarely trigger concerns that they will create more crime or impede the
accurate prosecution of the guilty and the exoneration of the innocent. But
many do seem to raise concerns about gender and discrimination.
We then examine which additional factors may warrant consideration in
the particular context of family ties burdens. We develop the claim that the
use of family status to allocate criminal liability causes substantial problems
for the liberal state, both because it can burden relationships that persons
have had no autonomy in creating or rejecting and because it risks infringing
upon citizens’ liberty without sufficient justification or narrow tailoring
between the goal and remedy. As we hope to demonstrate, we think that
some of these family ties burdens run afoul of principles that should constrain the use of the criminal justice system in a liberal democracy.
We emphasize here that many of the family ties burdens we find in the
law occur in the context of relationships that have a voluntary or “opt-in”
nature, meaning that the individual who faces the burden imposed by the
criminal justice system has consensually entered into the relationship of
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caregiving that serves as a basis of liability. We find that this pattern has
some normative valence and explain its dimensions, limits, and implications
for policy design within the criminal justice system.
Specifically, we propose that family ties burdens undergo a form of scrutiny similar to that which we advocated with respect to family ties benefits.
Our general approach is that a presumption against special burdens based
on familial status is also warranted. Perhaps unsurprisingly, just as we
exhibited a tendency to be skeptical toward family ties benefits, we are
also inclined to protect individuals from burdens based on familial status.
However, because we are sensitive to the caregiving contributions that might
stand in need of special protection from the state, we believe that at least
some of the concerns we have about family ties burdens can be addressed by
redrafting these laws in a manner that avoids a reflexive resort to familial
status alone and instead focuses on voluntarily assumed obligations of
caregiving.
Of course, we recognize that an analysis of a family ties burden needs to
be viewed in its particularized context and that, in some classes of cases, the
unusual burdens currently placed on family members may be proxies for
promoting some of the distinctive purposes of the criminal justice system.
Thus, our presumption against family ties burdens does not entail eliminating all family ties burdens; instead, we propose that such policies undergo a
set of searching inquiries.
First, we propose that those seeking to impose a burden ask whether the
burden falls on persons who had voluntarily assumed some duty of caregiving. Second, we explore whether the burden impinges on some liberty that
should be recognized as deserving of protection in a liberal society. Third, we
examine whether the laws can be drafted so as to be narrowly tailored to the
governmental objectives. Fourth, we look to whether there are non-criminal
measures that could be equally effective in achieving these government
objectives, assuming these government objectives are sufficiently compelling or important to vindicate through law. Last, we examine whether the
existing family ties burdens contribute to concerns about gender inequality
and discrimination. As with family ties benefits, this scrutiny will not, to be
sure, resolve all questions; inevitably, disputes about the strength of competing claims will persist. But, it should do some important work in helping
clarify the problems under consideration.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we apply this framework to the various issues
highlighted in Chapter 4. Having identified seven distinctive family ties
burdens, we demonstrate how our normative framework helps illuminate
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analysis of these burdens. We conclude that, in each case, the kind of scrutiny we deem appropriate presents at least some challenge to the relevant
burden. In all but one of the family ties burdens, we are inclined to recommend either full or partial decriminalization. We recognize, however, that
some might disagree with those conclusions, that some might want better
empirical evidence to be pursued in order to refine our means-testing prong,
and that some may think some of our conclusions politically unfeasible.
Thus, our second-best solution in many of those instances is to require the
state to impose the burden in ways that do not simply embrace a traditional
conception of the family. Rather, the burdens should be expanded to other
relationships that involve voluntarily assumed obligations of caregiving.
Given that the promotion of voluntary relationships of care ultimately is the
justification for the burdens in the first place, we conclude that nothing else
justifies limiting the burdens to the family as such; even the purported ease
of administration associated with targeting family status in particular does
not justify laws that impose special burdens triggered by family status
exclusively. Accordingly, we endorse reorienting the criminal law of family
ties burdens around a conception of voluntarily assumed obligations of
caregiving. This will mean that at least some family ties burdens can withstand scrutiny, but only once they are redrafted so as not to align the
criminal justice system with any particularly partisan conception of what
the family is and who belongs to it.
We conclude with a coda, which reflects on what we hope the book can
offer to policy makers within the criminal justice system. The coda extends
special attention to domestic violence issues, and serves as an occasion to
think through some useful ways to tie together insights from both halves of
the book.
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part one

Privileging Family Status
A Roadmap
the goal of these first three chapters is to explore how the American

criminal justice system privileges a defendant’s family status such that in the
absence of that defendant’s family status, he would not experience the same
benefit.
At the core of this inquiry stand two basic questions: when does, and
when should, the state use the criminal justice apparatus to treat a defendant’s family status as a basis for positive differential treatment? While
answering these descriptive and normative questions separately, we characterize state policies that use a defendant’s family status to improve his situation as family ties benefits. If we say the state extends a benefit because of
family ties, we are using that term to refer to situations in which the state
extends a privilege to (or forbears requiring something from) a family member
on account of his being a family member with someone else.1
Chapter 1 does the descriptive work of spotting these benefits. Chapter 2
builds a normative approach to furnish a way to think synthetically about
these benefits. Chapter 3 analyzes the benefits explored in Chapter 1 through
the normative lens developed in Chapter 2.
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as we demonstrate in this chapter, there are a number of sites within the
criminal justice system in which a defendant’s family status is explicitly considered by judges or legislative or executive policy makers to be a basis for
relieving or mitigating the extent of one’s criminal liability or, alternatively, to
ameliorate the conditions of one’s punishment.

•

A. Evidentiary Privileges
In 1993, Kenneth Taylor, a New Orleans police officer, brutally beat his girlfriend over a period of many hours. He beat her with his fists, his police flashlight, and his service revolver, and several times put his gun in her mouth and
threatened to pull the trigger. His girlfriend had to be hospitalized for several
days to recover from her injuries. Shortly before the defendant’s trial was to
begin, the victim married the defendant and refused to testify against him,
asserting a claim of spousal privilege.1

One way in which family ties permeate the trial process is through limitations on the government’s ability to present all relevant evidence. Testimonial
privileges are widely recognized exceptions to the common law principle
that “the public has a right to every man’s evidence.”2 Because the public has
a compelling interest in the efficient and correct administration of its criminal justice system, even the few privileges recognized by the law are not to be
“expansively construed,” since they “are in derogation of the search for truth.”3
Nevertheless, the law recognizes a small class of relationships held to be
inviolable by prosecutors and other litigants, allowing witnesses with
relevant and probative evidence to claim a privilege not to divulge the
information they know even though it could be useful in the administration

3
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of justice.4 In a number of cases, as explained below, the defendant is empowered to block the testimony of a willing family member, usually a spouse.5
The testimonial privileges immediately relevant to our analysis here are
the spousal privileges and other claims of intrafamilial privilege as applied in
the criminal justice context. We focus here on the spousal or parent-child
privilege but the analysis could be applied to other intrafamilial privileges a
legislature or court might choose to create, such as between brothers and
sisters, nephews and uncles, and the like.

1. Spousal Privileges
In the common law, there are two categories of spousal privileges, and all
states and federal courts have adopted one or both of them in some form.
They are the spousal immunity and the marital-communication privileges.
The spousal immunity (sometimes called the adverse testimony privilege)
operates in criminal cases and generally protects spouses from testifying as
witnesses against their spouse-defendants during a valid marriage.6 Different
jurisdictions apply the immunity in different ways: some insist on complete
disqualification of spouses; some allow a spouse-witness to testify if he or
she wishes; some allow a spouse-defendant to prevent the spouse-witness
from giving adverse testimony; and others allow a spouse-defendant to
consent to adverse spousal testimony.7
The immunity evolved from the old English common law rule of complete
disqualification, according to which, in the first instance, a wife was not
allowed to testify against her husband.8 Eventually, the disqualification
rule became gender neutral—and was finally abolished in England in 1853.9
The United States also recognized a disqualification rule in the federal
courts until the Supreme Court refined the immunity in Funk v. United
States,10 which found spouses competent to testify at one another’s
trials—particularly for rather than adverse to one another.
The US Supreme Court once recognized very broad spousal privileges for
the federal courts in Hawkins v. United States.11 There, the Court held that the
privilege was a “rule which bars the testimony of one spouse against the
other unless both consent.”12 To justify such a powerful privilege, the Court
argued that “the law should not force or encourage testimony which might
alienate husband and wife, or further inflame existing domestic differences.”13
But in Trammel v. United States, the US Supreme Court reversed course and
concluded as a matter of federal law that “[w]hen one spouse is willing

Dan Markel-Chap01.indd 4

2/26/09 10:53:39 AM

a survey of family ties benefits

5

to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding . . . their relationship is
almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital
harmony for the privilege to preserve.”14 Accordingly, the Court modified
the spousal immunity in federal courts, allowing it to be waived by the
spouse-witness. Many states have followed a similar pattern of having once
allowed the spouse-defendant to prevent the spouse-witness from adversely
testifying but now “liberalizing” to allow spouse-witnesses to testify if they
wish—even if the testimony is only to reduce their own potential sentences.
Unlike spousal immunity, the spousal-communication privilege survives
the dissolution of a marriage and prevents a spouse from divulging any kind
of confidential communication in a civil or criminal case; it is waivable only
by the communicant.15 The privilege is limited to communications (not acts)
that transpire during a valid marriage—and it is deemed waived if the communications are disclosed to third parties. The spousal-communications
privilege, with its roots in the common law, was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Wolfle v. United States 16 and Blau v. United States,17 and remains
largely unmodified and undisturbed. According to its proponents, the privilege ensures free and frank communication between spouses; the idea is that
without such protections, marriages would lack the open conversation
appropriate for a confidential relationship.18

2. Other Intrafamilial Privileges
In contrast to the spousal privileges, federal courts tend not to provide any
similar protection for a parent-child, sibling-sibling, or other intrafamilial
relationship—regardless of whether testimonial immunity or a confidential
communication privilege is at stake. A parent-child privilege is the one most
often claimed (and discussed in the secondary literature)19—and most often
flatly rejected by courts,20 with a few exceptions.21 It is true that the US
Supreme Court, in Jaffee v. Redmond,22 opened the door for federal courts
below to recognize new privileges under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
specifically Rule 501. But federal courts have generally continued to reject
the assertion of additional intrafamilial privileges.23
The story is somewhat more complicated at the state level. A majority of
states reject intrafamilial privileges beyond spousal relations.24 However,
Idaho,25 Connecticut,26 Massachusetts,27 and Minnesota28 all have some limited form of parent-child privilege conferred by statute; additionally, New York
courts have judicially carved a limited parent-child testimonial privilege.29
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Moreover, Virginia and Texas appellate court judges have written strong dissents arguing for state recognition of a parent-child privilege.30
Each of the jurisdictions that recognize the privilege gives the parentchild privilege different contours. The Idaho law seems to give the privilege to
parents so they do not have to testify against their children, but it does not
give symmetrical treatment to children who do not want to testify against
their parents.31 Connecticut limits its grant of the privilege to “juvenile
proceeding[s] in Superior Court.”32 Massachusetts limits its parent-child privilege to “unemancipated, minor child[ren], living with a parent,” ruling out
application of the privilege to older children.33 Like Idaho’s Law, Massachusetts’
law is asymmetric, but in just the opposite way: in Massachusetts, parents
can be forced to testify against their children, just not the other way around.34
Minnesota, although supporting a symmetrical privilege, limits its grant of
privilege to cases involving “minor” children, subject to waiver by parent or
child.35 In short, there is little uniformity in the states about whether the
privilege exists—and if it does, exactly how and when it applies. Most states
that recognize the privilege, however, recognize an exception that applies if
there is a dispute between a parent and a child, a possibility of parental abuse
or neglect, or a crime of violence within the household.

•

B. Exemptions for Family Members Harboring
Fugitives
It’s a choice that no parent would want to make. Kelley Thomas’ 23-year-old
son, Kelly Carter, escaped from a Georgia jail in April and shortly thereafter
allegedly showed up at his dad’s doorstep on E. Lorado Avenue. Now, Thomas
has been charged with harboring a felon. What’s a parent to do? It’s a difficult
question, even to Genesee County Prosecutor David Leyton. “The fact that
he’s the father was discussed by my staff, and we will take that into consideration as the case progresses,” Leyton said. “It’s hard to turn your back on
your own flesh and blood.” 36

The story of David Kaczynski, with which we began this book, is just one
of the better known examples of family members grappling with the dilemma
of whether to turn a family member over to the authorities.37 In California, a
police sergeant was suspended for helping his son evade arrest after committing a series of bank robberies.38 In Louisiana, a sheriff ’s deputy helped his
son flee the jurisdiction, after alerting him that warrants had been issued
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for his arrest on child pornography charges.39 In Minnesota, a mother arrived
home just after her son had shot and killed an acquaintance in her kitchen.
Instead of calling the police, the mother helped dump the body in an alley
and clean up the bloody crime scene.40 These conflicts of loyalty trigger
significant media and public interest in the decisions made by the family
members;41 those who cooperate with law enforcement are often called
“snitches” and are regarded as people who violate “the taboo against turning
on one’s family.”42
Some of the most difficult decisions for law enforcement arise in relation
to the charging decision associated with these kinds of cases. If a family
member has cooperated with the primary defendant in some way, should
that family member be prosecuted? Prosecutors have grappled with that
question in several recent high-profile corporate crime cases, such as those
involving the Enron, Adelphia, and ImClone corporations.43 The prosecution
decision is typically an easy one if the family member is involved in the crime
as a principal in the classic sense of the term.44 The difficult decisions for
prosecutors lie at the margins of criminal involvement, when a family
member has acted as an accessory, particularly as an accessory after the
fact.45 Typical charging options in this scenario would be obstruction of
justice or hindering prosecution, harboring a fugitive, or accessory after
the fact for states that retain that criminal offense.
Remarkably, in fourteen states, the prosecution of family members for
harboring fugitives is not an option, regardless of the nature of the fugitive’s
crime.46 These states typically exempt spouses, parents, grandparents, children, grandchildren, and siblings from prosecution for providing assistance to
an offender after the commission of a crime “with the intent that the offender
avoids or escapes detection, arrest, trial, or punishment.”47 An additional four
states reduce liability for an immediate family member but do not exempt
them from prosecution entirely.48
Florida’s statutory exemption for family members provides an interesting
example. It forbids prosecution of spouses, parents, grandparents, children,
or grandchildren for helping an “offender avoid or escape detection, arrest,
trial, or punishment,” with one important exception.49 The exemption does
not apply if the primary offender is alleged to have committed child abuse or
murder of a child under the age of eighteen, “unless the court finds that the
person [claiming the exemption] is a victim of domestic violence.”50
These statutes are significantly broader than the exemption that existed at
common law, which forbade only the prosecution of a wife as an accessory but
not the prosecution of a husband for aiding his felon wife or the prosecution
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of other family members.51 Despite the popularity of the broader exemptions
among many states, the Model Penal Code drafters rejected the inclusion of
a family member exemption in its accessory provision, “in part on the ground
that this is a factor that can be taken into account at sentencing.”52 The drafters also noted that “exemption rules create trial difficulties if the government
bears the burden of proving that none of the specified relations exists.”53
No federal law currently provides a family member with an exemption
from prosecution.54 A number of federal courts, however, have at least
expressed sympathy with the pleas of family members charged with aiding
an accused relative. For example, in United States v. Oley,55 the court upheld
the right of the government to charge a wife with harboring her fugitive
husband. Nonetheless, the court remarked that “[i]t would undoubtedly
be difficult to obtain a conviction charging wives with harboring their
husbands” and that “it might be regarded as inhuman and unnatural on the
part of a wife to surrender her husband to the authorities and contrary to the
instincts of human beings to do so.”56
A number of states have grappled with the constitutionality of the family
exemption. For example, in upholding Florida’s statute against an equal protection challenge, a Florida appeals court emphasized “society’s interest in
safeguarding the family unit from unnecessary fractional pressures” and
applauded the legislature’s decision to “confer[] immunity so that these individuals need never choose between love of family and obedience to the law.”57
The New Mexico Supreme Court, similarly, upheld its state statute against a
constitutional challenge but did not engage in any sustained analysis and
instead simply stated that the statute’s classifications were reasonable and
thus consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.58
More recently, United States court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded, as a matter of federal law, that it was indeed constitutional to prosecute a spouse for hiding her husband and his assets.59 In United States v. Hill,60
Patricia Hill claimed that her prosecution on charges of harboring a fugitive
and accessory after the fact for helping her husband evade child support
obligations to his first wife was unconstitutional because the government
sought to “criminalize conduct in which she is entitled to engage under the
First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution,” specifically “her rights of
association, marriage, privacy, and due process.”61 Although the court noted
that “basing a harboring or accessory conviction on normal and expected
spousal conduct might well violate Griswold,” it concluded that Hill’s conduct in this case crossed the line past “normal spousal conduct” and into the
realm of the intentional frustration of law enforcement.62
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C. Violence Within the Family

Another important way in which the criminal justice system uses family ties
to mitigate or eliminate criminal responsibility is when a defendant has
selected a family member as his victim. Some of the most striking examples
of the criminal justice system’s preferential treatment of family relationships
occur in relation to crimes committed against spouses and children by a
family member. A general hesitance to intervene in family life, even to protect a family’s most vulnerable members, is a deeply ingrained historical
tradition in this country.63
In recent years, we have, of course, seen some progress in criminal justice
policy,64 such as the repeal of marital rape exemptions in many states,65
the increased law enforcement attention and funding devoted to spousal
battering,66 and the widespread adoption of mandatory child abuse
reporting statutes.67 But the general tradition of noninterference in crime
involving intrafamilial violence is hardly a historical relic.

1. Parental Discipline Defenses
In 1990, Artemio DeLeon became angry because his fourteen yearold daughter repeatedly invited friends over to her house without his
permission. On May 24, when he learned his daughter had once again
invited friends over, DeLeon took a belt and hit her on her legs with it for
approximately ninety minutes, causing bruises that lasted for a week.
He then took scissors and chopped off his daughter’s waist-length hair. The
Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed his conviction for abuse of a family
member, concluding that his action did not rise to the level of inflicting
extreme pain, mental distress, or gross degradation.68
Family ties recognition is quite pronounced in the context of crimes
committed against children. A notable example of this kind of family ties
benefit is the acceptance of the “parental discipline defense” in child abuse
prosecutions. Although the contours of the defense vary somewhat among
states, in general, the defense exempts parents from prosecutions for assault
if the corporal punishment was used to “benefit” the child and if the nature
of the punishment used was objectively reasonable.69 This defense is available
in both fatal and nonfatal cases of child abuse.70 A recent comprehensive examination of child corporal punishment in the United States concluded that
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every state still uses some variant of “a justification-based defense that operates to defend parents from liability for even severe physical violence and
injury to minors,” as long as the parent was “engag[ed] in ‘discipline’” at the
time of the conduct in question.71 The use of this special defense for parents
persists even though twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia ban
spanking in public schools and thirty-nine states ban spanking in day care
centers.72 Around the world, at least twenty four countries have banned or
restricted spanking in the home.73 The Model Penal Code also recognizes a
variant of this defense, stating that “the use of force against another is justifiable if: (1) the actor is the parent . . . and (a) the force is used for the purpose
of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, including the prevention or punishment of his misconduct.”74

2. Manslaughter as Mitigation
Kenneth Peacock, was a long-distance trucker who “came home at the wrong
time . . . [Upon return from work and being] caught in an ice storm last
February while traveling from Pennsylvania to Florida, [he] got no answer
when he called his wife to say he was coming home. When he arrived around
midnight, his wife was in bed, naked, with another man. Mr. Peacock chased
the other man away at gunpoint, and at about 4 A.M., after drinking and
arguing, shot his wife in the head with a hunting rifle. He pleaded guilty to
voluntary manslaughter . . . Judge Robert E. Cahill sentenced Mr. Peacock to
18 months in prison, saying that he wished he did not have to send him
to prison at all, but knew he must ‘to make the system honest.’ ‘I seriously
wonder how many men married five, four years would have the strength to
walk away without inflicting some corporal punishment,’ said Judge Cahill,
referring to the circumstances of the case.” 75
In states following the common law rule, a jury can return a verdict of
manslaughter instead of murder if it finds that the defendant killed under
provocation that would inflame a reasonable person to act in the heat of
passion.76 The “archetypal” common law example of “adequate provocation”
turns out to be a family ties benefit: namely, if a defendant finds his or her
spouse engaged in infidelity.77 At the time of Peacock’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter, Maryland followed the common law rule that “discovering one’s spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another” constitutes
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adequate provocation for a manslaughter charge.78 This is a family ties
benefit because the mitigation to manslaughter under common law in this
context was generally available only to persons who were lawfully married
in such circumstances.79 Although the Maryland legislature later amended
its manslaughter statute to preclude a spouse’s adultery as a basis for
mitigation,80 the modern trend has been to expand what counts as adequate
provocation.81 So, to the extent jurisdictions have broadened the availability
of the partial defense by including non-married persons,82 then, strictly
speaking, these newer laws are not family ties benefits. Indeed, under the
modern version of the provocation doctrine, defendants often can reduce
their liability for an intentional killing from murder to manslaughter if
“the defendant claims passion because the victim left, moved the furniture
out, planned a divorce, or sought a protective order.”83 Clearly, a number of
those situations do not require marriage as a predicate. Therefore, whether the
provocation doctrine can be strictly construed as a family ties benefit turns
on whether the state in question retains traditional views of provocation or
follows a more modern approach like that of the Model Penal Code.

3. Sexual Misconduct
Legislatures have also tended to privilege familial status in the context of sex
offenders who victimize family members. For example, in the last dozen
years or so, every state has enacted some form of scheme in which convicted
sex offenders must register with the state.84 Under some statutes, family
members may receive preferential treatment because, for example,
“[i]ndividuals convicted of incest are excluded from the state’s online sex
offender database.”85 Other defendants benefit if they commit crimes against
spouses: some states continue to extend preferential statutory treatment to
a sexual offender who victimizes a spouse.86 A recent article, for example,
explains these patterns in detail, concluding that “the law in more than half
the states today makes it harder to convict men of sexual offenses committed against their wives,” as compared to convictions for sexual offenses
against an acquaintance or a stranger.87 These benefits to defendants fall into
three categories: “those that exempt spouses from sexual offenses
other than forcible rape, those that maintain separate spousal sexual offense
statutes, and those that impose extra requirements for the prosecution of
marital rape.”88
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D. Pretrial Release
“A man released from jail to care for his seriously ill mother while awaiting
sentencing for fondling a 5-year-old girl has been arrested again in connection
with an attack on another child. Donald Ray Hager, 24, was arrested [. . .] after
a 5-year-old boy told a school counselor about the incident that allegedly
occurred on either Hager’s Jan. 14 sentencing day—when he got 3 1/2 years—or
the day before. . . . According to police, Hager spent part of his free time with a
female friend in Dade City; the boy was the woman’s son. . . . [Apparently,] Hager
went into a bedroom, fondled the boy and forced him to have oral sex.” 89

Family status sometimes serves to benefit defendants in the context of pretrial release. Before a suspect is tried for his crime, the state must first decide
whether to detain or release him.90 If it releases him, the state must determine
which conditions it will impose to ensure that the defendant appears at trial.
If it detains the alleged offender, the state must determine what kind of access
to the outside world it will allow so that the defendant can prepare his case.
Determinations of pretrial release take different forms in different jurisdictions, but they usually share at least one feature in common: decision-makers
are explicitly directed to look at a suspect’s family ties and responsibilities
when considering whether to release the suspect, and under what conditions.
For instance, the 1966 Bail Reform Act (BRA) gave federal judges guidance
regarding decisions about pretrial release, expressly articulating that courts
should examine the accused’s family ties.91 Many states followed suit.92
Additionally, some states delineate pretrial release conditions that are tied to
family status. For example, in Illinois, the statute governing bail bonds informs
judges that they should consider the imposition of conditions that require
defendants to support his or her dependents.93 If the victim of the crime is a
member of the household, then, depending on the precise circumstances, the
court may impose conditions that require the defendant to vacate the home,
refrain from contact,94 or make payments of temporary support.95 As we explain
later, the state may have its own reasons for looking at a defendant’s family
ties in the pretrial context.

•

E. Sentencing
In the case of United States v. Johnson, two defendants were convicted of
participating in the same crime and were found to have warranted the
same offense level.96 Nevertheless, Johnson, the defendant with caretaking
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responsibility of four children, received a significant downward departure
from the Guidelines based on family responsibilities and was sentenced to
six months’ home detention and three years of supervised release; meanwhile
the other defendant, Purvis, who was without children and who was also
found to have played a more minor role in the scheme, received twenty-seven
months in prison and two years of additional supervised release.97
According to a 1999 study, over half of all state and federal prisoners have
children; indeed, more than a million minor children have at least one parent
incarcerated.98 Accordingly, consideration of a defendant’s family status
often arises in the sentencing context. This section explores ways in which
family ties influence judicial consideration about the appropriate sentence
for a particular offender.

1. Federal Practice Pre-Booker
Prior to the US Supreme Court’s 2005 ruling in Booker v. United States, which
rendered the federal sentencing guidelines “effectively advisory,”99 the familial
ties or responsibilities of an offender were, generally speaking, accorded little
significance in the federal sentencing regime.100 Indeed, the United States
Sentencing Commission (USSC) regarded “family ties and responsibilities”
as a “discouraged” factor, and thus downward departures from the guidelines
on such a basis were permissible only if the court found that the negative
effects on the defendant’s family were “present to an exceptional degree or in
some other way makes the case different from the ordinary case where the
factor is present.”101 That said, federal courts did make exceptions in a number
of cases and even across a wide range of crimes.102
Courts extending such departures usually did so after determining that
the offender provided an irreplaceable (or at least critical) role as caregiver to
family dependents.103 Moreover, the exceptions were typically supposed to be
made only if the downward departure contemplated by the judge would
suffice to “cure” the harm that would otherwise be visited upon the family
member.104 Thus, the more severe the criminal offense level of a particular
offender, the less likely it would be that a departure based on family responsibilities would be granted—because, as the USSC stated in its commentary
on the relevant provision,105 the departure should be capable of resolving the
problem of the irreplaceable caregiver.106 That said, the fact that a defendant
was an “irreplaceable caregiver” was not always a necessary or a sufficient
explanation for federal court practice. Some courts authorized departures
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if a defendant was not the sole caretaker because the court recognized the
extraordinary nature of the family situation and wanted to minimize disruption to the children’s lives.107 Other courts refused to extend departures even
if the defendant was an irreplaceable caregiver.108
These family ties departures had the capacity to cause wide disparities
between otherwise similarly situated offenders, as shown by the description
of the Johnson case above. The Johnson case dramatizes the disparity because
the offenders were codefendants in the same case—but the disparity that
resulted there is at least as likely to arise across cases as within them.
Moreover, some judges recognized that departures motivated by a desire to
minimize the harms inflicted on innocent third-party family members conferred a windfall benefit on the defendant.109 Those courts typically justified
their decisions by reference to a cost-benefit analysis under which the costs
to the innocent children were weighed against the public benefit of incarcerating the defendant; the reasoning under such analyses, however, was usually conclusory.110
Finally, although departures on the basis of family responsibilities in the
federal context had been discouraged pre-Booker, district court judges
retained discretion to sentence within the range prescribed by the federal
Sentencing Guidelines, and in that area of discretion, judges may have considered the influence of the factor of family ties and responsibilities, although
it is difficult to determine just how much influence that factor had.111

2. Federal Practice in the Post-Booker Landscape
With the Guidelines now advisory in a post-Booker world, federal courts
have a wider berth to impose sentences outside of the ranges established by
the USSC.112 As a result, courts are awarding more downward departures
than were awarded under the old regime.113 In the post-Booker world, as the
Ninth Circuit observed, “[c]onsideration of family responsibilities” may now
be viewed as part of a defendant’s “history and characteristics,”114 and judges
can assess those traits as reasons to mitigate the length of sentences.115
Whereas various federal district court judges felt, prior to Booker, that the
Guidelines were too harsh because they failed to give significant weight to
family ties and responsibilities,116 these judges can now invoke family ties
and responsibilities as a basis for departure from the Guidelines with greater
frequency and flexibility.117 Indeed, given the US Supreme Court’s recent
decisions in Gall v. United States 118 and Kimbrough v. United States,119 which
affirmed the wide discretion available to district court judges, we should not
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be surprised to see more trial judges invoke those authorities as a basis for
disagreeing with the USSC’s policy decision that family ties and responsibilities should be generally discouraged as a basis for downward departures.

3. State Practices
The flexibility that now exists in the federal sentencing system regarding
consideration of family ties and responsibilities also prevails in many states,
especially those that endow sentencing judges with wide discretion to determine the length of a sentence. Approximately thirty-two of the nation’s
jurisdictions have retained an indeterminate sentencing scheme, with the
remainder having some form of sentencing guidelines in place.120 These eighteen sentencing schemes may have voluntary guidelines, presumptive guidelines, or fixed guidelines, depending on the jurisdiction, as well as variations
on these themes. By contrast, the other states have traditional indeterminate
sentencing schemes that extend virtually unfettered discretion to sentencing
judges (or, in some cases, sentencing juries) to sentence within the statutory
limits set by the legislature. In some jurisdictions, determinations about
release on parole are also made under wide discretion. Generally speaking,
the decision makers in those indeterminate sentencing states may consider
the nature and extent of family ties or responsibilities (along with a wide
range of other reasons for leniency) in setting a sentence or releasing an
offender.121 And, for the most part, they are not required to explain that a
particular sentence was enhanced or reduced on account of family ties or
responsibilities. Iowa’s sentencing scheme, for example, simply makes “clear
that sentencing is a matter of [a] trial court’s broad discretion,” and trial
courts will be reversed there only for “abuse of that discretion,”122 though
what counts as an abuse of discretion is substantially unpredictable to
the outside observer.
The multiplicity of sentencing structures in the states is mirrored by the
various approaches states take in setting sentences in relation to the family
ties or responsibilities of an offender. In some jurisdictions, the presence or
absence of family ties and responsibilities will do little to affect one’s sentence.123 For instance, in Oklahoma’s noncapital sentencing proceedings that
occur before a jury, a defendant may not introduce evidence solely designed
to mitigate the sentence, such as information about family ties and responsibilities.124 Florida’s sentencing scheme is somewhat similar in that it does not
articulate any express exception for defendants with family ties and responsibilities; the relevant statute states that sentencing “should be neutral with
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respect to race, gender, and social and economic status,”125 but it is unclear
whether social status includes familial ties and responsibilities.
By contrast, in Massachusetts, the state legislature authorized the courts
to consider an offender’s family ties and responsibilities in setting an offender’s sentence.126 Consideration of family ties and responsibilities has also been
expressly permitted in Louisiana,127 Pennsylvania,128 Utah,129 Wisconsin,130
Tennessee,131 Arizona,132 and North Carolina.133 Indeed, in Louisiana, the legislature has said that a court, when deciding to suspend a sentence, should
consider whether “[t]he imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his dependents.”134 Perhaps the most unusual
feature of some courts’ family ties sentencing jurisprudence is that some
judges will consider the absence of family ties to an area as a reason to not
extend any leniency in a sentence.135

•

F. Prison Policies

Our punitive practices regularly require governments to make choices about
how to address family ties and responsibilities. For example, should offenders with families be entitled to special visitation rights? Should offenders get
special dispensations (like furloughs) to see family members outside of
prison? Should offenders with families have priority in terms of prison placement decisions? While there is still empirical work to be done regarding how
these issues are resolved among the fifty states, we examine below how these
questions are resolved in the context of the federal criminal justice system.
Our descriptive discussion focuses primarily on the facial family ties benefits,
but we also briefly explore a few of the “informal” family ties benefits.

1. Federal Prison Visitation Policies
The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ policy statement announces that “visits [by
family] are an important factor in maintaining the morale of the individual
offender and motivating [him] toward positive goals.”136 Although some
advocates have gone so far as to argue that family visitation in prison is a
“fundamental” right protected by the United States Constitution,137 courts
have not, generally, found such a “right” to exist,138 though some courts have
shown solicitude for family visitation if privileges are withheld unreasonably.139
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In the final analysis, however, courts rarely intrude on the wide discretion
afforded prison administrators in devising visitation policies.140
That said, most prisons make some provision for family visitation, though
such policies routinely give prisoners access to visitors who are not members
of the offender’s family as well.141 Accordingly, although families do not necessarily get privileged status in the realm of visitation policies (because
inmates can also be visited by friends and business associates),142 it is likely
that family visitation would be greeted with greater deference than nonfamily visitors at the prison administration level, given the Federal Bureau of
Prisons’ general embrace of family ties as especially important for rehabilitative purposes.143 Some jurisdictions may view furnishing families with special opportunities for visitation as important to ensure family reunification
after incarceration and to avoid the termination of parental rights.144 Indeed,
some states require reunification services for incarcerated parents.145

2. Federal Prison Furlough Policies
An offender’s family ties are directly implicated in prison furlough policy.
Furloughs are authorized unaccompanied absences from a corrections facility
during a term of incarceration and are privileges (not rights); they are explicitly
sanctioned by federal law at 18 USC §§ 3622 and 4082 and are available to eligible inmates based on the severity of the crime and sentence, the inmate’s
release date, and other factors. According to the federal guidelines, there are
many reasons that might justify furloughs, including: needing to appear in
court, participation in job training, participation in “educational, social, civic,
religious, and recreational activities which will facilitate release transition,”146
and participation in the “development of release plans.”147 Moreover, furloughs
are often used to facilitate the provision of healthcare, mental health, or dental
services not available on site at a correctional institution.
Nevertheless, according to the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Program
Statement about furloughs, “[d]ay furloughs are generally used to strengthen
family ties.”148 And the policies that govern furloughs make clear that furloughs may be given so that an inmate may be “present during a crisis in
the immediate family”149 and may request a furlough “[t]o reestablish
family . . . ties.”150 Families get special consideration in the distribution of
furloughs—and, all else being equal, those eligible inmates with families
will likely get more furloughs than those without.
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3. Federal Prison Placement Policies
Notwithstanding the general preference of Congress and the USSC to
discourage sentencing departures based on family ties and responsibilities,
there are various ways in which the federal criminal justice system is
sensitive to family ties and responsibilities when dealing with “the nature,
extent, place of service, or other incidents of an appropriate sentence.”151
In this respect, a judge could, in consideration of a family’s location,
recommend that the Federal Bureau of Prisons place an offender closer to
his family.152 Indeed, as Judge Posner wrote in Froehlich v. Wisconsin
Department of Corrections,153 concerning the transfer of a female state
prisoner whose children sued to keep her in Wisconsin, although such an
accommodation is not constitutionally imposed on prison officials, “it may
be a moral duty.”154
Additionally, a series of programs to accommodate families in placement
decisions have emerged, though often in very short supply.155 For example,
the Federal Bureau of Prisons instituted a program called Mothers
and Infants Nurturing Together (MINT). Under this program, “[e]ligible
women who have been sentenced to incarceration reside in a community
correction setting with their infants for up to 18 months after delivery.”156
Myrna Raeder elaborates upon other similar programs put in place at
the state level:
California funded its Pregnant and Parenting Women’s Alternative
Sentencing Program Act and has opened two long-term community
correctional facilities pursuant to California Penal Code 1174, to which
women are sentenced directly, without serving time in prison, where
they can reside with their minor children under six years of age for up to
three years. The focus is not only on treatment of the mother, but emphasizes the development of the mother-child bond. In addition, for the last
20 years, California also has operated a Community Prison Mother
Program, where inmates with less than six years remaining on their sentences may reside with their children in a residential facility where they
receive comprehensive programming to enable them to better reintegrate
into their communities. Small programs exist in a number of states, but
currently there is no groundswell to make such programs the norm
rather than the exception.157

Dan Markel-Chap01.indd 18

2/26/09 10:53:42 AM

a survey of family ties benefits

19

4. Other Intersections of Family Status and Prison
Practices
There are still other punitive policies and practices involving family status.
For example, in the event of an inmate’s death, the federal prison system
notifies family members and allows federal chaplains to be involved with the
inmate’s family during the initial periods of grief.158 The Bureau has also
developed parenting programs with the objectives of promoting “family
values,” counteracting “negative family consequences resulting from . . .
incarceration,” and intending for the “institutional social environment [to]
be improved through opportunities for inmates to maintain positive and
sustaining contacts with their families.”159 These programs spend substantial
governmental resources on developing family ties between offenders and
their families.160
∗∗∗∗∗
As this Chapter has made clear, the criminal justice system in this country—at both the federal and state levels—provides a number of important
family ties benefits.161 Members of state-recognized families fare better
throughout the system, which is designed quite self-consciously to make sure
defendants with families will get benefits that others will not. In the next
Chapter, we try to build a normative framework to help analyze these family
ties benefits.
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A Normative Framework for Family Ties Benefits

•

A. Some Prefatory Remarks

Our survey in chapter 1 shows how there are various areas in which the
criminal justice system explicitly distributes benefits to defendants based on
their family status, benefits they would not enjoy in the absence of those
family ties and responsibilities. Some important issues warrant discussion as
a result of this phenomenon.
First, in making any benefits available solely on the basis of a defendant’s
family status, the state necessarily is making express normative judgments
regarding who counts as family and who does not.1 Thus, large numbers of
persons who might justifiably, in our view, see themselves as entitled to
family ties benefits are excluded. Perhaps the most obvious example is families of same-sex couples, who are routinely denied treatment as equals in
the provision of family ties benefits, such as the evidentiary privileges.2 The
same sense of exclusion applies to those individuals in polyamorous unions.
If the state makes choices regarding families, it risks marginalizing persons
who consider themselves family members but are not recognized as such by
the state. In this sense, the use of the family to distribute benefits may be
underinclusive.3
Second, even assuming one could agree on which people count as a
family, reliance on that category may be overinclusive. One might have a terrible relationship with one’s spouse and be eager to testify against him, but the
spouse still might reap the benefits of an intrafamilial testimonial privilege.4
To be sure, the obvious advantage of using state-recognized family lines is
ease of administration. But, as we describe later on, one possible solution to
the administrability challenge would be for each eligible person to designate
a discrete number of persons for privileges through a registry.5 As a general
matter, because of the way in which these benefits might stand in the way of
criminal justice, we are more eager to see them abolished than expanded to
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include more relationships. Yet if the government is committed to handing
out benefits, we do not think it should do so in a way that discriminates
against those in family units unrecognized by the state.
Third, the government does not always demonstrate a consistent pattern
when choosing who counts as family for each of these benefits. In the federal
sentencing context, for example, if the courts look to determine whether the
defendant is an irreplaceable caregiver, the concept of family for determining
extraordinary family ties and responsibilities appears rather broad.6 Thus, if
a grandparent or an aunt can take care of the children, then the single-parent
defendant is unlikely to get a substantial departure, if at all.7 By contrast, in
other areas in which the government distributes family ties benefits, the
range of relevant family members may be very narrow—for example, evidentiary privileges that do not recognize same-sex partners or much family
beyond the opposite-sex spouse.8 What this means is that family status in
the criminal justice system is inconsistently defined.
Fourth, we recognize that a number of practices that confer benefits on
defendants on account of their family status may also serve other purposes
that in fact directly benefit the state. For example, pretrial release determinations that examine the presence of a defendant’s family ties in the area may
be viewed as a benefit both for the family and for the defendant lucky enough
to possess meaningful family ties. Nonetheless, familial considerations may
also serve as an imperfect proxy for assessing a defendant’s flight risk, an
issue in which the state has a clear and appropriate interest. Moreover, if a
parent or caregiver is being detained, dependents may find themselves needing the state to perform care functions that would be more cheaply and more
carefully executed by defendants while they await trial. Similarly, the various
accommodations of the family in the context of prison administration may
reflect (imperfect or indirect) choices of decision makers in the criminal justice system to advance goals such as strengthening precarious families or,
alternatively, reducing recidivism or facilitating offender rehabilitation and
reintegration into society.
Although we therefore acknowledge the difficulty of identifying what
counts as a genuine benefit to the family (either as an institution or in particular cases), we think it remains necessary to examine more specifically
those laws that benefit defendants directly on the basis of their family status.
Thus, our analysis in this book focuses on those sites and not the ones in
which the criminal justice system may be said to be accommodating or
promoting family interests as such. Consequently, we train our attention on
those sites discussed in Chapter 1 in which the criminal justice system
actively chooses policies that distinctively benefit those offenders with
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families. This chapter shifts from the descriptive to the normative, as we
consider what factors should help determine whether a particular accommodation of family interests by the criminal justice system is an appropriate
policy choice.

•

B. The Family and the Modern State: An
Ambivalent Relationship

The modern defense of using the state, its institutions, its laws, and its
coercive force to support the family often rings in communitarian tones.
The argument usually proceeds by drawing upon the “historical,”9 “constitutive,”10 or “situated”11 selves that constitute a polity.12 Such selves are composed of loyalties, role-responsibilities, and personal ties that are, in some
very basic sense, logically and morally prior to the individual. The self, it is
sometimes argued, is linked so inextricably to these group and relational
affiliations that any moral system embodied by a state and its laws must
appreciate, respect, and facilitate the self ’s authentic expression of that
which creates its very identity. States must either find a way to acknowledge
special associative duties flowing to family members that may conflict with
and trump more general duties to people as such,13 or risk irrelevance and
illegitimacy.
Accordingly, it can be argued that states ought not to ignore the individual
self ’s derivation from and debt to the family.14 If the family helps define the
individual, a state’s administration of justice must serve its citizens by appreciating the very sources of their individuality. Privileging and giving priority to
family status may be one way to have the state connect with the individuals
to whom it must dispense justice. Moreover, without extending benefits and
immunities that might assist the family, the state risks losing compliance
from its citizens; perhaps some family ties benefits are necessary to establish
and maintain the state’s legitimacy. Indeed, even if the benefits seem inappropriate in the context of the criminal justice system, they might be viewed
as a net benefit for inducing general compliance with a legal regime.15
There is yet another available justification for the state’s support of the
family—one that is potentially more practical and less philosophical. One
could argue that because the state either cannot or will not live in accordance with what Plato’s Republic idealizes for the Guardian class—no private
families with all children being held in common16—the state needs to keep
families together and solvent. The state can draw from the rich panoply of
resources naturally furnished and expended by the family in creating good
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citizens. By giving families special support through family ties benefits, the
state may be able to economize on expenditures that it would otherwise
be forced to bear in educating its citizenry and preparing its members to
contribute to the stability and flourishing of the regime. This is a crude way
of thinking about the matter, to be sure. But it is one that must have a grain
of truth: the state simply cannot afford or perform on its own all the services
families routinely provide; consequently, such work is, in effect, subcontracted to the family—which is paid accordingly. Families will not be able to
provide care services completely for free—and can rightfully demand that
the state (which is parasitically living off of its successes) subsidize the hard
work of helping children “take their place as responsible, self-governing
members of society.”17 The state helps itself when it subcontracts cheaply the
“formative project of fostering the capacities for democratic and personal
self-government”18—and leaves it in generally reliable hands.
There is a third argument available to those wishing that the state continue
to furnish families with special treatment. Some argue for an ethic of care in
political and moral life more generally—and think the state can facilitate this
ethic by supporting families in the right way.19 As Deborah Stone puts it,
Caring for each other is the most basic form of civic participation. We
learn to care in families, and we enlarge our communities of concern as
we mature. Caring is the essential democratic act, the prerequisite to
voting, joining associations, attending meetings, holding office and all
the other ways we sustain democracy. Care, the noun, requires families
and workers who care, the verb. Caring, the activity, breeds caring, the
attitude, and caring, the attitude, seeds caring, the politics.20
Accordingly, making sure the state cares for the family ensures that
citizens can care for one another, the state, and politics.21 A less “political”
version of this notion states that families are instrumentally required for individuals to flourish, and states should help secure the conditions for human
flourishing by facilitating the emergence and maintenance of family life.
These arguments have much to recommend them. Together, they seem
persuasive and suggest that the law’s recognition of family ties might be more
than just irrational sentimentalism or a knee-jerk instantiation of “family
values.”22 These arguments go beyond the oft-heard notion that strong families lead to a strong nation and the contention that families help furnish
“civic virtue” and “social capital.”23 Although many have tried to connect
familial self-government with democratic self-government,24 the scholars
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we draw upon here put meat on the bones of the mottos and creeds routinely
invoked. Obviously, we have not exhausted the field or comprehensively
explained how these ideas cash out in particular legal contexts; instead, we
have aimed only to summarize very briefly the arguments of those who grapple with the role of the family in the state’s endeavor to secure the political
conditions for human flourishing.
Ultimately, we find little to quarrel with when these arguments are considered at the most general level. All things being equal, we do not think
states can succeed without being attentive to the way in which selves are
constructed through families—and we agree that if states are going to feed
on the capacity-generating benefits families confer, it is not inappropriate for
families to demand some subsidization in return. Families may be labors of
love, but they are full of real undercompensated labor all the same.
Nevertheless, we do not think that the arguments to support family
benefits at a general level of political theory can succeed in every area of
the law. For the reasons we sketch in the remainder of this Chapter, we think
that the criminal justice system needs to be especially leery about distributing benefits to defendants based on the state-drawn lines of who counts as
family.25 Put briefly, the consequences of wrongly or unfairly distributing
criminal penalties or causing more crime trump the reason for granting
family status special force in this legal venue.
We advance four normative cost considerations; together, we think they
justify a presumption—albeit a rebuttable one—against family ties benefits
in the criminal justice system. The structure of the presumption we have in
mind is borrowed from philosopher Sam Scheffler: “To say that these [arguments] are seen as [creating a] presumption is not to say that they can never,
in the end, be outweighed by other considerations. It is merely to say that, in
the first instance, they present themselves as considerations upon which one
must” render judgment.26 The normative costs we identify can be summarized briefly. Benefits based on a defendant’s family ties or status historically
facilitate gender hierarchy; undermine the pursuit of accuracy in the effective prosecution of the guilty and the exoneration of the innocent (thus, possibly leading to unwarranted harshness or leniency in the administration of
justice); disrupt our egalitarian political commitments to treat similarly situated persons with equal concern and discriminate against those without
families recognized by the state; and can tend to incentivize more crime and
more successful crime. For these reasons, we are generally skeptical of using
the criminal justice system to distribute family ties benefits absent a substantial reason and no feasible alternative means.
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C. Some Normative Costs of Family Ties Benefits
1. Patriarchy and Power: Historical Perspectives

The historical context in which family ties benefits evolved reveals that many
family ties benefits often served (and, in some cases, continue to serve) to
perpetuate patriarchy, gender hierarchy, or domestic violence.27 A few examples serve to make the point. In the context of evidentiary privileges, their
patriarchal origins are clear: women could not testify against their husbands
because they lost their claim to any separate legal existence upon entering
into marriage.28 Defendants have long enjoyed a sanctuary from the reach
of the criminal law in the context of crimes against children, specifically
through the parental discipline defense. The cultural assumption here has
been that the “natural bonds of affection” between parent and child will protect children, an assumption sometimes validated by members of the US
Supreme Court.29 But this assumption has entailed a perverse result, namely,
a culture of relative indifference toward violence in the family, particularly
against children.30 To be sure, many family ties benefits have “liberalized”
over the years and now operate to prevent family members from using their
special immunities to subvert prosecution for domestic violence and child
abuse. Still, there can be no question that some of the policies canvassed
in Chapter 1 have ignoble origins and serve to facilitate domination in the
private sphere. We think that places the burden of justification on those
seeking such benefits.
As recounted in Wayne Logan’s illuminating article, “Criminal Law
Sanctuaries,” the family has long been understood as an untouchable site for
criminal justice.31 Under Roman law, the doctrine of patria potestas empowered fathers and husbands to dominate family life without fear of the state’s
interference; thus, adulterous wives could be killed without public retribution, and wives could be beaten with impunity.32 In colonial America, Puritan
courts squarely “placed family preservation ahead of physical protection of
victims,”33 allowing men to use force against wives and children for “legitimate” reasons, a limit rarely tested out of reluctance to disturb the privacy of
family life.34 Law enforcement interest in family violence then waxed and
waned over the generations, with periods of activism butting up against a
deep-rooted tradition of noninterference in the affairs of a family.35
Over time, wife beating was officially banned,36 but like so much else,
the law on the books eclipsed life on the streets, as the act of wife beating was
often viewed as a nonevent from the eyes of the state—it was, as one scholar
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perhaps cynically called it, the “rule of love.”37 Unsurprisingly, children also
suffered under the de facto sanctuary from the reach of criminal law.38
Needless to say, there was still great difficulty in prosecuting and punishing
marital rape.39
In the 1970s, matters improved at least in part as a result of greater sensitivity to the concerns raised by feminists. Police officers, for instance, were
no longer urged or instructed to play the role of “mediator” or “peacemaker”
when called to a domestic disturbance; they could play their normal role of
enforcer of the criminal law.40 Those developments, of course, led to
an expansion of the debate about how the criminal justice system can best
serve the individual members of a family—for example, some scholars
contest whether that “normal” role is a desirable role in the family context
for fear that the implementation of “no-drop” or “shall-arrest” policies41
might end up alienating victims from a criminal justice system that is
indifferent to or dismissive of their particular interests.42
But the underlying problem remains. Notwithstanding some advances in
prosecution norms for domestic violence, the criminal law system still exhibits a great reluctance to interfere in the private life of the family. Scholars,
such as Logan, point to several examples of this ongoing phenomenon: elder
abuse,43 tolerance of domestic violence in homosexual relationships,44 the
continued difficulty of prosecuting marital rape,45 and the free use of corporal punishment against children.46 Moreover, the scourge of domestic violence continues at astonishingly high levels.47 The effects of these willful
silences and deferential nods to defendants using violence in the family
context have been, in Logan’s words, an unrelenting “form of criminal predations, perpetrated in the shadow of public law.”48
The historical context briefly sketched above only partly underwrites our
presumption of skepticism.49 Our argument reaches well beyond the fear
that family ties benefits facilitate the perpetuation of gender hierarchy and
domestic violence—though these reasons alone might suffice to reorient our
doctrines and practices.

2. Accuracy and Justice
Family ties benefits in the criminal justice system also endanger the
accurate and just imposition of punishment. As we described earlier, various
jurisdictions afford defendants special privileges that allow them to bar
others from testifying at trial or from providing other assistance to law
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enforcement, even though the latter have information critical to the accurate prosecution of the defendants or the exoneration of others.50 At bottom,
there are places where truth and family loyalty conflict, and the state should
not knowingly afford defendants family ties benefits or exemptions from
duties borne by other members of society simply because of familial status. If
innocent people mistakenly sit in prison (or guilty people escape prosecution
altogether) as a result of these benefits, then our commitment to the
accurate distribution of justice is undermined at an intolerable cost.
To be sure, we recognize that our concern about family ties benefits also
has an empirical component. For one thing, in defense of the testimonial
privileges, the state can argue that it will be effectively inviting perjury without them—and that no “truth” benefit can be conferred by forcing people to
testify against their better judgment to maintain the secrets of a loved one
against state intrusion.51 Although we have found no empirical evidence to
support the thesis that family members would lie under oath if forced to
testify against a loved one (in sufficient numbers to undermine the quest for
truth in criminal trials), there is some plausible appeal to the suggestion.
Additionally, it may turn out that having the privilege deters future crime
because the communication of the information to the spouse may have the
salutary effect of prompting the spouse to encourage the defendant to forbear from further crime. (Of course, if it turns out that this is empirically
grounded, then the privilege or immunity should be limited to communications regarding future conduct, not past conduct.)
Similarly, a necessary assumption at work in the exemption for family
members’ harboring fugitives is that the temptation to commit the crime of
harboring is overwhelming in certain contexts. A parent would have a very
difficult time turning away a child at the door precisely at a moment of
extreme vulnerability. Some might think that prudence demands that we
exempt those family members who are, in this situation, undeterrable.52
Others might think leniency is appropriate for those unwilling to turn their
closest relatives away in a time of desperate need. Indeed, some jurisdictions
seem to acknowledge that family members have reduced culpability; accordingly, some states do not immunize family members but charge them with
a lesser crime.
Our reaction to these efforts to excuse family members’ commission of
a crime (perjury and harboring) is the same: the criminal law is a separate
sphere of justice, with its own primary values, among which are the
protection of citizens and the accurate and fair prosecution of those who
have endangered public safety and contravened the laws passed to protect
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that interest in security.53 Although it cannot be denied that humans are frail
and fallible—particularly when it comes to family loyalty—the state simply
cannot legitimize its acceptance of perjury and obstruction by refusing to
prosecute individuals who engage in these practices. Moreover, those who
think it is unattractive to make a parent testify against a child should undertake a thought experiment: imagine that, because of a parent’s failure to testify against her child, another person sits wrongfully on death row, a person
who would otherwise be exonerated. That wrongfully convicted person may
also have a family whose interests in their child’s life should be protected.
The fact that it appears to be only a distant and disembodied government
that loses access to evidence should not obscure the fact that the state
is acting on behalf of potential future victims, past victims, and family
members of those who stand wrongfully accused. The state must fairly and
effectively balance its solicitousness of the defendant and his or her family
against its need to protect others in society.
There are certainly other aspects of the criminal justice system that similarly undermine the quest for accuracy, such as the exclusionary rule associated with evidence procured in violation of the Fourth Amendment.54 But we
do not believe the existence of such practices necessarily undermines our
argument here. The exclusionary rule, for example, vindicates another critical interest of our system of criminal justice—the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures by state actors .55 In contrast, we
do not think the interest typically invoked in defending those family ties benefits that impede accurate punishment or exoneration—encouraging close
familial relationships—constitutes sufficient reason for the state to deny our
commitment to the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system.

3. Equality
Family ties benefits not only impede the accurate and just administration
of criminal penalties, but also threaten basic commitments to equality under
law. Thus, our third difficulty with family ties benefits is that they can disrupt
norms of equality.56 Criminal law investigation and prosecution should treat
citizens’ interests with equal concern, without fear or favor based on morally
arbitrary characteristics like family status. The extension of special privileges
to persons simply because of their family situation (if that proxy bears no real
relationship to a legitimate criminal justice goal) bears an onus of justification, especially because any benefits that accrue to those who have specially
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recognized family ties will be unavailable to those who lack such family ties.
Whether this constitutes pernicious or permissible discrimination may be
subject to some debate, but, for reasons we elaborate on in Chapter 3, we
think it is the former in all but the rarest of circumstances.
We do not think it especially controversial to draw upon a principle of
equality under the law. This basic egalitarian commitment underwrites not
only our governing documents and institutions, but it is a prerequisite for a
legitimate system of criminal justice as well. Accordingly, benefits and special treatment that emerge from leniency on account of family status are,
generally speaking, unattractive.57 Why should this be?
At one level of abstraction, if a criminal derogates from the democratically derived codes of proper conduct, he indicates a superiority that claims
he is not bound by the rules that bind others. Society builds credible criminal
justice systems to diminish the plausibility of those claims of superiority, and
by its attempt to punish offenses, the criminal justice system endeavors to
make clear that no one is superior to the law or to any other member of
society. Family ties benefits can threaten the very basic equality principle
undergirding our constitutional democracy, because, in some instances, they
allow the offender to maintain a claim of superiority and to point to that
unanswered wrongdoing as evidence of that superiority.58 This is especially
problematic when the judiciary confers this family ties benefit on defendants
without legislative imprimatur. Because at least part of the justification for
the state’s administration of criminal justice is that it must—under the principle of equality—try to diminish the offender’s claim of superiority, the state
fails part of its essential purpose in having a criminal justice system when it
distributes benefits to some offenders merely because of their family status.59
Having a family, while “constitutively” relevant to an individual’s identity, is
typically morally unrelated to the offender’s claim of superiority represented
by the crime. Accordingly, allowing leniency based on family ties subverts
the institutional task of recalibrating the messages of equal worth undergirding the legitimate institutions of criminal justice.60
The principle of equality also has a more straightforward valence.
Unjustified disparities in sentence disposition or duration contribute to the
perception of the illegitimacy of the criminal justice system. To illustrate,
imagine that one physically attacks one’s neighbor and that such attacks are
illegal. If the state, in its ordinary course of business, knowingly did nothing
in the face of this crime, its inaction could be read to express two social
facts. The first fact is an indifference to the legal rights of its citizens, particularly to the security of their persons and property; and the second is the
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condescending assertion to the offender that his actions will not be taken
seriously by the state. If the state makes an effort to investigate, prosecute,
and punish the crime, by contrast, the message is that one will be held
accountable for one’s unlawful actions. It also sends a signal to one’s fellow
citizens that their legal rights are being vindicated by the state.61
These various expressions and communications of care and concern are
significantly more difficult to articulate if the state must address many
offenders, many victims, and many citizens. These difficulties are best alleviated if institutions exhibit fidelity to rule of law values, under which like cases
are treated alike, in accordance with legal norms that are known or knowable
to the offender. In a situation in which we address two similarly situated
offenders and an unjustified disparity results, these departures from rule of
law values will invariably trigger demoralization, resentment, and, perhaps
in some cases, outrage and violence. Thus, in light of the risks associated
with disparity—and the cuts in the moral fabric of impartial justice such disparities create—the principle of equality should be a lodestar guiding our
collective actions in the criminal justice system.
It goes without saying that invoking the principle of equality does not
mean mindlessly giving every offender the same punitive response. Some
level of granular analysis is required to sort cases appropriately—only the
“like” should be treated alike. But once we have devised reasonable bases for
distinguishing among classes of offenses and offenders, only compelling reasons and narrow options should suffice to displace the outcome that would
have been otherwise obtained in light of the classification scheme that has
been established through democratic institutions.62
That said, we recognize that incarceration may wreak havoc on innocent
third parties, many of whom are wholly innocent family members.63 But our
concern for minimizing harms to innocent third parties should not necessarily be tethered to the proof of a family relationship; it is both over- and
underinclusive to limit benefits only to those individuals in a statesanctioned family unit. Moreover, as we explain later, there may be more
broad-based ways to minimize these harms without actually extending
unfair sentencing discounts to someone simply because that person is a
father or mother, or son or daughter. Still, to the extent that rehabilitative
aims are pursued through our corrections systems, we can imagine
sites within the criminal justice system in which the presumption is overcome by distributing benefits in a manner that is neutral to family status
but still pays close attention to the obligations of those with unique caregiving
roles.
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4. Do Family Ties Benefits Incentivize More Crime?
Finally, we note that some family ties benefits can have the unwanted effect
of incentivizing more criminal activity—and more successful criminal
activity to boot. To the extent that the law effectively signals to the public
that family membership confers special benefits, some family ties benefits
will encourage family members to keep their criminal enterprises in the
family or to actively solicit help from other family members because, after
all, they can assist without fear of punishment. Jeremy Bentham disfavored
the notion of spousal privilege precisely because “it secures, to every man,
one safe and unquestionable and ever ready accomplice for every imaginable
crime”64—and facilitates criminals converting their own castles into “a den of
thieves.”65 Today, many jurisdictions have acknowledged the need for a joint
spousal criminal activity exception, precisely to reduce the likelihood of the
den of thieves arising in the castle. Moreover, if sentencing policies serve to
create a nonincarcerable (or less carcerable) class of persons because these
persons are “irreplaceable caregivers,” then those persons will seek out criminal endeavor or be, other things being equal, more sought after by others to
serve in criminal enterprises.
In short, we fear that family ties benefits will help fortify a sanctuary from
criminal law, and thus encourage the enlistment of family members into
criminal enterprises of all sorts, whether fraud or murder, embezzlement, or
racketeering.66 With respect to sentencing, we should be especially anxious,
for as Judge Kleinfeld noted, “[n]o class of persons can be immunized from
imprisonment without assisting recruitment for criminal enterprises by providing an incarceration-proof labor force.”67 This point has been reiterated by
other appellate courts construing sentencing departures based on family
responsibilities,68 as well as by members of other branches of government.69
We note that we have, thus far, found little empirical research examining this
hypothesis; it remains fertile ground for future research.70

•

D. Scrutiny of Family Ties Benefits: A Normative
Framework for the Presumption

In light of these four distinct normative concerns, we think a presumption
against family ties benefits is warranted when considering a potential policy
in the criminal justice system that affects family life, even though not every
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family ties benefit triggers all of these concerns.71 Thus, the bare proposal of
a benefit should not be categorically rejected under this framework—it just
means the benefit should undergo scrutiny.
This scrutiny requires inquiry into several matters. First, to what extent
does the particular family ties benefit contribute to patriarchy, inaccuracy,
inequality, or risk of heightened crime, collusion, or complicity? If the family
ties benefit does not incur one of these normative costs, then it may be
appropriate to extend it, especially if the interest underlying the family ties
benefit is substantially beneficial (and substantially achievable through the
benefit). Usually, though, we find that the bare use of family status as a basis
to distribute a benefit to the defendant is one that triggers equality and
discrimination concerns. Typically, these concerns can be resolved by more
careful drafting such that the distribution of the benefit occurs in a way that
is neutral to family status while still achieving its underlying goal. When that
is the case, there is good reason to distribute the benefit more broadly than
would be done under the rubric of family status currently recognized by
most states.
On the other hand, if the family ties benefit triggers normative costs that
cannot be ameliorated through mere redrafting into family-neutral terms,
then, at that point, we think the state must have a compelling or heightened
interest that vindicates the use of the family ties benefit (the purpose test)
and the state must have adopted narrowly tailored means to achieve that
purpose. A good example might be something like sentencing discounts for
defendants with young children. This is a rather typical family ties benefit,
but we think the policy associated with such benefits can be more granularly
administered, as we discuss in the context of time-deferred sentencing,
such that it might apply to more people who could benefit from it but in
a way that does not create the same normative costs. By contrast, if the
benefit in question affirmatively impedes the state’s interest in ensuring
the safety of vulnerable persons, such as the continued vitality of the
parental discipline defense, which has been used to legitimate what would
otherwise be criminal assaults upon one’s children, it should be soundly
rejected.
In other words, an especially weighty public interest would be needed to
justify the family ties benefit, along with an inquiry into whether alternative
measures were available to promote that interest without triggering or
increasing the normative costs we identify. Moreover, we would still want
to ensure that the underlying public interest that is being vindicated is
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distributed in a way that is not predicated on family status alone, but
rather on voluntarily assumed obligations of caregiving. To be sure, our proposed method of scrutiny will not resolve all questions; we will inevitably
have disputes about the strength of competing claims. But this method
will help us think more clearly about the challenge of family ties in criminal
justice.
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three

Applying the Framework to Family Ties Benefits

in this chapter, we apply the normative framework to a number of the family
ties benefits discussed in Chapter 1. Using the framework developed in
Chapter 2, we examine how some of the benefits from Chapter 1 fare under
our normative approach. Thus, we briefly explore how evidentiary privileges,
harboring fugitive exemptions, violence within the family, pretrial release,
sentencing, and prison practices should be analyzed in light of our normative framework. In most cases, our framework adds new insights into how
policymakers, judges, and citizens should think about family ties benefits.
In the case of any benefit, there are multiple considerations that will be
relevant to policymakers beyond our presumptions and analyses. But we are
hopeful that our framework can shed new light on these benefits, some of
which are very much contested while others have escaped any substantial
analysis. As we will show, in many cases, our analysis recommends eliminating the benefit.
Other benefits, by contrast, such as sensitivity in assigning prisoners to
specific prison locations, survive scrutiny because there are compelling state
interests that are properly vindicated or because the benefits trigger such
minimal normative costs that the presumption against family ties benefits
should be rebutted. However, even in these situations, we think there should
be some effort to distribute the benefits in terms that are neutral to family
status when possible. Doing so, at the very least, can remove some of the
inherent gender and heteronormative biases that the benefits display. We
also discuss how some benefits can succeed by being retailored through alternative means. In the section addressing sentencing, for instance, we discuss
the case of the irreplaceable caregiver who is asking for a sentencing discount.
In this connection, we discuss the use of “time-deferred sentencing,”1 as well
as the use of programs that redound to the benefit of family members,
but not exclusively to them and not on account of their status as family
members. This final insight paves the way for the second part of the book, in
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which we are able to see protecting voluntary caregiving relationships as the
center of the family ties burdens we discover; we are also able to start the
project of redesigning all family ties intersections with the criminal justice
system in family-neutral terms, focusing more on function than status. But
that effort, which preoccupies us much more pointedly in the second part
of the book, is also very useful in some of the cases of family ties benefits
that we explore here. Ultimately, however, because inaccuracy, crime creation, inequality, and patriarchy are such severe costs of family ties benefits in
the bulk of cases, we can only support, promote, and vindicate privileging
family status in the rarest of cases of family ties benefits.

•

A. Evidentiary Privileges
1. Competing Assessments of Familial Privileges

Views about the marital privileges are, unsurprisingly, mixed. These privileges
are ostensibly justified not only because they are rooted in the common law
but because they are presumed to have a persuasive rationale. For instance, the
spousal immunity “provides social benefits by preventing marital discord,”2
and the marital-communications privilege is said to “foster[] openness between
spouses by ensuring that none of their confidences will be revealed in court.”3
In short, “[t]he basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or
husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake [is] a belief that
such a policy [is] necessary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit of
husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the public as well.”4
But not all agree that the spousal privileges are proper exceptions to the
hoary rule that every man’s evidence should be available in the administration of justice. In recent years, the spousal immunity has come under more
serious fire from commentators than the marital-communication privilege,
which on its face just looks like other confidential communication privileges,
such as the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges.5 Still
others think that spousal immunity makes sense if we really care about protecting family harmony—and that we do not need the marital-communication privilege because people will trust their spouses naturally and are usually
indifferent to legal entitlements to privileges. Moreover, once the marriage
dissolves, the justification of “keeping the family together” dissolves with
it—and a marital-communications privilege certainly should not outlive the
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marriage (as it currently does in some of the jurisdictions that recognize it).6
Finally, some oppose the immunity because, in practice, it operates in a
gendered manner: “[t]he plain fact is that . . . the adverse testimony privilege
operates largely to prevent wives from testifying against their husbands . . .
[and] reinforce[s] a traditional ethic of self-sacrifice for women within
marriage.”7 The detractors aside, the marital privileges enjoy widespread support in the nation’s courts and state legislatures.8
With respect to broader intrafamilial privileges, there are several arguments offered by their proponents. Proponents argue that “[ f]orced disclosure of confidential communications between children and parents not only
destroys the trust between parent and child necessary to foster open communication, it pits a parent against a child in a court of law.”9 As the In re
Agosto court put it, “[t]o damage the parent-child relationship would result
in damage to the child’s relationship to society as a whole.”10 Advocates routinely cite the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
which stressed that “[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect
a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children.”11 The importance of this relationship is the reason that society
seeks to foster open communication between parents and children.12 In
short, the “arguments in favor of adoption of the parent-child privilege center
around the importance of loyalty . . . inherent to the [] relationship.”13 This is
generally known as the “preservation of the family” argument.14
Another related argument relies upon the “cruel trilemma” presumably
imposed upon subpoenaed family members who must “either (1) testify
truthfully and condemn the accused relative, (2) testify falsely and commit
perjury, or (3) refuse to testify and risk contempt.”15 As In re Agosto found, in
putting witnesses in this position, “the law would not merely be inviting perjury, but perhaps even forcing it.”16 This argument emphasizes not only that
we put family members in an awkward position but that the search for truth
itself will be hampered because in our zealous pursuit of it, we are inviting
falsified testimony that will adulterate the system more than it will foster the
system’s integrity. There is also the possibility, as mentioned earlier, that the
extension of these privileges works in favor of reducing crime; a spouse with
an adverse testimonial immunity may decide to talk to his wife (because
he knows she cannot testify against him), and during that talk, she may
persuade him to desist from future crimes.
More generally, advocates of the expansion of intrafamilial privileges
beyond the spousal privileges argue, by analogy, to other privileges already
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recognized in the courts and by legislatures. The professional privileges are
generally thought to encourage the free flow of information in socially valuable relationships in which trust is required for the success of the relationship.17 Similarly, the marital privilege supposedly serves the function of
preserving harmony and fostering openness in socially valuable relationships. Proponents of other intrafamilial privileges argue by analogy to other
relationships of trust to reinforce their case.18 A final strategy proponents
(and adopting courts) have drawn upon is basing the extended privilege in
the constitutionally recognized right to privacy.19
In response to those who favor extending intrafamilial privileges, critics
(including judges on many federal and state courts) argue that there is no
case law to support such a new privilege; that privileges are meant to be
granted very sparingly and narrowly for they are in derogation of the search
for truth; that further intrafamilial privileges do not pass the Wigmore Test20;
and that Congress may, if it wishes, furnish such a privilege if there is a true
need for it.21 More basically, critics “commonly assert that people typically
know little or nothing about their privilege[s] and that, even if they did, the
knowledge would rarely alter their communicative behavior.”22 In short,
intrafamilial privileges are very unlikely to incentivize people to talk with
their families if they are not otherwise inclined to do so. As unseemly as it
may be to force people to testify against their family members, it may just be
the cost of doing justice.

2. The Framework’s Application to Evidentiary Privileges
We think our normative framework offers a different perspective on intrafamilial privileges, one that has heretofore often been overlooked: that family
ties generally ought not to be exalted or privileged in the administration of
criminal justice. Accordingly, not only should courts and legislatures reject
the parent-child and more attenuated intrafamilial testimonial privileges,
but they should also revisit the marital privileges, which enjoy widespread
support. In short, it is our view that the family neither needs nor deserves
any special protection when the smooth and fair administration of criminal
justice is at stake. Just as our society values friendship as a very beneficial
social relationship of trust but fails to entrust friends with testimonial privileges,23 we believe that the family can sustain itself without special immunity
from the criminal justice system. We take no position here, however, on the
ongoing debates about whether there should be intrafamilial privileges in
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the civil context.24 But because the intrafamilial evidentiary privileges implicate our four normative considerations—and all four of them, no less—we
think such benefits are inappropriate and should therefore be abandoned.
As we have already recounted, the testimonial privileges have an undeniably patriarchal lineage. Based on an old English common law rule of
complete disqualification in which a wife was not allowed to testify against
her husband,25 the testimonial privileges have roots that would offend our
first normative consideration. Indeed, at common law, women were not
considered to be competent witnesses at all. Even those who contest the
disqualification theory of the derivation of the privileges and assume that the
privileges developed from a theory of “petit treason” against the head of a
household could not deny that the protection of the “head of a household”
traditionally protected men.26 And although the testimonial privileges have
been modernized in most places to defang their patriarchal origins,27 they
continue to operate in a male-friendly manner: men commit more crime, so
it will benefit men more often if their spouses (or mothers or sisters) are prevented from testifying against them. As Wayne Logan writes, “[e]videntiary
law . . . continues to betray an age-old reluctance to interfere; the spousal
privilege, for instance, prohibits the government from compelling the testimony of a battered spouse, should prosecution ensue.”28 This is especially
disconcerting in the wake of Crawford v. Washington, which will only further
exacerbate the use of spousal privileges to protect male domination in the
household.29
Even bracketing the gendered roots and effects of the intrafamilial testimonial privileges that give us pause, our second normative consideration is
also implicated. Testimonial privileges are very much exceptions to the
common law principle that “the public has a right to every man’s evidence.”30
Because the public has a compelling interest in the efficient and correct
administration of its criminal justice system, the law should not lightly
create exceptions to the rule that people must testify truthfully before legal
tribunals. Even the few privileges recognized by the law are not to be “expansively construed” because they “are in derogation of the search for truth.”31
Privileges that facilitate the exclusion of relevant evidence from a fact finder
seriously impede the truth-seeking function of the trials, which hampers
both the effective prosecution of the guilty and the exoneration of the innocent. These privileges matter not only at trial, but also beforehand, because
their availability at trial casts a shadow over plea-bargaining between
the state and the defense lawyer. Without other independent evidence,
a prosecutor will be more likely to drop a case against a potential defendant
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if the prosecutor knows a husband can block the testimony of, or revelations
about communications to, his wife.
We acknowledge, of course, the speculative concern that the privileges
may help prevent perjured testimony from polluting the trial. Perhaps the
privileges function to prevent family members from lying on the stand—a
result that may, after all, serve the truth. To the extent that any credible
empirical evidence would bear out such a claim, we would reconsider our
conclusions about the benefit’s implication for the normative consideration
of accuracy. We also recognize the empirical possibility that the privileges
may have a deterrent effect on crime if spouses communicate intentions to
commit future crime and are subsequently able to dissuade each other from
committing that future crime.32 We have not seen empirical evidence to
support this possibility, however, and we suspect such instances are rare.
Third, there is a basic inequity built into intrafamilial testimonial privileges. Although this inequity is not as obvious as the central case in which an
offender gets differential treatment in a sentence on account of his family ties,
the normative consideration of equality is implicated nevertheless; those with
spouses (rather than friends or same-sex partners) get to share the details of
their crimes with a loved one without consequence. This may have a cathartic
effect for offenders, rendering an ultimate confession to the police less likely.
And it may enable more intimacy to flourish in state-sanctioned families in a
way that will be discouraged in less traditional family structures, though as we
suggested earlier, we are uncertain about how responsive many people are to
the signals or incentives created by these laws in particular.
More importantly, this particular benefit creates a class of persons, who
might otherwise have extremely useful information about an offender,
immune from questioning at trial. This allows the offender to maintain a
sense of superiority—both over his household and over the polity, whose
interests in vindicating justice play second fiddle to the protection of the
sanctity of his family. This is unfair to the state and unfair to victims whose
rights can be vindicated only if the police and prosecution can do their jobs
effectively. Creating rules that prevent the police and the prosecution from
learning the truth are counterproductive to the tasks of criminal justice.
Although one can sympathize with the difficulty of testifying against a family
member, we suspect that thoughtful citizens would not want to live in a
regime with such privileges for family members when they realize that a perpetrator of crimes is being shielded from justice by family members who are
immune from questioning on the witness stand.
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Finally, our last normative consideration is also implicated by the testimonial privileges. To the extent that defendants receive signals from the evidentiary privileges,33 the privileges furnish incentives to keep criminal
conspiracies within the family. Spouses are more likely to recruit each other
into criminal activity because they know they can shield their communications with their spouse later on. The law needs tools to disrupt conspiracy
and make it less efficacious, not more so. A better system would realize that
the law should aim at “help[ing to] destabilize trust within the conspiracy, cue
the defection of conspirators, and permit law enforcement to extract more
information from them.”34 Unsurprisingly, some jurisdictions have adopted
a joint-spousal-criminal-activity exception to the marital-communications
privileges.35 Obviously, in lieu of a full-scale abandonment of the privileges,
we welcome at least this development.
But in light of the troublesome normative costs in the context of
evidentiary privileges, we think there is a good basis to eliminate these
privileges. We do not see any compelling state interests that could render
these privileges appropriate or acceptable, unless our empirical concerns
regarding perjury and deterrence were proven demonstrably.36 Moreover,
although we recognize that some argue that familial interests are prepolitical
or prelegal in some sense, such that the law needs to step aside in the face of
family loyalties (rendering family interests to be sufficient to override the
maxim that the public is entitled to every man’s evidence), we are not persuaded. At least as a matter of fit with other aspects of the legal landscape,
we note the state’s extensive regulation of family law; thus, it is hard to take
this argument seriously. Marriage itself is an undeniably legal relation—and
it betrays common sense to think a general respect for the private sphere of
the family should be sufficient to overcome our normative framework, which
itself derives from the task of trying to assess whether family ties benefits are
appropriate in the criminal justice system. In this case, to say that family ties
should override our normative framework is only to disagree that our normative framework establishes a presumption against family ties benefits in
the criminal justice context in the first place. When the benefits are disbursed to reinforce inequality, gender bias, patriarchy, and inaccuracy in the
criminal justice system, the costs are too great to bear.
Moreover, those who wish to support this family ties benefit (and others
like it) as a way of generally supporting an important social institution of
caregiving have an extra step of justificatory work to do that we think cannot
be done successfully—one must defend not only the general idea that it
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would be nice for the law to protect the family from some legal incursions
but also the more specific proposition that the law must protect families in
the context of criminal justice, a site where we think the law cannot afford this
type of benefit. Too much is at stake when the lives and liberties of men and
women are held in the balance.
That said, we can imagine that jurisdictions might be interested in narrower options than the ones we endorse. For instance, Maryland has a twostrikes policy regarding the invocation of the privileges in courts.37
Alternatively, jurisdictions might want to limit the application of the privilege to cases involving a discrete set of crimes, leaving violent or more serious felonies outside the scope of the privilege (or even other benefits, such
as the exemptions and defenses that are based on family status). A third
strategy might be to limit the privilege to cover communications regarding
only future conduct, not past conduct.
We cannot, of course, deny that our catalogue of normative considerations might seem to condemn other testimonial privileges. For example,
the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges might result in
prosecutors and police having less information to pursue justice. Although
these privileges have no especially ignoble histories, they are, at a general
level, in derogation of the search for truth and have the potential to implicate
an equality norm.
Still, we think the normative considerations we have highlighted condemn intrafamilial privileges in ways different and more substantial. In the
first place, we think other testimonial privileges do not fare as badly through
our normative framework: they neither offend our first consideration, nor do
they reasonably trigger substantial concerns under the fourth consideration.
On the contrary, the lawyer-client privilege, for example, can help prevent
crime by facilitating communications with potential offenders to steer them
away from unlawful conduct. Moreover, even our second normative consideration—accuracy—does not clearly disfavor the lawyer-client privilege. The
lawyer-client privilege substantially contributes to the vindication of our
adversarial system of justice. By giving the defendant a true and zealous
advocate who is bound by a duty of confidentiality to him, we give the defendant a fighting chance to use the criminal justice system to prove his innocence; this ultimately contributes to the project of accuracy. We do not often
worry that psychotherapists and lawyers are actually going to become coconspirators (though, of course, such results are not unheard of). Moreover,
our “crime-creation” prong fares better with the lawyer-client privilege and
the psychotherapist-patient privilege than it does with the marital privilege:
some professionals in some jurisdictions might be required to reveal when
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their client threatens a third party with substantial harm or a crime. Not so
with the marital privilege.
Finally, while one can make the claim that other testimonial privileges
also fail our normative framework, we would not be the first to notice that
some of the privileges rest on less-than-firm footing: a number of scholars
have argued that, to the extent the privileges have value, the value extends
only to advice regarding prospective behavior—not past behavior.38 In any
case, to the extent that the other privileges pursue compelling state interests
that are appropriate in the criminal justice sphere, we acknowledge that
our normative framework is not the final word on whether a benefit is
acceptable. Other testimonial privileges may be justifiable by countervailing interests that override the considerations outlined above.

•

B. Exemptions for Family Members Harboring
Fugitives

As discussed in Chapter 1, another way in which states favor family relationships in a facial manner is by exempting family members from prosecution.
Eighteen states currently exempt immediate family members from prosecution for harboring a fugitive or reduce their potential liability.39 What are the
rationales offered for these family exemptions? First, perhaps, “it is unrealistic
to expect persons to be deterred [by the possibility of criminal prosecution]
from giving aid to their close relatives.”40 Criminal punishment is therefore
unwarranted as a deterrent because it would be ineffective in any event.
Second, perhaps such statutes are “an acknowledgement of human frailty.”41
Under this view, legislatures have simply recognized that the bonds of
familial love will inevitably trump any perceived obligation to the state.
A third rationale suggests the exemption vindicates “society’s interest in
safeguarding the family unit from unnecessary fractional pressures.”42
Analyzing these statutes under the framework of our four normative considerations, we conclude that the family exemption is misguided and should
therefore be soundly rejected by state legislatures. The exemptions obviously
contribute to a fundamental inequity: close friends who provide assistance
face prosecution, while family members do not. Further, like the evidentiary
privileges, these exemptions have patriarchal origins and may serve to shield
from prosecution those who commit crimes in the home. The focus of these
exemptions at common law was to exempt wives from liability for following
their “duty” by shielding their husbands. To be sure, these statutes have now
become gender neutral by extending their protection to other immediate
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family members, so perhaps they should not be invalidated on the basis of
their patriarchal roots alone. But these are not our strongest normative
arguments; we therefore turn to our two remaining considerations.
In terms of accuracy, these exemptions do a different kind of mischief
than threatening our ability to sort the guilty from the innocent; they facilitate a guilty person’s escape from punishment entirely. Allowing an individual to obstruct justice by hiding a family member obviously frustrates “the
essential government functions of locating and apprehending criminals.”43
Moreover, this immunity is granted without regard to the heinousness of the
underlying crime—the exemption is granted whether the fugitive is a forger
or a murderer. The statutes sweep with too broad a brush in another regard
as well—they protect those family members who might never have previously enjoyed a meaningful relationship with the primary offender, but
simply came to the aid of a relative when asked for assistance after the
commission of a crime.44 Moreover, the laws are written only to protect those
in traditional state-sanctioned familial units. It is also difficult to accept that
it is the government’s decision to prosecute that creates significant stresses
upon the family; rather, the responsibility for that would seem to lie squarely
on the shoulders of the family member who decided to enlist his relatives to
assist him in his illegal activities.
Finally, like the testimonial privileges, these statutory exemptions create
perverse incentives. In a state with a family exemption, there is no reason for
a defendant to commit a crime unilaterally; he has every incentive to enlist
close family members to help him conceal evidence and hide from the
authorities because those family members face no criminal consequences
for their actions. Why should we create an incentive for a defendant to recruit
accomplices and thereby increase the chances of success for his criminal
venture? As the Supreme Court recognized forty years ago:
[C]ollective criminal agreement—partnership in crime—presents a
greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted
action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals
involved will depart from their path of criminality. Group association for
criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes possible the attainment of
ends more complex than those which one criminal could accomplish.45
Because family exemptions pose such significant costs in terms of
preventing the government from punishing criminal activity and creating
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incentives for conspiratorial activity, we believe our presumption against
such benefits is clearly triggered. Further, these benefits provide no substantial benefit to the criminal justice system. We reject the notion that allowing
siblings to dispose of murder weapons for one another is an essential component of family harmony. Even if we were to concede the point that not
every brother would be deterred by the threat of criminal punishment from
hiding a murder weapon for his beloved sibling, it might still be the case that
the possibility of punishment would deter the killer from making the request
in the first instance.

•

C. Violence Within the Family

In demonstrating how our normative framework would apply in the context
of familial status defenses, we have chosen to focus here on the example of
the parental discipline defense as it is used in child abuse prosecutions.
Parents have employed corporal punishment to discipline children and mold
their characters for centuries with minimal interference from the state.46
The historical origins of the tradition of noninterference in matters of family
violence, and its obviously troubling patriarchal origins, have been well documented.47 We choose here to focus on the less obvious concerns this defense
raises in terms of equality and incentivizing more criminal activity.
In terms of equality, the parental discipline defense elevates the right of the
parent to discipline his child over the right of the child not to be subjected to
physical force. We would never allow an adult to exercise comparable physical force against another adult or against someone else’s child; any adult who
took a belt to the backside of an unrelated adult or child would be eligible for
swift and condign punishment.48 Why is a child’s relative entitled to escape
punishment within the criminal justice system when an unrelated adult is
not? The nature of the defendant’s conduct and the physical harm suffered by
the victim is the same under both scenarios. Critics, of course, respond that
the motive underlying the conduct is different, that the parent wishes to discipline and the non-parent wishes to harm. But non-parents may also have
“altruistic” motivations. And we shouldn’t uncritically embrace the rosecolored view of parenthood that so often permeates the practice of criminal
law. We as a society desperately want to believe that all parents are altruistic
and loving individuals who always act in their children’s best interest.49 But
the prevalence of child abuse and neglect in America shows this assumption
is too often untrue.50
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In terms of the negative incentives created by the use of corporal punishment, spanking is often a precursor to more serious parental violence.51
Deanna Pollard argues that “the defense of ‘discipline’ is raised in forty-one
percent of homicide prosecutions against parents who ‘accidentally’ killed
their child.”52 Pollard further suggests that spanking increases the chances
that the child victim of a parent’s violence will himself be more likely to
engage in aggression and other antisocial behavior later in life, including
engaging in domestic violence in his own family.53
Because of the normative costs associated with these family status
defenses, we believe it triggers our presumption. We recognize that critics of
our position will argue that the utilities of this “family ties benefit” are indeed
substantial. Many believe spanking is in fact beneficial to children; others
simply believe that parents should be allowed to make their own disciplinary
choices without undue interference by the state. For the reasons stated
above, we are unpersuaded that these interests are sufficient to override our
normative considerations. Far from promoting the safety of vulnerable persons, this particular benefit exposes children to state-sanctioned physical
harm, and thus cannot survive scrutiny under our framework.

•

D. Pretrial Release

As we described in Chapter 1, many jurisdictions expressly direct judges or
magistrates to consider a defendant’s family ties and responsibilities when
deciding whether or not to release him pending trial. Thus, it is not difficult
to imagine a scenario in which a defendant who is a father to minor children
is able to secure his release pretrial, while a single, childless defendant
charged with an equivalent crime is not. Equality and discrimination
concerns are therefore clearly implicated under our normative framework.
These disparate decisions can have very real consequences. For example,
it is undoubtedly easier to mount a successful defense from outside the
correctional system than it is from the inside, because incarcerated
defendants have much more constrained access to lawyers, witnesses, and
other investigative resources. As a result, there is some statistical evidence
showing that pretrial release is correlated with higher acquittal rates and
even stronger evidence regarding sentencing. Detained defendants are more
likely to receive a sentence including incarceration than those who are
released.54 Accordingly, distributing the pretrial release benefit only to family
members risks creating a two-track criminal justice system with the “haves”
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(with children and dependents) coming out ahead of the “have-nots.” That
seems an odd and unfair result.
Our concerns about patriarchal origins do not seem to be implicated
here. But we do worry that heteronormativity could rear its head if persons
with ties or responsibilities to non-traditional family units (whether homosexual or polyamorous) were being denied pretrial release while those in
such state-recognized units were granted such release. Moreover, marginal
increases in crime-creation may very well be an issue worth considering.
During the period of release, a defendant with children might be especially
prone to flee if he can take his family with him, because he knows that possible incarceration would have a terrible effect not only on him but also on
his dependents. The same concern might especially motivate the defendant
to attempt to obstruct justice in order to increase his chances for an eventual
acquittal.
Our concern about accuracy may be relevant as well. As suggested above,
a defendant who is released pretrial may be able to interfere with potential
witnesses, evidence, and the like, such that the accuracy of the ultimate adjudication of his guilt is called into question. This problem may be particularly
acute for defendants who are charged with committing a crime against a
family member, because they will potentially have easier access to their
victim and potential witnesses than defendants who committed a crime
against a random stranger, for example.
In the end, if detention is being proposed because the defendant poses a
danger to the community generally or an individual within it, then one’s
family ties and responsibilities should not be enough to afford a defendant
preferential treatment—the need to ensure the safety of the community
must be the primary consideration. If the issue is whether a defendant poses
a flight risk, then it would seem that responsibility for minor children, for
example, could be considered as one of a myriad of factors that would lead to
a conclusion that a defendant will not flee—but it is one of many possible
relevant factors and not a dispositive one. Indeed, for reasons we mentioned
before, the fact of responsibility for minor children might enhance the risk of
flight. Thus, judges should try to reduce flight risk without reference to family
ties and responsibilities; indeed, there are ways of reducing the risk through
other means, such as GPS devices or other location tracking devices. And if
such alternatives are not available, then we are ultimately more comfortable
with judges focusing on whether the risk is attenuated by reference to all
relationships of caregiving, rather than merely focusing on traditional family
relationships, which may not reflect any particular defendant’s actual circle
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of affection. Indeed, to look only at traditional family ties or responsibilities
would often entrench heterosexist conceptions of the family, which have no
proper place in the criminal justice system.
One other aspect of pretrial treatment of defendants warrants mention.
A child-sensitive arrest policy is a good example of a situation where our
normative cost structure is not implicated.55 Arranging to arrest an individual outside the presence of his minor children, while ensuring that the
children have safe and comfortable living arrangements after the arrest, can
be a family ties benefit or accommodation in the sense that it might be more
administratively burdensome for police or prosecutors and might be disbursed now only to those that meet a certain definition of status. But the four
costs we identified in Chapter 2 are of only attenuated relevance. Therefore,
the presumption against such a benefit can be rebutted, and we believe the
policy is an appropriate one for the criminal justice system to pursue.
However, because we ultimately worry that this respect for certain relationships of caregiving can still be carried out in a manner that is heterosexist
and insensitive to those outside traditionally recognized familial organizations, we are hopeful that these policies can be revised to extend their protections outside the limited confines of the solely biological and heterosexual
family. For instance, in the context of the arrest of a caregiver, and in the
absence of exigent circumstances, we think it is not too much to ask the
police to apprehend the caregiver in a manner sensitive to the responsible
care of any vulnerable persons under the care of the arrestee.

•

E. Sentencing

As discussed earlier, until the recent Booker decision by the Supreme Court,
which rendered the federal sentencing guidelines advisory,56 the federal
government’s position on family ties discounts at sentencing has probably
been the most restrictive compared to the policies guiding sentencing in the
states. Even in the federal context, of course, courts found ways to extend
discounts to offenders with extraordinary “family ties and responsibilities.”
Now, with the imprimatur from the Supreme Court in Booker, federal courts
are more likely to award discounts out of compassion for the defendant’s
family responsibilities. Moreover, to the extent that the federal courts
conform to the pre-Booker guidance from the United States Sentencing
Commission (USSC), it bears emphasis that the federal courts address only a
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small fraction of the cases in the national criminal justice system. And as we
saw earlier in Chapter 1, many states expressly tell judges to calibrate a sentence based, in part, on one’s family ties and responsibilities in sentencing
offenders.
Thus, offenders who are parents or caregivers to spouses or elders may,
depending on the jurisdiction, be in a position to receive a sharp discount
from the punishment they might otherwise receive. Not only does this
facilitate ad hoc disparities between offenders who are otherwise similarly
situated across cases, it also creates inequalities between persons involved in
the very same offense.57 These disparities require justification.
An offender—so long as he satisfies the competence criterion for punishment58—anticipates (or should reasonably be expected to anticipate) a risk
that he will be punished in accordance with extant sentencing norms. If we
make that presumption, which is not an unreasonable one, there is nothing
unfair—putting aside proportionality issues—about the offender seeing that
risk of punishment materialize. No unfairness to the defendant attaches to
punishing persons for conduct they could, by hypothesis, control with consequences they can reasonably anticipate.59 The resulting disparities in
sentences across otherwise similarly situated defendants at least shift the
burden of justification for discounts onto their proponents. A person who
commits a crime can reasonably foresee that, if prosecuted and punished,
his punishment will affect not only himself but also his family. Extending a
discount to an offender for a reason unrelated to his crime constitutes an
undeserved windfall. In addition, as we adverted to earlier, giving benefits to
defendants with family ties in the currency of sentencing discounts will also,
on the margin, incentivize this class of defendants to seek out greater criminal opportunities, or they will be recruited or pressed into action by others.
Of course, the fact that offenders do not “deserve” sentencing discounts in
an abstract sense does not mean that accommodations should never be
made—there may be compelling, non-desert-related reasons to extend such
accommodations. Incarcerating a defendant with significant family responsibilities unquestionably imposes tremendous costs on innocent family
members, and those costs are most severe when the defendant is an irreplaceable caregiver to vulnerable family members. Therefore, although we
advance the unusual position—taken primarily and unpopularly by the federal government’s sentencing guidelines—that, ordinarily, a defendant’s
family ties and responsibilities should not serve as a basis for a lighter sentence, we are sensitive to the serious arguments made by proponents of
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sentencing departures for those with significant caregiving responsibilities.60
These arguments merit attention and amplification.
Primarily, the proponents of these departures can point to the anticipated
harms to innocent third parties as a reasonable basis to distinguish the
sentences caregivers should get from those who do not have those responsibilities.61 In other words, they can reject the claim that offenders with urgent
family responsibilities are similarly situated to those offenders without pressing family responsibilities. Insisting on such a distinction is reasonable, they
might add, because, in a particular case or class of cases, the private harm of
removing a caregiver’s support to an innocent third party outweighs the
public gain from continuous incarceration.62 In this respect, the judge need
not be expressing any claim about the diminished moral culpability of the
offender who receives the sentencing discount. Rather, the claim is simply
that, although this offender deserves no breaks, the weight of these harms to
innocent third parties should trump the need for a lengthy incarceration. To
the extent that this departure disrupts equality norms, the proponents say,
such departures are justifiable.
The justification may take several forms. First, it can be argued that
depriving children of parents in order to incarcerate the parents for the purpose of punishment is itself a criminogenic (crime-creating) policy.63 Second,
notwithstanding the culpability of the offenders and the harm suffered by the
victims of their crimes, it can be argued that the harm is already done; the
state should not inflict its own harms on the offender’s children or other
persons benefiting from the offender’s caregiving. Indeed, if we urge offenders to bear responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of
their actions, so too must the social planners who create institutions of
punishment bear such responsibility.
By that logic, our compassion and concern should properly extend to the
harm imposed on innocent third parties by the state’s punishments.64 We are
therefore willing to agree that compelling circumstances arise when an offender
is the sole and irreplaceable caregiver for minors or for aged or ailing persons
with whom the defendant has an established relationship of caregiving.
However, we abjure any reason to privilege only the traditional familial relationship in the context of any accommodations made to “irreplaceable caregivers.”
What matters from our vantage point is that the defendant is serving a critical
social role as an irreplaceable caregiver. We recognize our approach may incur
slightly higher “information costs” by abandoning the simple proxy of family
status, but this approach in practice is not apt to be more costly than the extant
costs of verifying the reality of familial caregiving responsibilities.
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Ordinarily, however, we think that harms to innocent third parties should
be ameliorated through the institutions of distributive justice, not criminal
justice. In an attractive polity, a child without a parent should receive state
and communal aid regardless of whether the parent is not around due to
sickness, death, or imprisonment. But where the state has persistently failed
its obligations of distributive justice, it would not be unreasonable to tailor
the punishment of caregiver offenders in a way that mitigates third-party
harms without simultaneously elevating the offender’s status in violation of
the principle of equal justice under law.
For that reason, we think, assuming the crime was severe enough that
some form of incarceration is deemed necessary, it may be appropriate for
legislatures to authorize greater use of time-delayed sentencing to offenders
with irreplaceable caregiving responsibilities.65 For example, if an offender is
the irreplaceable caregiver for children, the offender in a time-delayed sentencing scheme would defer the incarcerative aspect of his punishment until
after the children reach the age of majority or until alternative and feasible
care can be arranged.66 In the case of caring for aging parents or ill spouses,
the sentence may be delayed until the person receiving the care is deceased,
improves in health, or is able to obtain care from another person or entity.
During the period that the sentence is deferred, the offender’s freedom of
movement would be dramatically limited so that only work and necessary
chores (i.e., taking one’s child to the doctor) would be permitted. Electronic
bracelets or other tracking devices could be used to ensure compliance.
Additionally, during the time of deferral, the state could attach extensive
community service obligations or other release conditions, such as drug testing. Failure to abide by the conditions would lead to more severe punishment than would be experienced absent the deferral of the sentence to
minimize possible exploitation by the defendant.
Of course, this option should not be restricted to only those with a blood
relationship or marriage. If there is an established relationship of caregiving,
then that should be the critical issue. On the other hand, this option should
not be available when the defendant has already committed a crime either
with or against the recipient of the care, or has exhibited a propensity to
harm his family (e.g., prior convictions for reckless endangerment of a child),
or is such a dangerous criminal that it would be foolish for society to let him
remain free. Simply put, there might be some crimes whose nature would
render an offender ineligible for this kind of differentiated-sentencing
scheme. But generally speaking, there are ways of implementing punishments that still, by their coercion or deprivation, communicate to the
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offender the norms of equal liberty under law without wreaking (as much)
havoc on the lives of innocent third parties.
As should be clear from the foregoing, we are very sympathetic to the concerns of innocent third parties affected by draconian sentencing policies.
Myrna Raeder, for example, has forcefully illustrated that our current sentencing regime has particularly harsh consequences for incarcerated mothers and
their children.67 But recognizing the consequences of a sentencing regime is
not the same as effectively condemning it in whole cloth. For one thing, a
caregiver who is also a serial killer should not receive a sentencing discount
simply because of the caregiver’s status as a mother. Rather, the critical issue
here seems to be that many of the crimes for which women are convicted
(providing low-level assistance to a drug trafficking ring, for example) do not
deserve the extremely harsh sentences that are currently imposed for such
activity. Thus, many of Raeder’s very legitimate concerns about the “gendered
differences in criminality”68 could be taken into account if we properly consider factors such as the nature of the criminal conduct, the criminal history
of the defendant, and so on, in making a sentencing decision for an individual
defendant or a class of defendants similarly situated. Further, many of the
harms to innocent third parties can be addressed by reducing across the
board the sentences imposed for nonviolent crimes, which are the crimes,
some suggest, that women are more likely to commit in any event. But this
analysis and the prescriptions that flow from it do not require an uncritical
extension of sentencing discounts simply because of family ties or responsibilities. Instead, we need to focus on whether a defendant has irreplaceable
caregiving responsibilities and how we can best accommodate that caregiving role. It bears emphasis that for us it is the voluntary caregiving and not the
familial status that justifies greater sensitivity.
In sum, we recognize that punishment (especially in the form of incarceration) affects innocent third parties. Those innocent third parties, however, are not connected to the defendant through family status alone. Thus,
to the extent legal officials should tailor a punishment in recognition of its
deleterious impact on innocent third parties, the law should reject a categorical effort to accommodate only those innocent third parties who are family
members.69 Second, we doubt that the criminal justice system should be the
first resort to resolve the social needs of families in distress. But in those situations in which distressed-family problems arise with no alternative resources
available to ameliorate the situation, it is preferable to establish more options,
including time-deferred sentencing or, for example, custodial options where
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the sole caregiver and the cared-for individuals can live together, assuming
that the offender’s offense was not directed against his children (or other’s
children) in the first instance.70

•

F. Prison Policies

Our normative framework requires a fairly nuanced approach to the evaluation of prison policies. That is because each individual policy we mentioned in
Chapter 1 implicates different normative considerations. Accordingly, we
cannot present a unified approach to prison policies as such. At some very
basic level, it is understandable that our punitive practices aim to take account
of family ties; we often harm entire families for one member’s wrongdoing by
punishing and removing the wrongdoer from the home. Still, our normative
framework furnishes some reasons to think that there is an unfairness and
inequality associated with state promotion of family ties in the penal context.
Moreover, we think many of the policies can be recrafted in terms that are
neutral to family status.
We think there is one central difference, however, between most of
the other family ties benefits discussed and the set of practices we group
together as prison policies: the state’s legitimate interest in successful
offender reentry. In the context of corrections, we cannot ignore that one’s
family can play a central role in facilitating successful prisoner reentry, one
of the most important, if often overlooked, functions of our penal system.
The criminal justice system’s interest in offenders prior to the service of a
sentence must focus on the inculpation of the guilty and the exculpation of
the innocent—a task routinely undermined by the provision of benefits for
family ties. Nevertheless, once an offender is sentenced and responsibility for
a crime is placed on the right shoulders, our penal system can rightfully draw
upon the resources of the family to help reintegrate an offender back into
society and encourage rehabilitation during periods of incarceration. It is
the penal context that the interests in rehabilitation and reintegration might
trump the considerations within our normative framework—and where
family networks might warrant benefits precisely because they are doing
work that is subcontracted out by the state. As we discussed in our introductory remarks to Chapter 2, one of the strong arguments for having the state
benefit the family arises when the family is doing work the state very much
wants done—but the task can be accomplished more cheaply and effectively
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by drawing upon the natural resources within the family. Nonetheless, our
normative framework remains useful in analyzing a host of prison policies.
For example, in trying to assess the furlough policies we recounted in
Chapter 1, our normative framework demands an inquiry into how such
policies could potentially implicate an ideal of fairness or equality. Why
should those with family members get more days off from their prison
sentences than those without family? Although our other normative considerations do not seem applicable to furloughs, our norm of equality seems
offended by policies that favor those with family members.
Similarly, visitation policies that bar visitors who are not within the state’s
definition of family are very unfair to those without a family recognized by
the state.71 Because courts give prison officials substantial discretion in
devising visitation policies,72 there can be inequities that escape notice.
Accordingly, the normative framework we offer here indicates that prisons
ought to devise such policies with care. It offends a sense of justice when
inmates with families receive preferential treatment via certain prison
policies as compared to those inmates without families. To the extent that
discrimination against those without families implicates our third normative consideration, our presumption against family ties benefits has some—
albeit limited—force.
Yet, in the post-sentence phase of the criminal justice system, we cannot
help but conclude that certain substantial interests of the state may counteract our worries about family ties benefits. First, only one of our four normative considerations is implicated here—the equality prong. Moreover, we
acknowledge the role that relations of caregiving can play in the corrections
system. The policy statements of the Federal Bureau of Prisons embrace
family ties because they can be especially rehabilitative.73 We acknowledge
that family reunification after incarceration may serve as an appropriate
predicate to favor the family in certain prison policies. Accordingly, our
sympathy for some of the “pro-family” arguments we adumbrated at the
beginning of Chapter 2 are given effect in this context. In particular, the state
interest in successful offender reentry informs our assessment of how family
ties should be addressed by the criminal justice system.
Still, as with child-sensitive arrest practices, we are mindful that there are
ways to administer these benefits that do not reinforce a heterosexist and
overly traditional conception of the family. Our preferred strategy would be to
look at function instead of status. If it is possible to craft the relevant policies
in ways that satisfy the goals of prisoner reentry without reliance on family
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status—because family status may be both under- and overinclusive—then
we should look at those possibilities rather than using the imperfect proxy of
“family” to achieve these goals.
An additional way in which we think the state can satisfy the imperatives
of punishment while exhibiting concern for innocent third parties and successful prisoner reentry is to realize that the coercion the state metes out as
part of its punishment need not be done in temporally contiguous ways.
If we think of punishment in terms of units, and we assume, arguendo, that
some period of incarceration is required, it might be better to ensure that
offenders spend five days a week working at home and the remaining two
days in a carceral facility. That might lengthen the period in which the punishment occurs, but it might also serve society’s interest by ameliorating
innocent third-party harms and achieving successful prisoner reentry.
If courts or prison officials are given the guided discretion to decide whether
a punishment-units approach should be embraced, then the offender is still
being coerced—and for the public’s purposes, not for the sole benefit of the
offender. Moreover, the condemnatory social message of this punishment
can still be expressed clearly by limiting the offender’s movements when not
serving time in prison.
A related issue requiring sensitive application connects to the placement of
inmates within the correctional system.74 If prisons are built in remote rural
areas, or if prisoners are sent to prisons far from their families, then it will be
harder for the families of most prisoners to visit. Equally difficult may be access
to the programs we want to make available to offenders as part of the coercive
punishment they endure at the hands of the state.75 Family ties are routinely
considered when establishing an inmate’s “place of service.”76 Although this
effort to use prison placement to help families might be seen as a family ties
benefit—and might also implicate the inequality/discrimination aspect of our
normative considerations (like furlough and visitation policies)—we think the
heightened state interest in successful reentry works to rebut the presumption
against such benefits. It seems perfectly appropriate for states to consider ease
of access for those who may facilitate reentry (whether family or friends) when
making decisions regarding prison construction or prison assignment after
conviction. A location-sensitive policy does not offend our four normative
considerations and simply prevents the intimates of inmates from paying
extra costs and forcing offenders to serve “harder” time.77 Still, our normative
consideration of nondiscrimination against those without family counsels for
sensitivity in designing such benefits: those with other good and rehabilitative
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reasons for visits, furloughs, and specific placement needs should be
heeded so as to minimize favoritism toward those with families recognized
by the state.
There is yet another potential state interest that also counsels for
more toleration of family ties benefits in the penal system, namely, the interests of extremely vulnerable third parties and their need for care. Just as
irreplaceable caregivers can, under certain conditions, get some reconfigured sentencing, they may appropriately be given special consideration in
their incarceration as well. As we mentioned in Chapter 1, a number of
innovative programs have been created to help mothers and their children
stay together, notwithstanding a prison sentence that would otherwise
seperate a mother from her children.78 To be sure, the focus on providing only
women with these alternatives could be said to implicate our first normative
consideration insofar as such programs reinforce traditional gender roles
and stereotypes (i.e., that parenting is primarily a woman’s responsibility, and
that men are entitled to less consideration for their status as fathers).
Moreover, our third normative consideration is potentially offended because
women who are not pregnant or mothers do not get the same “discount” in
their prison terms; and men are almost completely excluded from such
programs as the federal Mothers and Infants Nurturing Together (MINT)
Program and California’s Pregnant and Parenting Women’s Alternative
Sentencing Program Act.79 Finally, our fourth normative consideration is
implicated because such programs could set up incentives for mothers to be
targeted for criminal recruitment because they may be afforded especially
light sentences.
Nevertheless, we think these programs may yet be defensible in service of
the potential irreplaceability of a caregiver, something we discussed at length
above, in connection with sentencing. We would recommend, however, that
such programs become non-gendered, in that they be made available to men
who, for example, have sole custody of infants.

•

G. Conclusion

We think it bears emphasis that the accommodations to caregiving that we
endorse or tolerate in this Chapter might better be viewed as doing away
with a burden on all offenders than affording a real benefit to those with
family ties recognized by the state. For instance, time-deferred sentencing
for irreplaceable caregivers may benefit those with families more often
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than others, but we would not want to see the benefit of time-deferred sentencing restricted only to those who give care for their children. This is a
perfect example of how helping families need not offend our normative considerations—and we have no trouble signing on to policies that help families
in this benign way, affording a benefit in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
Although we are generally skeptical toward distributing family ties benefits
prior to and in determinations of criminal liability, and in many instances
of sentencing, when it comes to sentencing of irreplaceable caregivers
and matters affecting the incarceration of an offender, we are more
inclined to reengineer the current panoply of family ties benefits in terms
that are neutral to family status. In those contexts, we prefer to allocate
benefits in a manner sensitive to promoting established relationships of
caregiving.
We hope we have demonstrated how privileging individuals because of
their membership in a state-denominated family unit potentially threatens
some core functions of the criminal justice system. When we excuse certain
classes of individuals from prosecution entirely, solely on account of a family
relationship, we both allow potentially dangerous individuals to escape
punishment and create a more attractive class of accomplices. When we
allow a husband to prevent his wife from offering relevant testimony on the
witness stand that may exculpate someone else, we inhibit the truth-seeking
function of a criminal trial. When we allow a wife to claim a privilege but
not a partner in a same-sex relationship, we subtly but inevitably convey our
disapprobation of that relationship. Although this seemingly simple story
can get more complicated, we have argued that it rarely gets so complicated
as to sanction the privileging of family ties over our commitment to doing
justice in a sphere in which the liberty and lives of women and men are
at stake.
To be sure, the troubling normative costs we associate with these family
ties benefits require verification; and we hope other scholars will participate
in assessing the empirical costs of these family ties benefits.80 It is possible
that comparing crime rates in jurisdictions that have these benefits with
those that do not (both domestically and abroad) will yield interesting
results. Some family ties benefits for instance, may prove to be self-defeating.81 Other family ties benefits might demonstrate tangible public advantages, such as securing greater compliance with the legal system.82 And still
others are less susceptible to empirical “verification” because the benefits
involve tradeoffs between competing normative values, such as the family
ties benefits that pose risks to relevant equality norms.83
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Although we are open-minded about the possible empirical effects these
various benefits cause, we are, at least right now, doubtful that the family
needs systematic support through the use of criminal justice benefits in
order to enable and ensure its flourishing.84 We recognize that the tension
between loyalty to the family and loyalty to the state is real, and that the
choices faced by families like the Sheinbeins and Madoffs are agonizing. But
when conflicts between family and the criminal justice system arise, especially prior to the determination of the sentence, the state’s and the public’s
interests should generally prevail over the need to promote the comparatively private interest of family preservation and “harmony.” Indeed, if family
relationships involve criminal complicity, those families are already in disrepair and are likely undeserving of state protection.
Although our presumption against family ties benefits can be rebutted,
we believe the scrutiny called for under our presumption is warranted—and
entails curtailing some of the family ties benefits we have already and being
cautious in the creation of new ones.
But, thus far, we have addressed only part of the story. It is certainly true
that the criminal justice system extends a number of privileges and benefits
to those with state-recognized family relationships. There are, however, a
number of instances in which offenders are treated worse than other offenders by virtue of their family relationships. We turn to that part of the story in
the next half of the book.
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part two

Punishing Family Status
A Roadmap
In 2005, Christina Madison watched while her new husband repeatedly
punched her four-year-old son in the stomach after the child refused to get
dressed for school. Madison did nothing to stop her husband from hitting the
child. The child eventually died from internal bleeding as a result of a tear
in his intestine. Prosecutors charged Madison for her failure to act; she was
sentenced to twelve years in prison.1
Stories like Christina Madison’s abound. In the absence of her family
status, Christina’s omission or failure to rescue a child would trigger no
criminal liability. But because of it, she faces a very significant sentence. In
this part of the book, we examine the various places in the American
criminal justice system in which the law imposes burdens on defendants
on account of their familial status or familial connection to the crime. Where
do these burdens exist? Why do we have them? What, if anything, is wrong
with them? How can they be reformed? Thus, this part of the book analyzes
various “family ties burdens” and asks whether they are justifiable—or
whether they could be justified if redesigned. Although scholars have considered these burdens individually, part of our contribution here is viewing
these burdens synthetically and explaining what, if any, sense can be made
of them once taken as a whole.
Our research uncovers the following family ties burdens: parental responsibility laws imposing liability on parents because of crimes or misdeeds
committed by their children, omissions liability for failing to prevent harm to
family members, and criminal liability for nonpayment of child or parental
support. Defendants are also burdened on account of their family status
when they face prosecutions for incest, adultery, and bigamy.2 We survey
these family ties burdens in Chapter 4. In all seven of these instances, in
the absence of the particular familial status of the defendant, the actions
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or omissions at issue would largely be ignored by the criminal justice system
or, in some cases, treated more leniently.
We begin Chapter 5 by explaining why we have generally taken a
defendant-centered perspective in thinking about the sites of family ties
burdens, since many burdens on defendants based on family status may,
conversely, have been established in order to advantage the family members
of such defendants (and potential defendants).3 Focusing on family ties
burdens from the defendant’s perspective helps raise awareness about why
such burdens are normative yellow flags. As we explain, most centrally, they
have tremendous potential to discriminate.
Consider the example of omissions liability. When the state charges an
individual because of his or her failure to protect another human being from
harm, the state is signaling that the relationship at issue is one worthy of special treatment from the state. But in the context of family ties burdens, large
numbers of persons who might justifiably, in our view, see themselves as entitled to benefit from omissions liabilities are excluded. Absent a contract or
other special circumstances, a hypothetical Jill cannot rely upon the state to
signal to her life partner Denise that Denise is obligated by law to reasonably
prevent harm to Jill. When the state makes choices regarding families and
uses the criminal justice system to send normative signals about those
choices, it risks marginalizing persons who consider themselves family members but are not recognized as such by the state or other institutions. In this
sense, targeting persons with unusual treatment on account of familial status
is an underinclusive (and, at times, overinclusive) mechanism to distribute
both the tangible and expressive benefits conferred by the criminal law.
The rest of Chapter 5 constructs a normative framework to explain the
circumstances under which burdening family status might be justified. We
highlight that the vast majority of the burdens implicate the caregiving function of families. For example, society imposes liability on parents for their
omissions to reinforce the notion of a special obligation, one worthy of
enforcement through the criminal justice system, to care for their children
by protecting them from harm. The same logic of promoting caregiving plausibly motivates criminalization of nonpayment of child and parental support
and some of the other family ties burdens we discuss. The problem is that the
ways the promotion of caregiving is expressed in these family ties burdens
are at times illiberal and insufficient.
This conclusion is underwritten by an underappreciated point about how
the criminal justice system allocates family ties burdens. Our research shows
that the criminal justice system tends to enforce family ties burdens against
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those who have voluntarily chosen their caregiving role.4 In other words, stateimposed burdens tend to fall chiefly on those persons who have voluntarily
entered into a status relationship and enjoyed the privileges associated with
that relationship, thus making it seem more just to be required to carry some
burdens in return. Building upon this internal coherence, we argue that a voluntary caregiving orientation to burden allocation in the criminal justice
system is much more attractive than allocation on formal familial status alone.
Regardless of what one thinks about relational obligations within the family
that are divorced from ideas about consent or voluntarism, when it comes to
criminal justice design, liberal principles recommend focusing on voluntary
caregiving rather than an arbitrary status-based allocation of duties.
Indeed, a voluntarist approach to family ties burdens is expressive of and
consistent with our liberal minimalist orientation to criminal law legislation
more generally. That orientation, in other words, is liberal in that it justifies
additional interference into interpersonal relationships through criminal
sanction only through a showing that individuals have roughly consented to
these extra obligations by their antecedent conduct to join or start particular
relationships. And it is also liberal in a second sense, in that it tries to carve
out a large space for personal freedom to operate in a way compatible with
the personal freedom and security of others. It is only with respect to these
two notions (voluntarism and respect for robust individual liberties) that we
use the term liberal or liberalism.
Our orientation is minimalist in two ways too: first, we seek a narrow tailoring between government objectives and the means used to advance those
objectives, and second, we seek to constrain the use of the criminal law sanction when non-criminal measures are available and equally or nearly as effective in realizing the substantial interest the public has in reducing the
prohibited conduct. Thus, even when the promotion of voluntary caregiving
motivates the establishment of a family ties burden, that is not sufficient
justification if there are alternative and equally effective means of achieving
the goal without resort to the criminal justice system and its particular
power to infringe upon citizens’ liberties.
With these principles in mind, Chapter 6 rethinks the family ties burdens
we identified earlier. We hope to show why some burdens do not pass muster
and how others can be preserved in some form, as long as they are reconstructed to avoid the substantial costs of using family status alone to distribute burdens. Although we do not make the constitutional claim that family
status should be a suspect classification worthy of strict scrutiny when the
criminal justice system discriminatorily burdens individuals on the basis of
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family status, we do believe that, as a policy matter, the government should
view skeptically the use of family status. In other words, to use the language
of equal protection, without making the constitutional claim, the objective of
the government should be at least “important” and perhaps “compelling,”
and the means adopted to pursue that objective should be “narrowly tailored,” looking especially to see whether alternative non-criminal measures
might be equally effective. We also believe that the impairment of liberties
(including those associated with sexual autonomy) by pain of criminal sanction on the basis of family status needs to survive heightened (if not strict)
scrutiny as a matter of policy.5
As we discussed in the book’s Introduction, there are many important
studies of the ways various criminal justice policies unintentionally wreak
devastating harm on families and their communities. Our focus here is
different and has yet to be sufficiently addressed by the community of scholars interested in how the criminal justice system affects families. Here, we
examine those distinctively purposeful practices that consciously target
defendants for special burdens on account of their familial status. Scholars
have been successful in analyzing the effects of certain criminal justice policies and practices on the family. But most scholars have not recognized the
panoply of laws expressly written to disadvantage persons based on family
status alone. This part begins that inquiry.
In defining our focus this way, we do not intend to suggest that the particular liabilities addressed in this part of the book are necessarily guided by
the intent of hurting or burdening family life as such. Indeed, it may be that
many burdens on family status are “remedial” or intended to benefit family
life even though they penalize particular defendants on account of their
familial status. But in this context, it is worth remembering that many laws
disadvantaged women, for example, in the name of “protecting” them.6 Our
purpose here is to excavate the family ties burdens currently imposed by the
criminal justice system and to assess their desirability both now and as they
could be.
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four

A Survey of Family Ties Burdens

certain crimes permit the prosecution of a defendant for conduct that

would otherwise be lawful in the absence of a defendant’s familial connection to the crime. For instance, incest statutes generally proscribe sexual
conduct otherwise permitted between mature and consenting individuals.
The examples of this phenomenon on which we focus include certain
omissions and parental responsibility laws; incest, bigamy, and adultery
statutes; and statutes criminalizing the nonpayment of child and parental
support.1 In all of these examples, state-determined familial status alters the
blameworthiness that the criminal justice system assigns to the underlying
conduct.2 Although these examples are not necessarily exhaustive, we believe
they are the most frequently found examples of the criminal justice system’s
decision to criminalize certain conduct on the basis of family status.3 In what
follows, we provide an overview of the doctrine associated with these family
ties burdens.

•

A. Omissions Liability for Failure to Rescue
In June 2002, prosecutors charged Shavon Greene, a twenty-one-year-old
mother, with aggravated manslaughter after her boyfriend allegedly beat her
twenty-one-month-old daughter to death. The prosecutor did not allege
Greene was even present during the beating; instead, the prosecutor alleged
she had disregarded warnings from a social services investigator not to leave
the child alone with her boyfriend. Greene eventually pled guilty to culpable
negligence.4

At a high level of generality, the dominant rule in American criminal
justice (as well as tort law) systems remains that citizens are under no
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obligation to rescue each other.5 In other words, even though the failure to
help another person in distress can constitute a moral failing, the criminal
justice system does not generally impose liability on those who simply keep
on walking.6
The exceptions to the general rule are well-known. As the D.C. Circuit
stated in Jones v. United States:
There are at least four situations in which the failure to act may constitute
breach of a legal duty. One can be held criminally liable: first, where a statute imposes a duty to care for another; second, where one stands in a
certain status relationship to another; third, where one has assumed a
contractual duty to care for another; and fourth, where one has voluntary
assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to
prevent others from rendering aid.7
In addition, one bears liability if one directly created the conditions of the
victim’s peril or if one bears responsibility for the cause of the conditions of
peril to the victim (e.g., parents of children who pose peril to the victim).
There are limits to when liability will be imposed, however. First, liability will
not be imposed if rescue requires the defendant to make an undue sacrifice
or if the defendant cannot physically perform the rescue.8 Second, “the
defendant’s failure to act must be accompanied by whatever mens rea
the crime requires for its commission.”9
Of special interest here are the triggering conditions for liability based on
family status. The relationship of spouse to spouse and parent to child are paradigmatic, even if not exclusive, examples of status relationships in which one
owes a duty to rescue sufficient to trigger criminal responsibility (rather than
mere tort liability).10 Thus, if a defendant “realizes (or culpably fails to realize)
his wife is in danger, realizes (or culpably fails to realize) that he can rescue her
with minimal risk and/or sacrifice, and realizes (or culpably fails to realize) that
she is his wife,” then he can be liable for homicide “if he is aware of the existence
of the three elements (wife’s peril, his ability to rescue with low risk/effort, and
wife’s identity).”11 In the parent-child context, parents have been held criminally
liable for neglect for failing to protect a child who was being sexually abused by
another individual,12 and held criminally liable for manslaughter for failing to
protect a child from fatal physical abuse inflicted by another.13 These prosecutions exemplify the family ties burden phenomenon by which persons in certain family relationships are held accountable for harms to others even when
those harms are inflicted by another independent actor.
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Trying to understand who precisely faces omissions liability based on
the status of spouse or parent can be a bit tricky since these categories are
sometimes defined by courts with sensitivity to differing circumstances.
With respect to spouses or spouse-like relationships, courts have been leery
of recognizing the obligation to rescue outside of a state-sanctioned marriage. It is generally not enough to simply be dating or be paramours to trigger the duty to rescue,14 but some courts have recognized obligations between
unmarried couples. Where that has happened, however, it can often be
explained on alternative grounds, such as situations in which the long-term
girlfriend caused the peril to the boyfriend and thus is assigned a duty to
rescue for having created the peril.15 But drawing the line can be difficult in
other places too. Why should couples who married within days of meeting
each other have more legal obligations to each other than couples who have
lived together for ten years but never married? Why should the heterosexual
married couple have duties to rescue each other but not the long-term
homosexual couple who are legally prevented from marrying in most states?
What should happen when there is a married couple who have lived apart
for years but are not formally divorced?16
The murkiness is worse in the context of duties to rescue children. To be
sure, biological parental linkage is not required to create a duty and thus
the law places the same package of burdens on adoptive parents. But courts
are divided over whether to extend duties to rescue to people who have
not expressly consented to assuming legal responsibility for a custodial
role over the children.17 Further, just as biology may not be necessary to
impose a duty to rescue, there are certain circumstances in which it is
not sufficient: what should happen if biological parents have renounced or
terminated their parental rights prior to or after conception or birth of
the child, e.g., sperm or egg donors, or surrogate mothers and the resulting
children?
Importantly, consider the status relationships associated with grandparents, cousins, uncles, and aunts: none of these individuals is ever under
a legal duty to rescue their reciprocal relations—nor are siblings, regardless
of whether the relationship is biological, adoptive, or step-sibling in nature.
That said, it is possible that any one of these people might be under a duty
toward the victim for other reasons: perhaps they have induced detrimental
reliance, agreed to care for the victim, created the perils, etc.18 But in the
common law and around the country, it is exceptionally rare to find duties to
rescue based on familial status relationships outside the context of spousal
and parental relations.
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B. Parental Responsibility Laws
In St. Clair Shores, Michigan, prosecutors charged Susan and Anthony
Provenzino with a misdemeanor for failing to “exercise reasonable control”
over their sixteen-year-old son, Alex Provenzino.19 Alex had committed a
number of crimes, including burglarizing churches and homes and attacking
his father with a golf club. Despite knowledge of some of his burglaries, the
Provenzinos supported Alex’s release from juvenile custody, after which he
continued to commit crimes. The jury convicted the Provenzinos after fifteen
minutes of deliberation. The parents were each fined $100 and ordered to
pay $2,000 in court costs.20

Parental responsibility laws command widespread attention among politicians, courts, and academics.21 To provide an avenue of restitution for
victims and a stronger dose of deterrence to reduce the incidence of juvenile
crime, some jurisdictions permit criminal liability for parents whose children
misbehave.22 Statutes criminalizing the parenting of those like the
Provenzinos have an extended history,23 and their popularity seems to ebb
and flow.24 This section provides a short overview of the nature and scope of
parental responsibility laws in recent years and how courts have evaluated
them.
To begin with, it’s worth mentioning that most states have laws that specifically prohibit any adult from endangering the welfare of a minor or contributing to the delinquency of minors through specific affirmative actions,
such as knowingly providing guns or alcohol to them, which can be viewed
as proximate causes of the child’s wrongdoing.25 These kinds of statutes are
not only ubiquitous but longstanding, beginning at the latest in 1903.26 In
some instances, these statutes may also target any person’s omission that
arises under special circumstances, as opposed to affirmative acts, and
sometimes these statutes create liability resulting in fines or imprisonment
without any specific showing of fault required by the government.27
In truth, parental responsibility laws might reasonably be seen to encompass civil liability statutes or laws criminalizing the knowing contribution of
an adult to the minor’s violation of truancy and curfew laws, or laws creating
liability for parents who provide a weapon to a child.28 However, for our purposes here, we want to restrict what we refer to hereafter as parental responsibility laws to the category of criminal liability imposed upon family members
based on a theory of failure to supervise. This category is controversial in
large measure because, under a generalized failure to supervise theory, the
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wrongdoing of the defendant’s child is enough to trigger liability, subject, in
most cases, to certain affirmative defenses the parent may raise.29
In a number of cases, these laws require the government to show a lower
level of mens rea—usually criminal negligence, but in others strict liability. In
other situations, these improper parenting statutes differ from the general
delinquency statutes by defining the child’s misconduct with greater sweep
(beyond actual criminality). And in some cases, the parental responsibility
statute both lowers the mens rea and broadens the scope of a child’s misconduct (beyond actual criminality) that together expands potential liability for
parents.30 These parental responsibility statutes are different in that they have
to do with parents and legal guardians of the children—the scope does not
extend to any adult, unlike most of the statutes that address endangering the
welfare or contributing to delinquency of a child.31
These parental responsibility laws are exemplified by an Oregon statute
that holds parents criminally liable of a misdemeanor if their children violate
a curfew law, violate a truancy requirement, or commit an act that brings the
child within juvenile court jurisdiction.32 There does not need to be a showing that the parent specifically knew about or contributed to the violation
or criminal wrong by the child. Similarly, a Cleveland suburb not long ago
passed an ordinance under which parents can be charged with a crime based
on the misdeeds of their children; a third conviction under the statute could
result in parents serving 180 days in jail.33 Although parents would be permitted to raise as a defense that they had taken reasonable steps to control
the child, an Ohio court recently struck down the Cleveland ordinance
because it was inconsistent with a state statute requiring the person charged
to commit an act or omission as a predicate for culpability.34 The ordinance,
however, was modeled on a similar and widely reported law in Silverton,
Oregon.35 And according to the Mayor of Silverton, the law was very successful at reducing crime committed by juveniles in part because “[w]hen their
parents are being dragged into it, most kids see things a little differently. They
realize they’re not the only ones who pay the price for their actions, and kids
begin to take stock of themselves.”36
Because many of the failing to supervise laws are created at the municipal
level,37 they are more difficult to survey, and no accurate scholarly estimates
exist so far as we know.38 At the state level, only a few states appear to have
created parental responsibility statutes that go beyond the general delinquency statutes discussed above.39 But various cities or towns have similar
laws around the country.40 And some have created unique hybrid laws
that both lower the mens rea required for the parent and define as
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evidence of improper parenting conduct by a minor that would not be
separately subject to criminal sanction.41 Moreover, proposals to create such
liability regimes are regularly considered around the country.42
Jurisdictions vary with respect to how courts greet these legislative efforts.
To be sure, there are relatively few reported cases considering the constitutionality of these parental responsibility statutes. In addition to the court
that struck down the local Maple Heights ordinance, two state appellate
courts have also struck down parental responsibility statutes that rested
upon strict liability.43 In State v. Akers, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
struck down a statute that imposed criminal liability on parents for a child’s
violation of a statute concerning recreational vehicle usage. The court
concluded that the statute violated the due process clause of the state
constitution because it did not impose liability on the basis of any act or
omission committed by a parent but instead imposed liability solely because
of an individual’s status as a parent.44 Similarly, an appellate court in New
Jersey struck down a town’s parental responsibility ordinance under the
United States Constitution’s Due Process Clauses, concluding that its presumption that repeated juvenile misconduct “was the result of parental
action or inaction” could not be sustained based on the information about
the root causes of juvenile delinquency presented to the court.45
But not all courts have reached the same conclusions. The California
Supreme Court has upheld a parental responsibility statute with criminal
penalties.46 On its face, the statute seemed like a relatively straightforward
attempt to criminalize contributing to the delinquency of a minor, but a 1988
amendment to the statute provoked the constitutional challenge at issue.
According to the statute, “a parent or legal guardian to any person under the
age of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision,
protection, and control over their minor child.”47 The court rejected the
complainants’ challenge that the statute was “unconstitutionally vague,
overbroad, and an impingement on the right to privacy.”48 The court rejected
the vagueness challenge on the basis that requiring parents to exercise “reasonable care” provided “sufficiently certain” guidance because it “incorporates the definitions and the limits of parental duties that have long been a
part of California dependency law and tort law.”49 The court acknowledged
that “neither the amendment nor prior case law sets forth specific acts that
a parent must perform or avoid in order to fulfill the duty of supervision
and control” over minor children, but the court shrugged off that obvious
difficulty, stating that a statutory definition of perfect parenting would be
“inflexible.” Instead, “law-abiding parents” should simply understand that
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“the concept of reasonableness” should serve as their guide for complying
with the statute.50
Notwithstanding some courts’ disapproval of parental responsibility statutes, we anticipate that state and local legislatures will continue to explore
regulatory strategies to reduce juvenile misconduct that will invariably
burden those of a particular state-sanctioned family status.51 And burdens
they are. One of the most interesting features of these parental responsibility
laws is the way they frequently create liability for parents based on their
status as a parent and the misconduct of their child alone, leaving the intentionally responsible parent to plead their good parenting skills as an affirmative defense instead of making the prosecution show the absence of good
parenting as part of its case-in-chief against the parent.52 We say more about
the rationales and problems associated with these laws in Chapter 6.

•

C. Incest
In 1997, Allen and Patricia Muth were convicted of incest after they entered
into a sexual relationship and had four children. Allen and Patricia were biological brother and sister, although they did not meet until Patricia was eighteen because she had been in foster care since she was a baby. At the time of
their convictions, Allen was 45 and Patricia was 30. At the time of sentencing,
the judge stated “I believe severe punishment is warranted in this case. . . .
I think they have to be separated. It’s the only way to prevent them from having
intercourse in the future.” 53 The judge then sentenced Allen to five years in
prison and Patricia to five years. Their parental rights to at least one of their
children were also terminated because of the incestuous relationship.54

Incest laws, which prohibit both sexual relations and marriage within certain kinship relations, reflect one of the enduring sexual taboos.55 Perhaps
surprisingly, incest was not a crime at English common law,56 and it is not
even today a punishable offense in all jurisdictions.57 It is also yet another
complicated example of a situation in which criminal liability may attach to
a person only on account of some familial status (though as we suggested in
Part I, it can sometimes be “beneficial” for a defendant to be prosecuted
under incest laws rather than generally applicable sexual misconduct laws,
because the penalties and collateral consequences may actually be less
severe).58 The elements of incest are usually (1) sexual relations between two
persons within a particular prohibited level of consanguinity (or affinity
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through adoption or marriage); and (2) the defendant’s awareness of that
relationship.59
While prohibitions of incest are usually general, in theory they can be
grouped into three different categories: regulation of sex between adults,
regulation of sex between an adult and a minor, and regulation of sex between
minors. Most jurisdictions are unlikely to make these distinctions; indeed,
under most incest statutes, it is irrelevant whether the participants jointly
consent to the sexual activity.60 The issue of consent bears further mention.
As alluded to above, in most states, lack of consent is not an articulated element of the incest charge, which, in theory, renders victims vulnerable to
prosecution under statutes that are lacking specificity. In cases in which joint
consent exists, both parties may still be criminally liable, as in the case of the
Muths, whose parental rights were terminated and who were both convicted
and incarcerated. This crudeness in drafting raises a series of normative
questions we address in Chapter 6.
In the United States, all states but Rhode Island have criminal prohibitions on at least some consanguineous relations between family members
who are not a so-called conjugal couple, although there is some variation
between the states in terms of what relationships are prohibited.61 For
example, all states having criminal incest statutes ban sexual relationships
between (biological) parents and their children, regardless of the child’s age,62
but not all incest statutes prohibit sex between adult stepchildren and the
stepparent.63 All states with incest statutes also ban sexual relationships
between consanguineous siblings and most ban relationships between aunts
and uncles and their nephews and nieces.64 There is more divergence on the
question of cousins; only eight states criminalize sexual contact between
first cousins,65 but twenty-five states do not permit first cousins to marry.
Some states also extend their prohibitions beyond blood relationships:
“twenty-two states criminalize sex between stepparents and stepchildren,”
and some states treat adopted children the same as biological children for
purposes of incest prohibitions.66

•

D. Bigamy
In 1953, Marlyne Hammon’s father and dozens of other men in her community were arrested and sent to jail on charges of polygamy. Although her
father was released shortly thereafter, the family corresponded in secret and
continued to live apart because they feared further prosecution. Now an
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adult, Hammon is involved in a polygamous relationship and advocates for
the decriminalization of polygamy.67
Bigamy laws in the United States, broadly stated, prohibit an individual
from entering into multiple and simultaneous marriages when the first
spouse is still alive and the initial marriage relationship has not been terminated.68 Although there is some variation around the country regarding
incest prohibitions or the scope of omissions liability and parental responsibility laws, no such ambivalence exists regarding criminal laws prohibiting
polygamy in the United States. Indeed, these bigamy laws are universal
around the country,69 and, with a few exceptions in certain geographic communities, they are often enforced.70 As we discuss in Chapter 6, these
prohibitions raise substantial questions about the proper scope of the criminal law and its relationship to issues of family status.

•

E. Adultery
In 2004, John R. Bushey Jr., the former town attorney of Luray, Virginia, was
charged with adultery after his paramour reported the misconduct to the
police when the affair terminated. Bushey eventually pled guilty and was
sentenced to twenty hours of community service. Along with twenty-three
other states, Virginia can prosecute a husband or wife for having consensual
sex outside marriage.71

Adultery laws, at least as crafted in some jurisdictions without fornication
statutes,72 prohibit a married individual from engaging in extramarital sex,
notwithstanding that such sexual relations would not otherwise be subjected
to legal sanction.73 Perhaps because of the pervasiveness of adultery,74 a bare
majority of states no longer regulate extramarital relations,75 even though
large majorities of Americans continue to view adultery as immoral.76
Regardless of the cause of adultery’s relative demise as a crime, we recognize
that most jurisdictions do not actively prosecute or punish this misconduct
anymore, even though twenty-three states and the District of Columbia still
have statutes criminalizing this conduct.77
Although one might be tempted to dismiss the significance of adultery laws
today, we are loathe to do so in light of the continued enforcement of such laws
in some jurisdictions,78 especially in the military.79 Indeed, although civilian
courts have generally seen a decrease in adultery prosecutions, there is a
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steady flow of such prosecutions in the military courts.80 And during the
Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, many members of the armed forces were especially
critical of their Commander-in-Chief, who could have faced a court-martial on
adultery-related charges if he had been a mere service member.81 Additionally,
even though someone might not get prosecuted for the crime of adultery in a
jurisdiction forbidding such misconduct, it bears mention that the fact that
the criminal laws remain on the books has real consequences in civil contexts
other than the military, such as child custody, adoption, and employment.82
Moreover, there is an odd discrimination resulting from adultery laws that only
apply to heterosexual couples,83 which we think needs some articulation and
evaluation. It goes without saying that, as applied to the defendant who is
married, adultery laws are a clear and conventional family ties burden.

•

F. Nonpayment of Child Support
In 1997, an Anchorage, Alaska father was sentenced to five days in prison
and five years probation for failing to pay almost $98,000 in child support.84
A government official stated: “Our job is to collect money for children. Parents
need to realize there are penalties for ignoring their children.”85

Ordinarily, the failure to pay a debt to a non-governmental entity (like
one’s cable TV provider) is not a criminal act.86 An aggrieved party is forced
to pursue civil remedies to obtain redress.87 In contrast, failure to pay child
support is a crime. For example, the Child Support Recovery Act,88 amended
in 1998 as the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act,89 makes it a federal crime
to owe more than $5,000 in child support or to be in arrears for longer than
one year if the child owed the support lives in a different state than the delinquent parent. In addition, many states have statutes criminalizing a parent’s
failure to pay child support.90 This statutory regime demonstrates yet another
way family status can turn an act that ordinarily would be non-criminal into
a criminal one.

•

G. Nonpayment of Parental Support

The last area we explore here is a variant of the preceding family ties burden.
It has to do with what are sometimes called filial responsibility laws.91
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These laws, as their name suggests, require adult children to provide care or
support to their indigent parents if the adult children have the financial
means. But filial responsibility is actually a bit of a misnomer; many of the
very statutes that establish these obligations to parents also encompass
the obligation to materially support spouses and children as well. Most of
the thirty states that have filial responsibility statutes authorize only civil
actions. Nonetheless, twelve states currently authorize courts to levy a
criminal sanction upon adult children who fail to provide adequate care for
their parents.92 When applied to the situation of adult children with elderly
and indigent parents, it bears mention that, in contrast to the period prior
to the 1970s, the vast majority of these state statutes are not enforced at all,
or very rarely, especially in the criminal context.93
As to the mechanics of these statutes, California’s language is typical:
“every adult child who, having the ability so to do, fails to provide necessary
food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance for an indigent parent, is guilty
of a misdemeanor.”94 Massachusetts, like some other states, adds a proviso
that such liability will not attach to a person who was not supported by
parents as a minor or to a person who, “being one of two or more children,
has made proper and reasonable contribution toward the support of such
parent.”95 Our analysis in Chapter 6 will focus on the requirement to support
parents under these laws.
Having canvassed some of the ways that a defendant’s family status is
burdened in the criminal justice system, we now turn to develop a normative
framework to assess these various family ties burdens.
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five

A Normative Framework for Family Ties Burdens

in the previous chapter, we identified some practices we characterize as
family ties burdens. Here, we present a normative framework for analyzing
whether and how such burdens can be justified. First, we explain why we
adopt a defendant-centered perspective despite the fact that when other perspectives are introduced, family ties burdens could be thought of as bringing
benefits to the family as an institution or to particular family members other
than the defendant. Then, we revisit some of the normative costs of family ties
benefits that we explored earlier in the book to ascertain whether any retain
applicability in the context of family ties burdens. Finally, we highlight the voluntary caregiving feature we see in the structure of many family ties burdens.
We think this feature of voluntary caregiving can serve as a guide for scrutinizing burdens more generally, especially within a criminal law framework
informed by what we call a “liberal minimalist” approach. Informed by these
various principles, we offer a potential structure of normative analysis for
laws creating criminal liability predicated on the defendant’s family status.

•

A. A Defendant-Centered Perspective, Among
Others

In looking at family ties burdens, we have been making a claim that the
defendant is being treated differently, on account of some action or inaction,
because of his family status. In this Section, we explain why we make the
choice to use a defendant-centered perspective but we also try to contextualize that choice among the other perspectives one could adopt when
looking at the laws that create family ties burdens in the criminal justice
system.

75
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1. The Defendant as the Object of Punitive Coercion
In examining family ties burdens the way we have examined family ties
benefits in Part I, we are clearly looking at the nature of the wrongdoing from
the defendant’s perspective. We think this perspective is important because
it is, after all, the defendant whose liberty the state seeks to place in peril. The
conduct-guiding rules at the core of this book are aimed at defendants—and
it seems necessary to analyze those conduct-guiding rules on their own
terms. Ultimately, it is the defendants who are coerced in the name of state
punishment; and the criminal justice system’s coercive nature is its most
important feature demanding justification.
But there is, of course, much more to say on the matter. Although family
ties burdens might be thought of as burdens on the defendant, they might
also be viewed as burdens on or benefits to others, such as victims, other
family members, the state, or society at large. Let us explain how these other
perspectives might operate.

2. Family Members as the Object of Harm
In a number of cases, the burden imposed on the defendant is also a burden
on those whom it is allegedly supposed to help. Thus, for example, a woman
whose ex-spouse is jailed for failure to pay child support may object on the
ground that this burden imposes a terrible hardship on her family as well as
on the defendant, in that it reduces the ability of her children’s father to
play any kind of meaningful role in their lives. Thus, many of the practices we
have described in Chapter 4 powerfully affect family interests beyond those
of the defendant. Consider how the punishment of someone for failing to
supervise, rescue, or support a family member might impair that person’s
future ability or willingness to supervise, rescue, or support a family member.
The nature and intensity of the punishment for the offender may have
serious detrimental effects on the very family members who were initially
harmed by the defendant’s antecedent failure to satisfy his duty. The same is
true, at least in certain conditions, when we punish offenders for bigamy,
incest, or adultery. Incarceration or fines for violation of these laws may
impair the capacity of the offenders to care for and support their families.
In other words, the children in the Muth family felt the weight of that family
ties burden too.
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Undoubtedly, no legislator enacts these family ties burdens with the
intention of inflicting harm on innocent family members. But because
the harms to innocent third parties are often foreseeable, it is the
legislators’ obligation to weigh these costs in the balance of deciding
whether and how to insert family ties burdens in the criminal justice
system.

3. Burdens as Devices for Promoting “Family Life and
Values”
Another prism arises when we view these laws from the ex ante rather
than the ex post perspective. In other words, we might consider whether
the family as a social institution could be described as benefiting from
the law creating the family ties burden. On this view, what appears to be
a penalty on familial status in an individual case could have been created
as part of a strategy designed to confer benefits to the social institution of
the family as a whole. So, even if some individual families lose out because
of the penalty imposed on the defendant enduring the family ties burden,
the goal is that many more families will ultimately benefit from having
these laws.
For instance, the recent criminalization of nonpayment of child support
looks like a family ties burden in the sense we defined it earlier. That is
because, as a general matter, the failure to pay a debt is not a reason for
criminal punishment. Indeed, other legal mechanisms exist to help debtors,
most prominently bankruptcy. But now, the failure to pay child support,
which is a form of debt, is a basis for criminal punishment. Indeed, family
support obligations may not generally be discharged during bankruptcy.
Thus, failures to meet some kinds of intrafamilial financial obligations are
now penalized much more harshly than the failure to meet other financial
obligations. That definitely creates a burden on a defendant, at least as we
defined it earlier.
Characterizing these practices as burdens on the particular defendant
might be mistaken if we alter the lens through which we are looking at the
problem. If we move from an ex post perspective focused on the defendant to
an ex ante perspective focused on the institution of the family, the offender
in question might have agreed with having these family ties burdens as laws
if he assessed them impartially, that is, without anticipating that he would
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end up being the target of these laws. He might approve of these laws in the
belief that the family ties burdens were important to promote a certain vision
of family life within society. Thus, from the ex ante position, criminalizing
failures to rescue, failures to supervise, or failures to support, and banning
incest, adultery, or bigamy are all aimed at keeping certain kinds of families
together to perform the work associated with a certain kind of idealized
family life. If this is the purpose, the policy of criminalizing nonpayment of
child support might provide a benefit to both the offender and the institution of the family overall. Imposing a penalty on the offender for his violation
of these laws is simply a way to ensure that people do not defect from what
they themselves, as reasonable and rational persons working in concert with
each other, would otherwise agree is needed to secure the conditions for
human flourishing.1

4. Burdens as Devices to Serve Goals Beyond Family
Promotion
Family ties burdens might have other rationales too—aside from simply promoting a particular vision of family life. First, the various burdens placed on
offenders may reflect the imperfect or indirect choices of decision makers in
the criminal justice system to enhance distinctive criminal justice goals such
as deterrence or retribution. For example, the state legislature may be using
the criminal justice system to communicate to offenders that when one
wrongs certain family members, one is more worthy of reproach and condemnation.2 In this respect, the burdens might be thought to advance the
criminal justice system’s norm-projection purposes by reflecting society’s
deep values. Thus, certain burdens based on failures to care for one’s family
members entail a breach of a trust relationship, which certain persons created when opting into a caregiving relationship.3 If heightened penalties
attach in the context of crimes against victims with whom one has opted into
a relationship of caregiving, then those burdens might be justifiable: when one
hurts or fails to protect someone whom one has already signaled to society
that one will care for, then one might plausibly say there is an extra wrong
(a breach of trust based on implicit or explicit promise) that has been committed. That wrong is not only a wrong against a particular victim, remediable by
compensation. Rather, the wrong has a different texture because the wrongdoer has lulled others in the public into a false sense of security, leading the
public to fail to help or monitor the vulnerable person in question.
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A distinct but related idea is that these burdens serve other legitimate
goals of the state that have little to do with deterrence or norm projection
or even the vitality of family life. On this view, it might be that family ties
burdens stand to serve other purposes that, in fact, directly benefit the state.
For instance, the legislature might believe that imposing impediments to
even consensual incest between adult siblings is important for reducing
the prospects of increased social expenditures on food stamps and medical
care, because the legislature assumes that incestuous relationships will produce offspring who are more likely to require subsidized medical support.4
Again, here, we will have to weigh very carefully these purported benefits in
any one instance; if they serve compelling or important interests, perhaps
discrimination on the basis of family status is justifiable. But these compelling interests cannot be assessed in the abstract and must be pursued in
the specific context of each burden, an analysis we begin undertaking in the
next chapter.

5. Burdens in Relation to Family Ties Benefits
As shown in the preceding discussion, we obviously do not deny that the
laws creating what we call family ties burdens lend themselves to examination from a variety of perspectives. We do think, however, that there is something about these family ties burdens that requires more caution than
typically extended in discussions of any one of these laws in isolation from
one another and in isolation from the benefits the criminal justice system
extends to defendants based on family status. Indeed, in light of the fact that
our work in the first half of the book examines the benefits the criminal justice system extends to defendants based on family status, we don’t think
there is something inherently biased when we look at the burdens placed on
family ties here. To our minds, then, the inquiry at the core of this part of the
book is important—when should family ties become the basis of distinctively
criminal liability?
One answer to this question would be to look at these burdens in relation
to the various family ties benefits. It might be thought that the burdens “balance out” this discriminatory treatment pervasive within the criminal justice
system, just as, perhaps, family ties benefits may be a form of compensation
for the havoc the criminal justice system indirectly wreaks upon families.
But balance itself requires further justification to explain why there is a need
to have any family ties benefits or burdens at all. After all, there would be
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reciprocity or balance in the absence of both family ties benefits and family
ties burdens.
The better approach, we think, sees family ties benefits or burdens or both
as serving some “protective” role of a particular notion of family and its associated caregiving responsibilities. But this protective role itself needs further
elaboration. Consider the following: how exactly do sentencing discounts for
those with family ties and responsibilities rest consistently with criminalizing polygamy, adultery, or incest? At first glance, the benefit and burden
seem to be in tension—why would we make allowances based on family ties
in one place and then punish based on family ties in the other situation?
But there may be an identifiable logic here. The former—sentencing discounts based on familial obligations—is arguably protective of family caregiving functions ex post. The others can be deemed “protective” of such
caregiving functions from an ex ante perspective. That’s because some might
plausibly view incest, adultery, or polygamy (or the conduct giving rise to any
of the other family ties burdens) as endangering the caregiving functions
associated with the traditional family unit. On this view, these family ties
burdens and benefits work in tandem to signal that society cares deeply
about promoting particular conceptions of family even when they interfere
with other norms informing the construction of an attractive and effective
criminal justice system.
While this explanation sounds plausible, it suffers from the randomness
of choice as to when to adopt an ex ante perspective and when to adopt an
ex post perspective. It is arbitrary because it chooses to justify the practices
by selecting an ex post focus on benefits and an ex ante focus on burdens
without any further explanation of why such a choice is justifiable. The problem is that the protective function could arguably be promoted by selecting
an ex ante view of benefits and an ex post view of burdens. But that would
require a radical reorientation of the rules we have.
To illustrate: when taking an ex ante perspective on family ties benefits,
one might think that if a state decided it will not give sentencing discounts
based on family ties and responsibilities, then that would create extra deterrence with those parents sensitive to the signals the criminal law is emitting.
The same rationale attaches to spousal testimonial immunities or exemptions from prosecution for harboring fugitives. In those situations, ex ante,
people might think that they will forbear from crime so as not to put their
loved ones in jeopardy of having to testify against them or to house them
when they are fugitives. Forbearing from wrongdoing could be a way to
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demonstrate how they care about each other because it avoids putting the
family members in a tough spot later on, a spot where they will have
to choose between the obligations of kinship and citizenship. Moreover,
because the ex ante view means that persons will consider themselves
from the perspective of the victim’s family at least as much as the perspective
of the accused’s family, they will have a more impartial and multifaceted
view about what the better rules are here. Examined ex ante, most of the
family ties benefits should be jettisoned when they interfere with particular
criminal justice objectives they otherwise value. All this would be an argument for getting rid of at least those family ties benefits that impede criminal
justice objectives.
By contrast, when examining family ties burdens from the defendant’s
ex post point of view, the defendant will strenuously argue that punishment
for the family ties burdens will actually serve to interfere with caregiving
roles served (or potentially served) by the defendant—especially when they
strip resources (time, liberty, and money) from the defendant that might
otherwise be allocated toward caregiving functions.
The preceding discussion shows only that legislators need not have necessarily adopted an ex post view of benefits and an ex ante view of family ties
burdens. Moreover, since legislatures and scholars have likely not looked at
these benefits and burdens systematically and as designed to be offsetting,
critical and independent analysis is warranted.

•

B. Revisiting the Costs of Family Ties Benefits

When we analyzed family ties benefits in the first half of the book, we
scrutinized the plausible justifications for getting the state to help the family
in Chapter 2. There, we highlighted how critical it is to appreciate how
the family both molds the individual and reduces the states’ burdens.
Indeed, without repeating our views unnecessarily, we recognize that
the institution of the family helps create and fashion our individual identities, our “historical,”5 “constitutive,”6 or “situated”7 selves that depend heavily
on our families and our familial associations for survival and sustenance.8
And by giving families special support, the state can economize on expenditures that it would otherwise be forced to bear in educating its citizenry and
preparing its members to contribute to the stability and flourishing of the
regime.
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Notwithstanding the recognition that the family’s role properly warrants,
and the risk that states incur of irrelevance and illegitimacy when they
fail to treat persons as constituted selves, we ultimately concluded in
Chapter 2 that general arguments rooted in communitarian political theory
were insufficient to underwrite the special treatment of the family in the
criminal justice system. In particular, we noted how these family ties
benefits create the risks of inequality, gender bias, inaccuracy, and more
crime. Consequently, we expressed hesitation and skepticism toward many
of the family ties benefits distributed throughout the criminal justice
system.
The reasons for our skepticism toward the distribution of family ties benefits inform our approach to thinking about family ties burdens. First, we
must address whether, and to what degree, the normative considerations we
identified earlier in connection with family ties benefits—patriarchal domination and gender bias, inaccuracy, inequality, and crime-creation—apply in
the context of family ties burdens. But because we are also looking at the
creation of criminal liability (as opposed to exemptions or benefits), we must
also say a bit more about the liberal minimalism that informs our view of the
proper basis of criminal liability in a liberal democracy.
Let’s begin with the framework used for assessing family ties benefits and
how it translates to the context of burdens. One can see relatively quickly
that two of these considerations—crime creation and inaccuracy—are
mostly inapplicable in the context of family ties burdens. In other words,
unlike family ties benefits, family ties burdens rarely trigger concerns that
they will create more misconduct or impede the accurate prosecution of the
guilty and the exoneration of the innocent.9 Although it may be possible that
these two costs are implicated in a hypothetical burden that we have not
identified, we do not see them as generally applicable in the case of family
ties burdens and do not think it would be appropriate to criticize family ties
burdens along these lines.
But two of the normative considerations that we identified earlier do
seem generally relevant when analyzing family ties burdens: inequality (and
its relationship to morally arbitrary discrimination) and the related issue of
gender bias. Notice that although inequality and gendered effects of a neutrally drawn criminal justice regulation would not come within the ambit
of our discussion—for family ties burdens, as we define them, must facially
discriminate against family status—they are normatively relevant in judging
the viability of any particular burden drawn on the basis of family status.
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So, even though omissions liability, bigamy, and nonpayment of child support law are, for example, written in gender-neutral terms, once they are
identified as facially discriminatory against family members, it is appropriate
to ask under our model whether they have effects that reinforce gender
stereotypes.

1. Inequality and Discrimination
In many contexts, family ties burdens risk treating similar conduct
unequally—and affirmative discrimination against the family is hard to justify. For example, incest prohibitions affecting consensual sexual relations
among adults restrict liberties that would otherwise be unregulated and
generally protected. The nonpayment of a debt becomes a criminal offense
in one context (child support) while it remains a civil action in most others.
Although it is obvious through the exaction of burdens that we are often
seeking to have family members take special precautionary measures to
protect vulnerable potential victims, the tool of punishing otherwise
non-criminal conduct on the basis of familial status alone is surely worth
scrutinizing more carefully, since it does implicate norms of equality and
nondiscrimination that a criminal justice system within a constitutional
democracy should embrace.10
Indeed, as a general matter—and in ways we will expand upon presently—
we tend to think that targeting familial status is generally both an overinclusive
and underinclusive approach to achieving sound policy objectives. It may
make sense for the criminal justice system to try to protect our most vulnerable members of society. But many types of citizens are vulnerable, and targeting the state-defined family is not a sufficiently narrowly tailored means to
achieving that objective. Nothing about estranged family members, for example, necessarily renders them especially vulnerable to one another to justify the
imposition of special burdens upon offenders and potential offenders. Thus,
family ties burdens could be overbroad if they penalized, say, estranged
siblings with duties to rescue, support, or supervise. By contrast, many vulnerable citizens warrant protections that the criminal law currently renders
unavailable. The families of same-sex couples, for example, experience the
same vulnerabilities as the idealized traditional family does—but get few or
none of the criminal law protections. Thus, family ties burdens that do not
protect people who would agree to such protection and such burdens ex ante
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should be reconfigured to promote the underlying value of voluntary caregiving relationships. We say more about this below.

2. Gender Bias, Heteronormativity, and
Repronormativity
Imposing a burden or penalty on an individual in the criminal justice system
solely on the basis of family ties enmeshes the state in an expressly normative dispute over who counts as family and who does not—and in what the
family should be doing, namely, procreating.
And the position the state takes is one that is not merely conventional; it
also threatens to promote a discriminatory and gendered set of policies.
Thus, as noted above, in the context of family ties burdens, large numbers of
persons who might (justifiably, in our view) see themselves as entitled to
benefit from the imposition of family ties burdens are excluded. In this sense,
the use of the family as traditionally delineated is an underinclusive (and at
times, overinclusive) mechanism to distribute the tangible and expressive
benefits conferred by the criminal law when it targets persons with unusual
treatment on account of familial status. Although the exclusion of same-sex
coupling is the most obvious example of the criminal law’s heteronormativity bias,11 grandparents and other relatives routinely create homes that fall
outside the criminal law’s design for family ties burdens as well.12
Additionally, as we will argue, several of the family ties burdens express a
clear policy to promote procreation—an orientation some scholars have
called repronormativity.13 To the extent that the criminal justice system is
engaged in penalizing citizens criminally to further its repronormative
agenda, we think that calls for special justification. On the other hand, we
think that some family ties burdens are a useful counterbalance to repronormativity bias. That is, although the state promotes having children, some of
the family ties burdens serve as a way to mitigate the effects of subsidizing
procreation through tax and welfare policies.
Finally, in certain circumstances, family ties burdens are used in ways
that reinforce gender stereotypes. Although routinely drafted today in
gender-neutral terms, many family ties burdens raise substantial questions
about gender relations more broadly—and once a family ties burden is identified, it seems fair game to analyze whether the burden is contributing to
gender bias more systematically. As we explain in Chapter 6, we think that
some of the family ties burdens raise this concern.
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C. Uncovering a Structure of Family Ties Burdens:
Voluntary Caregiving

Five of the seven family ties burdens we find in the law—omissions liability
( for failure to rescue), parental responsibility laws, bigamy, adultery, and
nonpayment of child support—reflect a pattern that, to our mind, has not
been sufficiently emphasized. This pattern suggests an internal structure
that we find helpful in rethinking family ties burdens in our criminal justice
system.
Specifically, these five burdens occur in the context of relationships that
have a voluntary or opt-in nature, meaning that the individual who faces the
burden has voluntarily entered into the relationship that serves as the basis of
potential subsequent liability for doing or forbearing from actions that would
otherwise be lawful. This is not the case with most incest statutes, which prohibit sexual conduct in relationships that are both voluntarily and involuntarily created. Nor is it the case with filial responsibility statutes, which attach
liability to persons who did not consent to the relationship—though there is,
perhaps, some reason to marginalize this example in light of the relatively
trivial level of enforcement. But if one looks at the dominant practices with
respect to family ties burdens, they are imposed on defendants in two kinds of
relationships: spouse to spouse and parent to child.
Although we do not see this pattern as itself authoritative, we do think it
is illuminating in various ways. First, when family ties burdens are limited to
relationships reflecting this voluntary nature, we find the imposition of these
burdens more attractive. The voluntary nature at the heart of these obligations takes at least some of the bite out of the charge of discrimination: if
parties freely choose relationships that themselves trigger liability after fair
notice, liability on the basis of family status seems more defensible, at least
up to a point at which the penalty is proportionate to the wrongdoing and
the reason for imposing the burden can withstand some critical scrutiny of
the sort we describe below.14
While voluntarism matters, there’s also a basic trade-off going on: if one
wishes to benefit from the ways in which society privileges building family
relationships through institutions of distributive justice, then one needs to
be aware that greater burdens may be imposed to ensure the discharge of one’s
caregiving responsibilities. Moreover, in light of the fact that society confers so
much leeway to persons regarding how they treat children, there is a strong
reason to create a floor of obligations to rescue, support, and supervise in that
context. By contrast, extending family ties benefits only to those who have
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opted in to relationships of caregiving seems to discriminate more against
those who are deprived of the opportunity to develop legally recognized
caregiving relationships in the first place. In other words, not everyone can
choose (or wants to choose) to marry or procreate—and those who do not
make this choice should generally not be treated disfavorably by the criminal
justice system.
To be sure, voluntary relations can be fuzzy at the margins: Have we really
chosen our in-laws even though they have not chosen us? Have we really
chosen to have children when a pregnancy is the result of failed birth control
methods? Still, we think the relatively easy cases of spousal and parent-child
relationships help expose an important insight about appropriate burden
distribution; that is, family ties burdens generally seem more palatable in the
context of voluntary relationships of caregiving.
Why should voluntariness matter? For one thing, restricting the imposition of family ties burdens to those who choose to bear them is a way of
respecting one’s autonomy; if we forced all sorts of obligations on family members who did not choose to enter a relationship of care with someone, we
would be impinging on their reasonable liberty interests. This is why we think
the filial responsibility statutes have been improperly adopted—they are basically illiberal, as we explain in Chapter 6, because their basis is established
through reciprocity and “required” gratitude, rather than consent. Incest laws
that do not track consent suffer from similar problems.
Additionally, the special obligations some family ties burdens impose can
be understood in terms of signaling theory.15 On this view, family ties burdens are appropriately imposed on someone who has voluntarily entered
into and maintained a relationship because by their consent to that relationship they are signaling to others that they are going to be “first responders;”
society can then trust them to look after the people with whom they have
created a covenant of caregiving. The germ of this idea appears in duty to
rescue law.
As we discussed earlier, one does not generally labor under a duty to
rescue other people.16 But as we explained, there are widely acknowledged
exceptions to this no-duty principle. For instance, if Alice is walking by the
beach and sees Charlie drowning, and she then waves away Bob, who was
also on his way to rescue Charlie, Alice is now under a special obligation to
rescue Charlie. She cannot just walk away at that point, absent special justification (such as a new threat to her life). The actions of marrying or parenting can be interpreted to be creating similar statements about responsibility.
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When a person enters into a covenant of care in the form of marriage or
parenting, one message that decision signals to society is that she will be a
“first responder” to the person with whom she is covenanting when that
person is in danger.
Beyond signaling a willingness to be a first responder, those whose actions
exhibit a willingness to take on the obligations of spouse or parent have also
signaled their willingness to create a relationship of trust to care and support
the other spouse or child. When someone fails to rescue, support, or supervise (in the case of minors), there is a breach of that trust relationship, a breach
which the state has an especial interest in since the state has been effectively
waved away by the person opting into the caregiving relationship.17
It follows, we believe, that if voluntariness matters, then a family ties
burden should not be placed on someone who has had a familial status
imposed upon him. Consider siblings. Almost no child freely chooses whether
or not to have a sibling; that decision is generally made by parents.
Unsurprisingly, the law ordinarily does not impose special obligations upon
an individual to take or face risks on a sibling’s behalf. Other family relations
fall into the same category: no one freely chooses whether to have an aunt,
uncle, or cousin.
By this logic, it seems clear that some family relationships are involuntary
in the sense that they were not deliberately entered into by the relevant parties. The filial responsibility laws, which place burdens on adult children to
support their parents in their dotage, are an example of a family ties burden
that is at odds with the general vein of promoting voluntary caregiving relationships. The children never consented to the relationship they have with
their parents. Indeed, maybe that explains why there is so little enforcement
in the case of this family ties burden.
The more difficult question is whether there are family relationships that
are, in fact, truly voluntary. At first blush, the most obvious example of a voluntary relationship would seem to be that of spouses—it is certainly true for
most cultures in this country that no one is forced to marry and individuals
may freely choose their own partner.18 To be sure, some human trafficking
victims are coerced into marriage, but that marriage results from legal wrongdoing; it does not instantiate or exemplify what we think to be marriage’s
modern nature.19 Although some have argued that social and economic
forces render marriage compulsory,20 we think such conclusions are generally unpersuasive. The strong social and economic pressure to marry does
not vitiate the voluntariness that renders people’s decisions their own for
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the purposes of being responsible to take on family ties burdens and benefits.
Of course, current government policies and social norms undoubtedly
reward an individual’s decision to marry, and make that choice more attractive, but these rewards nonetheless stop short of compelling an individual to
marry. By the same token, some government policies also prevent an individual from marrying a person of his or her choice and that, to our mind, is
an undue intrusion of the state, since it denies opportunities and expressive
benefits on grounds we find morally irrelevant.
As to the parent-child relationship, we see this relationship as generally
voluntary (although there might be some social pressures in some communities to reproduce).21 A mother who does not wish to parent is legally free to
use very reliable birth control methods—and she may terminate her pregnancy or place a child up for adoption. To be sure, there are complications
with this general observation of voluntariness.22 For example, fathers have
long been held by courts to be forced to parent against their will in the sense
that they are subject to child support obligations even if they take affirmative
steps to avoid fatherhood.23 Still, for the most part, these complications are
indicative of the exceptions, not the general case. Most parents want and
choose their children. This is not to say that the laws that attach to parents
as family ties burdens are always justified. Rather, the fact that these relationships are usually voluntary helps us understand the underlying structure
of burden allocation by the criminal justice system.
Let us reiterate some features of this analysis, for we have earlier left
prior commentators on this aspect of our argument confused. Professor
Michael O’Hear suggests, in his thinking on our work, that we embrace the
view that “the voluntary assumption of a duty . . . adds substantial support
for the criminal enforcement of that duty.”24 Professor Rick Hills likewise
worries that we “root” criminal liability in “consent” to provide care.25
Although we think that voluntariness is relevant in analyzing family ties
burdens, we think the use of the phrase substantial support overstates our
position because we believe that voluntariness is not in and of itself a
sufficient reason to bring the criminal law to bear. Similarly, we resist the
idea that we root liability in consent, since it is not itself the reason for liability; it is only a necessary, not a sufficient condition for criminal law liability.
In the omissions context, for example, it is the failure to perform some underlying caregiving duty that remains the basis for the liability; voluntariness
with respect to the assumption of that duty only plays a role in delineating
whose acts or omissions may properly serve as a basis for criminal liability in
a liberal state.

Dan Markel-Chap05.indd 88

2/26/09 7:25:21 PM

a normative framework for family ties burdens

89

So what is our account of voluntariness and how is it different from the
voluntariness associated with criminal acts that the criminal law routinely
focuses upon? In deriving our voluntariness test we examined the way in
which criminal justice systems picked out familial relationships for burdening. In five out of the seven family ties burdens that we explore here—adultery, bigamy, parental responsibility, omissions, nonpayment of child
support—the liability only attached to a person who could plausibly be said
to have voluntarily created the relationship of caregiving. Moreover, with
respect to filial responsibility laws, we noticed the near complete lack of
enforcement today.
To be sure, this casual empiricism does not decide the matter for us. But
it does illuminate it for us because voluntariness must clearly play a central
role in assessing the fairness of allocating criminal law liability in these
contexts. That is, the pattern of voluntariness evidenced by the family ties
burdens we uncover here is consistent with what we think a liberal state
should do: namely, give people some autonomy about entering relationships
before using the relationship status as an element of a crime. This autonomy
principle is in some sense being stifled by the use of traditional family status,
since the laws in question often exclude from coverage many people who
should be covered because of the nature of their caregiving roles in others’
lives, whether they are persons in homosexual relationships, polyamorous
unions, siblings, or some other form of committed un-married persons.
Although this conception of voluntariness does not have a large explicit
role in most areas of the criminal law, if the criminal law seeks to burden a
relationship with the use of a status-oriented approach, we think liberalism
requires that the burdens created have been voluntarily assumed. If the law
requires that public officials provide the public their “honest services,”26 that
is, to act as quasi-fiduciaries to the public, it is fair, in part, because they have
not been forced into these jobs. In the world of family status liabilities that
we have found, most of which are predicated on a relationship, we think that
being able to choose or reject the relationship is a necessary requirement to
have the law comply with our basic commitments to autonomy specifically
and liberalism generally.27
Of course, that we are voluntarists in criminal law design does not commit
us to any voluntarist vision of the constitution of moral life and the source of
moral norms. We simply take a position about the institutional design of
criminal justice practices in a liberal state. It may well be the case that our
parents or siblings have legitimate moral claims on us that stem from their
relationships to us, independent of choice. But the liberal state should avoid
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enforcing those claims through the criminal law for all the reasons we have
specified here. In short, voluntariness of the sort we have identified is a
reasonable test for legislators to surmount if they are designing the enforcement mechanisms of the criminal law to target relational obligations.

•

D. Overcoming Family Status Through a Focus on
Voluntary Caregiving

Notwithstanding the ambiguities that might attach in particular situations
regarding whether a familial relationship is voluntary, using voluntariness
rather than familial status as a basis for distributing these kinds of obligations is initially quite attractive. Indeed, using voluntariness as a criterion
helps us solve the problems of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness
that arise when using family status alone. Importantly, it allows us to
encompass those who view themselves as obligated to others through
their own choices and actions regardless of the state-established delineations of an “acceptable” family. Thus, same-sex partners, unmarried heterosexual partners, grandparents caring for extended family members, even
platonic or polyamorous friends living together in a committed caregiving
relationship—all of these people are engaged in voluntary relationships.
They may both want and warrant the protections and expressive benefits
of burdens solely allocated on the basis of family ties in our current policy
environment.
Yet, how can one go about limiting the extension of such burdens that the
state is expected to prosecute with its criminal justice resources? Can a teenager choose his third closest friend as the person to whom he owes a special
obligation of protection? If he does, should scarce criminal justice resources
be used to reinforce that obligation? We need to know, in other words, both
who decides and by what criteria a particular relationship should be deemed
a voluntary relationship in which the party is willing to assume obligations
toward another and for which the law is willing to intervene.
In our view, voluntariness as a stand-alone criterion is insufficient for
assessing whether it is just and attractive to impose or enhance criminal
penalties on the basis of a particular relationship. When assessing criminal
liability, we suggest that voluntariness be used in conjunction with whether
a component of the relationship includes an obligation of some form of
caregiving. Our sense is that many sorts of people assume these caregiving
roles and not all of them are familial in nature. Roommates, for example,

Dan Markel-Chap05.indd 90

2/26/09 7:25:23 PM

a normative framework for family ties burdens

91

might choose to adopt an ethos of mutual care over a period of time. If that
relationship is freely entered into and maintained by individuals capable of
informed and intelligent consent,28 we do not see why they should not be
able to enter into the covenants of care similar to the ones that presumptively characterize spousal or parental relationships.29 But they should not
necessarily be required to adopt all of the obligations that the law ascribes to
parents either. Although this scenario may be unlikely, one roommate might
only choose to undertake a duty to perform easy rescues, while the other
might undertake obligations of financial support and a duty to rescue.
Friends or roommates should be able and encouraged to create obligations
that are both capable of being scaled in size or intensity and enforced through
threat of criminal sanction. That is, if we are going to recognize caregiving
responsibilities through the criminal law, they should not be restricted to
ones that are familial.
That said, we do think there are meaningful differences between a spousal
or parental duty of care and the additional covenants of care that we are
prepared to recognize. For example, we believe that one’s familial status qua
spouse or parent may be presumptively used to establish that the relationship involves voluntarism, whereas such a presumption would not be justifiable in the case of roommates. After all, the act of marriage in our society is,
absent any contrary evidence in particular cases, the product of individuals
choosing to marry each other; and the same goes for the choice to raise children, generally speaking. In contrast, the presumption in other relationships
would not automatically attach. Thus, familial status as such would be neither necessary nor sufficient to justify a family ties burden.
There is also the related question of whether voluntary assumptions of
responsibility can be terminated. We think they ought to be terminable
under certain conditions, depending on the context. In the context of married couples, legal separation would be the appropriate way to signal an
opting out of the marital family ties burdens. And in the context of a parent
giving up his or her child to friends across the country, the termination of
parental rights is the way to opt out of the special duties of parenthood. But
it is not obvious to us that these potentially costly signaling mechanisms
should be the only ways to break the covenants that trigger the special
responsibilities of voluntary caregiving.
Although for the average dyad (whether parent-child or spouse-spouse),
the legal opt out might not be unduly burdensome, there might be cases
when it seems unfair to require divorce or termination. Perhaps, in exceptional circumstances, parties to these special relationships ought to be able
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to show that they should be deemed “equitably” divorced or terminated for
the purposes of the family ties burdens. One way to determine the bona fides
of these parties is to ascertain whether they have tried to capture family ties
benefits through either the criminal or the civil system (say, by claiming a
dependent for tax purposes); in situations in which the parties have not
claimed those benefits, we can envision the very rare case when parties
should be saved the pain and cost of an official divorce and termination.
Spousal relationships, however, should not be treated the same as parents’ obligations toward their children. After all, minor children cannot avoid
their own vulnerability.30 Thus, although letting spouses opt out does not
generally offend a sense of fair play, letting parents ditch their vulnerable
children without their consent ( for minors cannot really consent by law)
quite centrally violates the most basic tenets of what many think parents
owe their children.31 But that is just another way of specifying why allowing
parental opt out without termination should be even rarer than allowing
spousal opt out without divorce.
Nevertheless, just because it should be rare does not mean it must be
categorically proscribed. Indeed, if we are right that voluntary caregiving
underwrites and furnishes justificatory principles for some status-based
burdens in the criminal justice system, we should seek ways to narrowly
tailor the family ties burdens to capture only the right kinds of offenders. If
we had to give up our children to good friends for several years because of
illness or incapacitation, for example, the scope of criminally enforceable
parental duties would have to be adjusted, though not necessarily eliminated. If a child visits her parent in prison, it is not wrong to continue to
assign that parent an obligation to perform an easy rescue just because the
parent is not the primary caregiver anymore. On the other hand, the fact that
the parent is in prison may be a good basis for not assigning criminal liability
on the basis of nonpayment of support if there is no income or wealth for the
parent to tap for the child’s support.
For most other relationships outside of childrearing and spouses, however, we think a registry could be created in which people opt in and opt out
of relationships of caregiving as long as they provide notice to the affected
parties.32 This strategy would allow adults to select a number of additional
persons eligible for receiving the adult’s responsibility. If unrelated roommates wanted to sign up (or create such covenants as a prerequisite for living
with another adult), they could do so, signaling commitments of care for
each other, to each other, and to those around them. And if adult children
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wanted to signal their willingness to shoulder burdens to care for their parents, then that would be an option, rather than the requirement it is under a
few states’ rules.
To be sure, there is something cheaply administrable when the law selects
simply a few family status relationships instead of creating a registry for relationships of voluntary caregiving. But it does not seem that much more difficult to use a registry of the sort we describe, especially when it lends promise
to the prospect of all sorts of people pledging their hearts and sense of obligation to others around them. Moreover, as alluded to above, the administrability of this system can be rather cheaply achieved by requiring that spouses
and children occupy a special role with respect to family ties burdens—i.e.,
certain duties can be imposed on parents and spouses to ensure they meet
the responsibilities they agree to when they volunteer to be a spouse or parent.
Our registry network, in other words, would supplement the core relationships of spousal and parental obligation, not supplant it.
In short, adopting a voluntarist approach to burden distribution in the
criminal justice system harmonizes well with what we think the system
appears to seek for itself, albeit imperfectly. Moreover, it might provide for a
better intellectual fit with the competing interests in promoting freedom and
autonomy, which is thought by many to undergird the no-duty-to-rescue
pattern of law.33 Additionally, the difficulties associated with the under- and
over-inclusive nature of family status can be remedied in large measure by
use of a registry where one can declare who counts within one’s sphere of
accepted responsibility for the purpose of some of the crimes discussed here.
This would strengthen voluntary assumptions of caregiving responsibilities
(of which the family is sometimes a great example) rather than rely upon
inflexible categories based upon antiquarian notions of status.
Spurning our embrace of a voluntariness requirement, Professor O’Hear,
in his published comments on earlier versions of these arguments, offers an
alternative basis of liability premised upon vulnerability and proximity.34
Presumably, this would entail an obligation of an older sibling to rescue a
younger sibling when possible, not to mention neighbors and co-workers.35
We certainly believe there is a moral basis for rescue in these scenarios, but
the question upon which we focus is whether the criminal law ought to be
used to punish a failure to satisfy that moral obligation. To our mind, vulnerability and proximity are aspects that matter insofar as they are parts of a
voluntarily created relationship of caregiving.36 But insofar as they serve to
create liability where no one consented to that caregiving obligation, we find
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such status-based obligations problematic.37 Under our view of these duties
to rescue, without one party agreeing to perform some degree of caregiving,
no criminal liability ought to attach.38 So we do not disagree that Professor
O’Hear’s normative foundations for these liabilities should also play a role in
thinking about when to exact them and from whom; it is just that we remain
convinced that the liberal state needs to assess some baseline voluntariness
of the relationship in the first instance.39
Instead of voluntariness or proximate vulnerability, Professor Hills, in his
published comments on a previous version of this argument, offers a different principle that, on his account, both fits and justifies a number of the
family ties burdens we reveal here. Hills would reorganize family ties burdens
to promote child-rearing. We find that alternative deeply troublesome for
the liberal state.
Professor Hills makes a good case for the child-rearing value as a good fit
with some of the family ties burdens we discovered in the law. Each burden
in its own way can be part of a story in which the criminal justice system
brings itself to bear on families because families are subcontracted the
task—without much oversight—of raising children for the state.
Yet it does not suffice to say, as Professor Hills does, that our society would
“be deprived of the future value of humanity” without “properly raised
children.”40 That may or may not be true. Indeed, if children are a positive
good, why do they become less valuable to society once they are less vulnerable as adults? Presumably what makes children valuable is also what makes
adults valuable, in which case Professor Hills has a hard time explaining why
we would not extend the reach of these family liabilities to all, or at least to
those who still have procreative (and caregiving?) capacity. In sum, we think
a liberal state may not use its criminal law to reinforce a very particular version of the right way to organize the institution of the family through the use
of status-based liabilities that citizens have never had the opportunity to
reject. We are also mindful that child-rearing values are often used in service
of discriminating against non-traditional groups.
Thus, at least two central differences with Hills’ focus on child-rearing are
worth highlighting. First, we see family ties burdens as efforts to cope with
and oversee relationships in which people often find themselves vulnerable
in intimate contexts in which the state can perform comparatively little
oversight. So we would not have criminal liabilities contingent on whether
anyone had children, something that—the future of humanity, notwithstanding—seems morally arbitrary to us, at least as far as the criminal law is concerned. Second, while we might concede the view that the perpetuation of
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our species and the acculturation of our citizens through private resources
are central goods that the state should pursue by propping up the family and
subsidizing its activities,41 we are still committed to the view that there are
certain liberal norms that constrain how the state may choose to pursue
such ends in the criminal law. Our normative framework highlights that
point through both our voluntariness inquiry as well as our minimalism.
Without some compelling proof that the state needs to use the criminal law
to forward its agenda of only allowing one man and/or one woman to raise
a child, we remain convinced that our account is more consistent with basic
liberal commitments, requiring only a focus on whether the obligation of
care was voluntarily assumed. It still might be a bad use of resources to
criminalize this world of intimacy and inaction; but that is a separate question from our threshold inquiry into whether a liberal state should create
such crimes in the first place.

•

E. Bringing It Together: How to Scrutinize a
Family Ties Burden

In light of all these various considerations, we propose that family ties
burdens—whether the ones we described in Chapter 4 or some others that
might be contemplated—undergo scrutiny, using a set of normative speed
bumps designed to track our discussion here. Our general approach in light
of the foregoing is that special criminal justice burdens based on familial
status alone require justification. Perhaps unsurprisingly, just as we exhibited a tendency to be skeptical toward most family ties benefits in the first
part of the book, we are also inclined to protect individuals from penalties or
burdens based simply on traditional familial status. However, because we are
sensitive to the caregiving contributions that might stand in need of special
protection from the state, we believe that some of the concerns people might
have about abandoning family ties burdens can be addressed instead through
careful drafting that substitutes attentiveness to voluntary relationships of
caregiving in the place of familial status alone. Thus, our skepticism toward
family ties burdens does not entail eliminating all such burdens. Instead, we
propose that such burdens undergo a searching inquiry framed by a liberal
minimalist paradigm.
What is liberal minimalism? A liberal minimalist approach to criminal
liability is reflective of two basic, though not uncontested, values. With
respect to the word liberal, we are relying on its roots to connect to
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a particular notion of when it is appropriate to use family status as an
element of a criminal law. To our mind, the family relationship that is an
element of criminal liability must be one that is the product of freely chosen
behavior. Specifically, we deem a burden to pass muster under our first
“liberalism” concern if the relationship which serves as the basis for a family
ties burden is one that the defendant freely created through her choice. The
consent is not always explicitly extended, but it may, in some cases, be
reasonably inferred in light of the other available options available to the
offender. Beyond this first basic liberal concern is also a need for some
showing that the relationship is one of caregiving. Without this additional
element, we risk allowing the criminal justice system’s apparatus to be
co-opted by mere contract.42
A second and more general liberal concern we deem important is that a
justice system must allocate liberty to citizens consistent with other persons’
liberty, putting the burden of justification on those who would limit individual
liberty.43 For this reason, in designing laws that target family status, one must
assess the liberty interest at stake—and how important it is.
With respect to minimalism in criminal law, we ask whether the government has an important or compelling objective it is trying to achieve through
the use of the family ties burden. This purpose analysis is obviously fraught
with controversy and so, in many situations, we usually stipulate to the
objective’s importance in order to assess the means used to pursue the ends.
This means analysis involves two kinds of questions. First, has the government narrowly tailored the criminal sanction to its putative objectives to
avoid overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness? Second, is there good reason
to believe that the use of a family ties burden via criminal sanction is justified
if and when other alternatives (education, advertising, regulation, tort, or
contract) could be equally effective in achieving the state’s objective?44 These
questions are important because criminal sanctions use coercion to limit
liberty; are especially costly to both the state and to the offender; and are
subject to error and abuse. For those reasons, we support a principle of pragmatic frugality both in the drafting of criminal legislation and the amount of
punishment imposed. Punishment should be no more severe than necessary
to achieve the legislature’s reasonable interests, and the legislature should
forbear from coercion through criminal sanction when possible. At a relatively high level of abstraction, this is a principle (also connected to proportionality) that theorists of many stripes can embrace.45 Although there is
much more that can be said about both these notions of liberalism and minimalism,46 we do not wish to stray too far from the subject at hand.
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As applied to our project on the use of family status to create criminal
liability, we think the liberal minimalist agenda, coupled with the concerns
about discrimination and gender bias alluded to earlier, trigger a set of questions for the normative review of the family ties burdens we discussed in
Chapter 4. These questions are similar (though not identical) to the ones
asked by courts in liberal democracies like the United States and Canada
when they review legislation alleged to impair a fundamental liberty or
alleged to rely on a suspect classification.
Of course, we must determine as a threshold matter whether the state is
in fact targeting a defendant for prosecution (or enhanced punishment)
based on his family status.47 But in the case of the seven burdens we have
discussed in Chapter 4, we can readily conclude that family status is relevant
and necessary for the liability the defendant faces, so when it comes to the
application of the framework in Chapter 6, we will dispense with this threshold question and instead focus on the rest of the framework develop here, as
follows.
First, does the burden fall only on persons who have voluntarily created a
relationship of care? Second, does the burden impinge on some liberty that
should be recognized as deserving of protection in a liberal society? Third,
are the laws drafted in such a way as to be narrowly tailored to the governmental objectives? Fourth, are there non-criminal measures that could be
equally effective in achieving these government objectives, assuming these
government objectives were sufficiently compelling or important to vindicate through law? Last, in what ways do the existing family ties burdens contribute to concerns about gender, inequality, and discrimination?
As before, this kind of scrutiny will not resolve all questions. Inevitably,
disputes about the strength of competing claims will persist – and means
testing will implicate empirical evidence, which is too often indeterminate
or simply non-existent. But, as we hope we achieved in our systematic inquiry
into family ties benefits in Part I, we hope to do some important work in
helping clarify the problems under consideration and alerting lawyers,
policymakers, and judges to some of the potentially hidden costs of family
ties burdens in the criminal justice system.
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six

Applying the Framework to
Family Ties Burdens

in this chapter, we undertake some analysis of the various family ties burdens we identified in Chapter 4. In what follows, we do not exhaustively analyze each family ties burden—even from within our own framework. As we
acknowledged at the very beginning, each of the burdens we have identified
requires its own long-form analysis, taking account of its particularized context and its systemic effects on the justice system and relevant family members. Accordingly, all we endeavor to do in this Chapter is furnish a basis for
how our framework contributes to a more comprehensive accounting when
analyzing each family ties burden. We think our framework recommends caution about the bulk of the family ties burdens we have identified and urges
creativity in redesigning these burdens to make them less discriminatory.

•

A. Omissions Liability For Failure to Rescue

The question of omissions liability for failure to rescue is a difficult one, and
the analysis seems to vary according to the kind of family status relationship
at issue.

1. Parental Duties to Rescue Children
Let us begin with the most common scenario where we see liability imposed:
the prosecution of parents who fail to protect their children. What are the
rationales used to describe why we impose criminally sanctioned obligations
on parents to rescue their children when they are imperiled and when
parents have an easy rescue to make?
Imposing liability on parents for failing to protect their children seems to
vindicate a compelling state interest—the need to protect children from
harm.1 It is in this scenario that our concerns about fostering the caregiving
99
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capacity of individuals reach their zenith. But the concern for protecting
children from harm would seem to require that anyone with the chance to
make an easy rescue should be under such an obligation. After all, young
children are often helpless to protect themselves from harm; responsibility
must seem to fall on the shoulders of those adults in the position to be a
child’s only lifeline. But this is not how the laws of rescue are drafted as a
general matter.
Thus, the objective of restricting the duty to rescue a child to its custodial
figure has to do, at least in part, with an expressive function about the kind of
commitment made by a parent to the world regarding the child. The law
seems to be saying that parents who have voluntarily chosen to retain the
benefits conferred by the parent-child relationship should endure some burdens in return, and ensuring the safety of a child entrusted to the parent’s
care represents the most fundamental of reasonable burdens. When a person
opts to have children, the parent is, as we suggested earlier, signaling to
others that the parent will be a first responder.
In this respect, imposing a duty to rescue here is analogous to the imposition of liability on those people who have “waved away” others. The goal, of
course, is not to tie an albatross around the neck of every parent. Omissions
liability does not create a responsibility to rescue against unreasonable risks.
It operates only to ensure that when a parent is in a position of protecting the
child from imminent harm, the parent takes reasonable measures to do so.
a. Voluntary Caregiving and Its Limits
We think it is fair to conclude, in most circumstances, that imposing obligations to rescue one’s children (defined as minors for whom one has legal custody) is consistent with voluntarist caregiving. That said, the question of
what justifies a status-based duty to rescue is a bit more complicated than
the one that grounds a spouse-like relation. To be sure, the vast majority of
parents eagerly assume the obligations associated with parenting—and,
therefore, the law’s placing a burden to rescue may be unnecessary. But
whether it is necessary or not as a policy matter is not our primary concern
here: we are first concerned about how consistent the policy is with a general
commitment to voluntarist caregiving.
Some parents might resist the ascription of voluntariness to their actions
or to the results of their actions. First, one might say that he volunteered to
have sex, but he didn’t consent to have a child that resulted from sex. Or one
may claim, under the circumstances of rape or stolen sperm, that one didn’t
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even volunteer to have procreative sex.2 As a general matter, however, we
view the risk of pregnancy as a risk people voluntarily assume when they
engage in sexual relations, even when using birth control. The question is
whether the risk of pregnancy should also be conflated with the risk of being
conscripted into parental obligations that are vindicated through the criminal law.
If women have exclusive control over the decision to abort and primary,
albeit not necessarily exclusive, control over the adoption decision, then that
makes more compelling the inference that mothers who have ultimately
acquiesced to or embraced the task of raising children should bear responsibility for caring for the child, at least as far as the criminal law is concerned.
To be sure, the absence of either of these alternatives would undermine the
moral basis for ascribing a burden of care to a person. So, too, would it be
inappropriate to establish omissions liability on sperm or egg donors who
make clear that they are renouncing future interests to those accepting the
sperm or eggs.
As to men: if men who have taken reasonable precautions in terms of
birth control—or who reasonably relied on express precautions taken by the
woman—lack control over the choice to abort or give the baby up for adoption, then it is inaccurate to say that they are consenting to the obligations
associated with parenting unless there is some other way to categorically
renounce their parental rights and obligations. Thus, if one biological parent
objects to becoming a parent over the wishes of the other parent, and secures
a pre-conception waiver from the other person, then, at least according to
two of us (Markel and Leib), that might be a basis for releasing the objecting
parent from the family ties burden.3 But in the absence of such evidence, it is
not unreasonable to place a burden on parents who, through biology or
adoption, assume this caregiving role. Indeed, to the extent that there are
borderline cases, we might highlight that the burden (on the potential defendant) may operate to help the vulnerable child, so questionable cases of consent should default to burdening the parent.
Might these consent or voluntarism arguments founder if we ask whether
parents specifically consented to taking care of a child with X, where X is
illness or a behavioral problem? The consent still exists so long as there is a
procedure by which parents can terminate their parental rights to the state
through voluntary relinquishment, a relatively widespread practice.
Still, because not all children live with their biological parents,4 we
believe that the use of traditional family status to limit omissions liability is
a problem. A child could reside with another relative, such as a grandparent,
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a family friend, or a foster family, to name just a few possible permutations.5
Alternatively, as we explain below, there may be homosexual couples or gay
and straight persons involved in polyamorous contexts who care for the child,
but their parenting status may not be recognized by the state. There is also the
difficult question about the caregiving responsibilities that occur outside the
home: schools, religious institutions, Girl Scouts, sports leagues—in all these
sites, adults and adolescents with supervisory roles play an increasingly important role in the rearing of children.6 Therefore, limiting omissions liability to
biological parents and their children has the potential to be underinclusive, in
that it does not recognize non-traditional relationships of caregiving.
Using only an opt-in registry system (of the sort described in Chapter 5)
seems unsatisfactory when it comes to duties to rescue children. Parents
who bring children into the world should be presumptively required to rescue
and care for their children, who are, after all, without resources to avoid their
own vulnerability and cannot sufficiently protect themselves from harm
through other means. However, the underinclusiveness (and, in certain circumstances, overinclusiveness) of biological parentage necessitates a test
that focuses on something other than only biological parenthood in the context of duties to rescue children: does the individual in question stand in the
position of a primary caregiver to the child? If the answer to this multi-factored
question is yes,7 then that individual should face liability for failure to rescue
on an omissions liability theory, absent any relevant and compelling excuse
or justification.8 It is important to note that more than one individual could
fall into this category—for example, both the mother and the father of the
child, assuming they both live with the child, and a grandparent who also
lives in the home. This test would avoid the overinclusiveness problem of
relying on biology too. There might be situations in which a biological parent
has parental rights terminated, and in those situations, we think (and the law
concurs) there should be no duty to rescue under the criminal law.
Several options exist for dealing with underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness and the use of presumptions or registries. First, one could entirely
decouple omissions liability in this context from parental status. Although we
do not embrace this position, we recognize that if we abolished the established linkage between parental status and omissions liability, then that would
serve as a default rule that might spur the use of the registry and at the same
time decenter the role of parents in our quest to ensure the safety of children.
Under this rule, family units may choose to require opting in as a precondition
for hiring nannies and babysitters; additionally, private associations such as
neighborhood groups or churches might require opt-ins of members to signal
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that this is an especially caring community. (The registry would effectively
create an easier method than exists now to facilitate a private ordering regime
that the state could monitor for purposes of prosecuting omissions cases.)
Alternatively, one could abolish the link between omissions liability and
status and instead simply require all primary caregivers (and discard special
references to parents altogether) to face omissions liability.9 This second
option creates a baseline in which liability for all primary caregivers is created
(as opposed to a baseline of no liability for anyone in the first situation); it
would also preserve an opt-in registry for others. Although we generally like
this approach, there are some difficulties with it. One downside is that requiring a duty to rescue by all primary caregivers may risk overinclusiveness
(and, thus, discourage persons from becoming primary caregivers) and some
degree of vagueness—given that the tests for who is a primary caregiver will
be hard to apply in some borderline cases.
A third option is another hybrid approach to reduce problems of underinclusiveness. First, retain the status-based duty for parents as a strong presumption that is rebutted only with the termination of parental rights;
second, impose omissions liability on all other primary caregivers; and third,
create an opt-in registry for all others. Our own view is that this option is
probably the most feasible and attractive in part because it involves only an
incremental adjustment from the current practice of most jurisdictions.
There is not much difference between the second and third option, but the
presumption of parent-based duties to rescue makes the third option arguably cheaper to administer from a social cost perspective and there is less
need to worry about chilling effects because, under this regime, parents
would generally have responsibility for children, whatever the status of other
primary caregivers.
A fourth option is to require all persons to make easy rescues regardless of
parental status. This option violates a thick commitment to voluntarism,
perhaps, but it might be said that the compelling interest underlying the
goal (saving vulnerable lives through actions that pose little to no risk to the
rescuer) justifies the infringement here. Here, we note that such infringements on voluntarism occur in other contexts where the stakes are high,
such as the lesser evils defense in criminal law,10 compulsory vaccinations,11
and conscription for armed services.12 And as a practical matter, it reflects
the prevailing norm by which most persons actually do undertake “easy
rescues.”13
Even though we can agree on the scope of duty attaching to parents and
others regarding obligations to rescue minor children, we must also consider
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whether such obligations persist with children who are no longer minors.
Should their primary caregivers still owe them a duty to rescue? If we take
the fourth approach—by which we impose general duties to rescue—then
the answer is yes. But two of us (Leib and Markel) believe that if we take any
of the three approaches described that focus on the relationship between
adult caregivers and children, then it makes sense to recognize that adult
children typically stand in a different position than minor children—they can
both utilize a registry system and have more options available to remove
themselves from a dangerous situation.14 In addition, the dynamics of the
relationship may be very different with an adult child. It may seem justifiable
for parents to wish to sever a relationship with a child who has committed a
heinous crime or even victimized his parents, for example, whereas we would
not allow parents of a minor child to walk away from their obligations to that
child because of the child’s misconduct unless they were prepared to terminate their parental rights. On the other hand, if an adult child is ill or incapacitated in some way, it does not seem unfair to require that the parental
status-based or caregiver-based duty to rescue should apply. Professor
Collins, by contrast, believes the parental duty to rescue one’s child should
persist into adulthood unless the parent has terminated his or her rights on
grounds such as having been victimized by the child’s criminal activity.
b. Minimalism and Means-Analysis
As to whether there are equally effective non-criminal alternatives available
to the imposition of omissions liability, several options are worth considering. Most people would say that a parent’s love and the social norm of being
a Good Samaritan together mean that any legal remedy is unnecessary. But
we often have criminal sanctions prohibiting or requiring conduct that
would otherwise be obvious and attractive to most people. Thus, the criminal law and its concomitant sanction may be used to deny defendants the
claim that the polity deprived them of fair notice of how they were expected
to act to avoid reproach.15
Couldn’t a tort remedy enunciate the same requirement of responsible
behavior here? It might, but chances are that it will be less effective. For one
thing, relying on the tort remedy here may be insufficient when there might
not be a plaintiff to bring a claim against a parent who fails to rescue a child.
Another issue is that the parent might be judgment-proof, which would give
parents inadequate incentives to monitor their care of their children. Parents
on the fence about the duty to rescue may be more likely to discharge the
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reasonable duties we impose in exchange for the benefits and latitude
afforded to parenting.16 So the criminal sanction here may serve to both educate the public about the obligation parents have toward children and to
effectively punish parents for their failing to live up to the obligations that
accompany the raising of children. When a parent fails to rescue a child
under the restrictive conditions that make one eligible for criminal sanction,
the parent is making a condemnable choice and is worthy of punishment
for that breach of trust described above. The criminal sanction also is
appropriate to ensure that parents do not skimp on their responsibilities
because they know they might not be attractive tort defendants under
existing law.
c. Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination
Even if omissions liability based on a parent’s failure to rescue passes our
voluntariness test and means test, we need to acknowledge that imposing
liability on a parent for failing to protect a child from harm certainly has the
potential to perpetuate inequality and discrimination. In those jurisdictions
where gays and lesbians are prohibited from marriage and from adoption,
these failure to rescue laws facially discriminate against families headed by
homosexual couples or polyamorous unions.
For example, imagine a state that does not permit homosexual couples to
adopt.17 One adult, John, might nonetheless formally adopt a child, but John’s
long-standing partner, Larry, who may have informally taken on a parental
role to the minor, will not be under the duty to rescue the child absent some
contract or other basis for omissions liability as discussed in Chapter 4.
Although this rule discriminates against Larry on the basis of Larry’s lack of
state-recognized family member status, the person who is harmed or left at
risk by this discrimination is the minor child.18 This is just one of the ways in
which state default rules based on status of a certain kind can risk arbitrary
and unintended harms against children.19
Because protecting minors from harm in the context of “easy rescues” is a
compelling interest of the state, regardless of how one feels about discrimination against gays, even a state that does not grant homosexual couples
adoption rights should make available a registry by which individuals may
volunteer to take on the duty to rescue a minor (or anyone else). Getting
“registered” might be a prerequisite that adoption agencies require of couples like John and Larry to ensure that the minor child is in a secure home.
Moreover, if Larry were not willing to register then that might be a good
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information-forcing device relevant to John’s choice to adopt the minor
individually or to continue in a relationship with Larry.
In addition to concerns about inequality and discrimination, we are also
worried about how prosecutorial practices regarding omissions statutes
are used in a way that may perpetuate stereotypes about gender.20 The first
concern is that focusing on caregiving relationships that are voluntarily
undertaken might have a chilling effect that exacerbates gender inequalities
operating in the current practices of caregiving. In a recent article,21 Professor
Melissa Murray observed that allowing nonparental caregivers to have rights
or authority over a child might deter parents from structuring care networks
comprised of non-parental caregivers. In a note to us, Professor Murray suggests the same concerns might attend a policy that extends criminal liability
to those who voluntarily provide care and thus risks further insulating families and caregiving within the private sphere, emphasizing caregiving as a
“private” (and presumably, more female) responsibility.22
With respect, we think most parents, male and female, would be pleased
to know that more caregivers for their children could face omissions liability
because that would redound to the benefit and safety of their children.
Indeed, to the extent that people are aware of broader omissions liability,
it might make them more inclined to separate from their children under
certain conditions and view caregiving as a task shared with the government
or non-governmental organizations.23 In other words, although we understand Professor Murray’s concerns in the context of the extension of rights or
benefits to non-parental caregivers, we think that in the context of obligations to children by non-parental caregivers this deterrent effect is unlikely to
be realized except to the extent that some non-parental caregivers might be
worried about their exposure to criminal omissions liability. But even in this
context, this anxiety is misplaced since it is likely that omissions liability
would already attach based on some of the other traditional bases for
omissions liability discussed in Chapter 4.
The second gender-related worry is that prosecutions based on omissions
liability disproportionately target women. Indeed, women are more likely
to bear the brunt of such prosecutions than men simply by virtue of the
fact that they are, more often, the custodial parent.24 Further, women are
commonly thought to be held by the public to a higher standard of care
in childrearing relative to men.25 As Naomi Cahn has argued, “Cultural
middle-class norms expect all women to be primarily responsible for their
children. The criminal justice system supports this norm by criminalizing
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the abusive and neglectful behavior of parents, penalizing mothers particularly harshly.”26
We also cannot ignore the linkage between domestic violence and
prosecutions for failing to protect a child from abuse by another. In our view, it
is important to acknowledge that, in many cases in which children are being
battered, a parent (usually the mother) may be the victim of battering as well.27
To be sure, in particular situations, it might be a male father who is battered,
and our approach to omissions liability does not hinge on the precise identity
of the defendant qua mother. But the general point here is that the adult
victims of violence may have few available options, from their perspective, to
remove their children from an abusive situation.28 They may (correctly)
perceive that attempts to leave will escalate the violence.29 Additionally, they
may have no economic options in terms of being able to find housing or a job
that will provide sufficient income to support a family.30
These issues are weighty and important, and thus, we need to consider
practical options to help mitigate the potential disparate impact of omissions liability. As a policy matter, we should partner any attempts to hold
parents accountable for their failure to protect with efforts to make it more
viable for battered spouses to leave abusive partners—for example, by ensuring adequate funding for shelters, job training, and child care resources.31
The question remains, however, whether the existence of domestic violence
should preclude prosecuting a parent for failing to rescue the child. Supporters
of prosecutions of passive parents argue that even a parent’s status as a
victim of domestic violence cannot categorically excuse a failure to act to
prevent the abuse of a child. Professor Mary Becker has suggested that
“mothers, even when abused themselves, should be held to a high standard
of care for their children and should normally be held responsible for their
own abuse or neglect of their children and for failing to protect their children
from others’ abuse and neglect, provided that they knew or had reason to
know of the harm to their children.”32 That’s because even though the mother
may have been weakened physically or mentally by virtue of the abuse she
has suffered, unless she is “literally a hostage,” she still has options to employ
in an attempt to protect her child that are not available to the child itself;
young children, after all, are utterly defenseless and completely dependent
upon adults for their protection.33
In domestic violence cases in which prosecution may be appropriate
because the parent did have some protective options available, there should
be some strict limitations on when the state seeks to impose liability.
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The focus needs to be on the easy rescue; thus, in cases involving child
abuse, we should limit omissions liability to those circumstances where a
parent had prior knowledge of past abuse and had the practical opportunity
to seek help, such as access to a telephone to contact law enforcement
authorities.34 Second, parents who fail to protect in a case involving a fatality
should only face the same homicide charge as the actual killer if they had the
same (or worse) mens rea; otherwise, a lesser (and perhaps non-homicide)
charge is appropriate to reflect the reduced culpability.35 And of course, in
some cases, no conviction is appropriate if the defendant had no easy
rescue to make based on her own circumstances or diminished capacity as a
battered spouse.
Another option legislatures should consider is adopting a statutory
scheme that recognizes the defendant’s omission as a distinct and separate
crime of failure to rescue like reckless endangerment. A separate charge by a
prosecutor would better reflect the idea that there is a meaningful moral
distinction between actually inflicting the fatal blows and, for example,
making the mistake of leaving a child alone with an individual who has been
abusive in the past.

2. Spousal Obligations to Rescue Each Other
Regarding spouses, the foregoing analysis calls for refinement though it also
tracks the discussion above. The plausibly strong interests the state has in
penalizing a failure to rescue between spouses are (1) saving human lives in
danger and (2) affirming the significance of marital obligations.
The problem with the first interest is that the means used here—spousal
obligations to rescue each other, policed through the criminal law—is woefully underinclusive, so much so that it’s hard to take seriously the idea that
this is what’s motivating the use of this family ties burden. The second objective, by contrast, makes more sense. Although the obligation to undertake
easy rescues is not specifically articulated in many wedding vows, it reasonably falls under the language that often is used in those vows.36 Thus, it makes
sense to impose the duty to rescue on those who become vulnerable after
they have already made commitments to each other to serve as caregivers.
The notion undergirding the legal obligation here is that spouses who
have voluntarily chosen to obtain the benefits conferred by the spousal relationship should endure some burdens in return, and facilitating the safety of
a spouse is a reasonable burden. When a person opts to marry, the person is,
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as we suggested earlier, signaling to others that he or she will be a first
responder. In this respect, imposing a duty to rescue here is analogous to the
imposition of liability on those people who have “waved away” others. Just as
with children, the goal here is not to tie an albatross around the neck of every
spouse. Omissions liability does not create a responsibility to rescue against
unreasonable risks. Rather, it simply punishes the breach of a trust relationship that marriage creates between the parties to the marriage and those
creating the political community around them.
But let’s consider further how our normative framework applies to this
family ties burden. We note at the outset that even more so than with children
who may not have been “wanted,” spouses have already evidenced their commitment to take care of each other. Thus, we view obligations to spouses as
grounded in voluntarily created commitments to care for each other and that
easily includes the duty to undertake an easy rescue. Together, married couples
share a freedom to pursue in concert those goals and goods they cannot or will
not pursue alone or without the stamp of social recognition.37
With respect to minimalism, we need to examine the same arguments
about whether an effective alternative to criminal sanction is available. As
with children, the need to create a spousal obligation seems practically
redundant because most people would say that romantic love would render
any legal strategy unnecessary. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to
legislate criminal sanctions prohibiting or requiring conduct that would
otherwise be obvious and attractive to most people; as explained above, the
criminal law and its concomitant sanction may be used to deny defendants
the claim that they were denied fair notice of how they were expected to
act with respect to certain conduct.
As with children, here, too, reliance on tort remedies as a substitute
seems unhelpful. There might not be a plaintiff to bring a claim against
a spouse who fails to rescue another spouse (though a plaintiff is more likely
in this context than in that of the wrongful death of a child). Moreover, the
spouse might be judgment-proof in a civil case involving money damages,
and knowledge of one’s inability to pay may marginally cause spouses (on
the fence) to have inadequate incentives to rescue. So the criminal sanction
here may serve to both educate the public about the obligation spouses have
toward each other and to effectively punish spouses for their failing to live
up to their caregiving obligations. In other words, when a spouse fails to
rescue a partner under the conditions eligible for criminal sanction, the
spouse-defendant is making a condemnable choice and is worthy of punishment for that breach of trust described above. The criminal sanction also
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is appropriate to ensure that spouses do not renege on their responsibilities
because they know they might not be attractive tort defendants under
existing law.
Any law calling for the prosecution of a person for failing to protect his or
her spouse from harm also has the potential to have a discriminatory impact,
in a different and critical sense: it treats differently those who cannot or
choose not to enter a spousal relationship recognized by the state.38 For
example, these laws currently do not clearly give the family members of
homosexual couples the comfort of knowing that omissions liability is parceled out in a non-discriminatory fashion. One way to see this discrimination is through analogy: if omissions liability were distributed on the basis of
race, such that whites had a duty to rescue their spouses but blacks did not
unless they separately contracted for that duty, what message would that
send? It clearly exhibits a lack of respect to the value of the spouses of black
people.39 The same inference of disrespect is true when a state restricts omissions liability along lines that are tethered to the few family status relationships recognized by the state. Why should a heterosexual man have an
obligation to protect his spouse from harm while a gay man in a similarly
meaningful and voluntary partnership does not?40 In both instances, imposing liability serves the same valuable functions: increasing safety and promoting an ethos of caregiving relations triggered by voluntary choices. Thus,
limiting omissions liability to those in a state-sanctioned relationship seems
plainly underinclusive—it leaves out those who cannot get married because
of a plainly troubling moral choice made by the state.41
For the most part, we do not have much problem with marriage
being an overinclusive obligation because divorce is an option by which the
obligation can be terminated. But because marriage is an underinclusive
basis for imposing omissions liability, we think several options should be
explored.
One solution would be to decouple omissions liability from marriage altogether and instead ask parties to any relationship to register sua sponte.42
This would treat all persons the same and without favor. But a no duty to
rescue rule in marriage could act like a penalty default rule. On the one hand,
it would probably encourage more people outside of marriage to think about
whom they wish to rescue. On the other hand, it might also add needless
costs associated with persons who by virtue of marriage would already be
willing to undertake a duty to rescue. A better solution, based on reducing
the social costs of the scheme, would be to require duties to rescue in marriages and to create a registry for all others who want to participate in a
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“covenant of care” such that they have a duty to perform easy rescues.
Marriages would simply have the implicit term of duty to rescue built into
them and others outside marriage (including those in polyamourous relationships) could opt into it. This would also allow persons to insist on seeing
evidence of opt-in by another person before they decide to jointly acquire
property, cohabit, or perform caregiving tasks for one another.

3. Duties to Rescue in Other Relationships
Some might raise concerns that we are too focused on spouses and parents
as paradigmatic relationships here. The worry here would be that we are
constructing the sexual family or marriage as the normative ideal for adult
interactions with each other. We respectfully disagree. Indeed, the point of
our registry system is to obviate this concern entirely. People who are not
married do not have to register, but they may choose to do so. In any given
relationship, just one person may decide to do so for the other since the registry is a place of declaring one’s assumption of obligation—it is not predicated on norms of reciprocity, nor does it require contractual formalities.
To be sure, our slight preference for assigning duties to rescue in the context
of marriage and custodial parenting is responsive to what we think of as
the specific features of caregiving written into the “scripts” of marriage
and parenting, but no one should be forced into assuming those burdens
otherwise.
That said, people should be free to and encouraged to assume these obligations outside the scripts of marriage and parenting. The registry we discussed in Chapter 5 permits siblings or cousins or roommates or friends to
enter into covenants of care, but the idea is not to require it through the
criminal law outside voluntary choices or the specific circumstances of the
parent-child or spousal relationships. Indeed, we would resist any state’s
attempt to impose a duty to rescue on those persons outside the parentchild or spousal context because we simply cannot say these relationships
have been entered into voluntarily. In the context of platonic roommates,
imposing a duty of rescue through the criminal law would be drastic restructuring of the traditional boundaries of that relationship. On the other hand,
we certainly believe that individuals should be able to create a legally enforceable relationship of caregiving through the use of a registry. This allows
individuals to signal their commitment both to each other and to those
around them.43
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It is, of course, possible that very few individuals will choose to register—
why would they voluntarily assume the risk of a legal liability that they
currently do not face? But if that is the outcome, we are no worse off than we
are now, as these individuals do not currently face liability. If, on the other
hand, some individuals do choose to undertake an obligation to rescue, the
benefits that decision conveys in terms of promoting safety and promoting
an ethos of care and compassion certainly seem worth the effort. We can also
imagine the state incentivizing such registrations through small tax breaks
or norm entrepreneurs (private employers or faith groups) that mobilize
“opt-in days” to foster solidarity among members of their communities. And
because people’s relationships ebb and flow, we could imagine that the registry would permit people to withdraw from these covenants of caregiving
when adequate notice is given to the affected parties.
Allowing more private-ordering in the context of criminal law
regulation (with sufficient attention to third-party harms) is also consistent
with the suggestions we make later in the contexts of incest, bigamy, and
adultery.

•

B. Parental Responsibility Laws

When adults have committed an affirmative act contributing to a minor’s
delinquency with a culpable state of mind, the traditional core requirements
for a crime have been satisfied; moreover, in those situations in which the
laws speak to a general obligation by all adults to forbear from contributing
to a minor’s truancy or curfew violation or criminal misconduct, there is no
specific family ties burden. But as we saw in Chapter 4, some states and more
municipalities have created criminal liability for parents when their children
commit some misconduct based on nothing more than a failure to supervise
theory. It is these laws we focus on here because parental status is an
element of liability.
Discussions of these laws suggest several reasons for their passage: first,
they are thought to reduce crime; second, they are viewed as vehicles to project norms of parental conduct by instructing parents to monitor their children carefully and to remain actively involved in parenting; third, these laws
are regarded as an avenue of restitution to victims for the harms committed
by the minors. Despite these plausible justifications, we view these laws as
normatively troublesome and think they should be jettisoned for the reasons
we articulate below.
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We are willing, for the purposes of argument, to stipulate that the state has
compelling interests in the reduction of crime, whether by minors or adults;
the proper instruction of parental obligations in supervising minor children;
and ensuring adequate compensation to victims of crime. However, we are
not of the view that the state claiming to pursue these objectives has shown
that the means used here are appropriately tailored to these ends, especially
if other non-criminal alternatives are available and equally effective.
To begin with, if the goal is to reduce crime, why not require all adults who
are aware of criminal mischief by a child to prevent the crime and/or report
it if prevention fails? It does not make sense to restrict failure to supervise
laws to parents for the sake of reducing crime. The second argument, restricting the reach of these laws to parents, makes sense if the state’s goal is to
instruct parents to be involved in raising their children and to act diligently
in the supervision of their children. But if that is the case, then it is not clear
why mandatory parenting classes, public advertising, civil recovery statutes,
and a showing of an affirmative culpable act or omission by the parent would
be insufficient, as we explain below. The use of strict liability and a criminal
sanction are unnecessary and have problematic effects. As to the adequate
compensation of victims, every state has a civil recovery statute or tort in
place by which victims can seek compensation from parents for harms
perpetrated by their minors.44 The criminal sanction is redundant in that
respect.

1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
Admittedly, these laws attach obligations only to the person who voluntarily
creates a relationship (i.e., the parent, not the child). In that respect, these
laws are consistent with one aspect of liberalism.
However, because these laws create strict criminal liability by punishing
parents without proof of a choice to commit an action, they fail to respect a
reasonable liberty-maximizing rule by ensuring that the defendants have
performed a voluntary action or omission with a culpable mind that
warrants condemnation and punishment. To visit the full weight and
condemnation of a criminal sanction upon an individual for an action by
another person beyond his or her control is antithetical to the spirit of a liberalism that respects individuals and their liberties.
A plausibly fair interpretation of the failure to supervise theory requires
proof that the parents could reasonably have done something to prevent the
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minor’s misconduct and chose not to. But the statutes as drafted, which hold
parents criminally and strictly liable for the misconduct of their children,
leads to absurd results in some situations: for instance, parents could be
liable for prosecution when they themselves were the victims of the minor’s
misconduct. To be sure, some jurisdictions allow this or other reasons
(e.g., the parent acted reasonably in the situation) as an affirmative defense,45
but the absence of reasonableness by the defendant should be part of the
government’s case-in-chief—not a burden allocated to the defense in a
criminal case.

2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
As suggested above, we think imposing criminal liability is misplaced in
the absence of a blameworthy state of mind and a wrongful action or omission by the caregiver in question. If a parent acted with something approaching at least criminal negligence, we could better understand the impetus to
punish the parent with a light sanction. But imposing criminal responsibility
on a strict liability theory does not seem to promote more effective caregiving than a negligence standard. Rather, it would only chill the underlying
activity of raising or adopting children or foster children and/or force parents to take unreasonable steps in monitoring their children. This would
undermine the very point of trying to cultivate and support voluntary
caregiving relationships through family ties burdens. Some examples can
illustrate our point.
Imagine a parent goes out on a date and leaves a fourteen-year-old alone
in the house with unsecured firearms and an unlocked liquor cabinet, even
though the parent knows the child has attempted to play with the guns and
drink liquor on prior occasions. If the fourteen-year-old proceeds to get
drunk and use the parent’s gun to shoot up the neighbor’s car, the parent has
been reckless, or at a minimum, criminally negligent by “failing to exercise
reasonable control” over the child. Imposing liability in this scenario will
signal both to this particular caregiver, and other caregivers in the community, that caregivers must supervise their children more vigilantly.
But imagine instead that the child buys the gun on his own with his
money from an after-school job and shoots up the neighbor’s car on the way
home from school, despite repeated admonitions by his parents to stay away
from guns and people with guns. Under an ordinance like the one passed
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in Silverton, Oregon, and other jurisdictions, parents could face prosecution
on a strict liability theory because their child had been charged with a crime.
But such a prosecution would have little impact in terms of promoting better
caregiving in situations like the one that gave rise to the misconduct in our
hypothetical—there is very little caregiving the parent could have done that
would have prevented the crime in question. Perhaps the parent could prevent the child from earning extra money or going to school independently,
but children who are determined to find trouble can do it, notwithstanding
all reasonable efforts by parents.
The consequences of parental responsibility laws warrant consideration
too. To the extent that criminal law successfully projects norms about correct
values, the strict liability standard in some parental responsibility laws will
deter people from becoming foster parents, adoptive parents of teenagers, or
on the margins, parents of their own biological children. That’s not the signal
regarding the promotion of caregiving that society should emit.
As to restitution, there is no reason that a civil tort remedy against the
parents (or the minor) would not suffice in providing an avenue of repair for
the harms caused by a minor. After the children themselves, parents are
likely the next cheapest cost avoider, and so pinning parents with obligations
under civil recovery statutes gives parents a strong incentive to monitor their
children closely and provide an avenue of compensation for victims.46 To be
sure, there is the possibility—as there was above—of parents being judgment-proof and of there being no available plaintiff to sue. But if parents
were reasonably nowhere near the misconduct of the minor—if, for example,
the child goes on a supervised school trip with teachers—then, quite generally, the assumption that parents are the next least cost avoider may be misplaced. In any event, under the parental liability laws we discuss, the
defendant is not being forced merely to pay for harm; the defendant is being
condemned through criminal punishment for wrongdoing that someone
else committed even if the defendant was non-culpably unaware of and did
not participate in the wrongdoing and even though the defendant instructed
the wrongdoer that such misconduct was forbidden.
To be sure, we allow vicarious liability elsewhere in the criminal justice
system: for example, in the crime of conspiracy. Co-conspirators have been
permissibly held liable for substantive crimes committed by another member
of the conspiracy, through the Pinkerton doctrine,47 even if they are not present at the scene of that crime or aware of the crime’s commission.48 These
efforts are controversial and have been subject to substantial criticism.49
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But the parental responsibility law differs significantly from the Pinkerton
scenario. To impose liability under Pinkerton, the defendant must have committed the act of joining a conspiracy, and the additional crime by the coconspirator must be committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and be
reasonably foreseeable. In a recent article, Professor Kreit excavates the constitutional foundations for Pinkerton, noting that many courts have acknowledged the Pinkerton criteria—that the co-conspirator’s crimes be in
furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable—to be due process
requirements.50 If Pinkerton can be read roughly to establish a floor of a negligence rule in the context of vicarious liability for conspiracy then why, we
might ask, doesn’t the negligence rule operate in other cases of criminal
vicarious liability, such as felony murder, or for our purposes, parental responsibility laws?
Putting the constitutional issue aside, we do well to consider whether
these laws are likely to be effective at reducing the incidence of crime by
minors. Professor Dan Filler suggests that such statutes could be effective if
the consequences for violation were sufficiently severe and certain, although,
of course, we might not be willing to live with stakes of such high magnitude.51 For example, if parents whose children threw an alcohol-filled party
for their friends faced a felony conviction and a lengthy prison term, most
reasonable parents, Filler argues, would quickly “lock up the booze and
perhaps install a nanny-cam to monitor the house.”52 We think they might
take even more drastic measures—put their children on lockdown. Moreover,
to be effective, the government would have to enforce these laws more
often. The fact remains that though these statutes are on the books in a
number of jurisdictions, criminal prosecutions remain extremely rare.53 The
laws receive most of their attention in the media on account of those few
prosecutions that have taken place, such as the St. Clair prosecution discussed in Chapter 4.
But even if these statutes could be made effective, would it be appropriate
to use them? We have already articulated some reasons for thinking that
other alternatives might better achieve the goals sought by these parental
responsibility laws. But it is also important to question the assumptions
associated with these laws. Support for these statutes is motivated in part by
the belief that “poor parenting” is a root cause of much of the juvenile crime
in this country. As one family outreach worker exclaimed, “We have an adult
problem, not a children problem . . . If we can get our adults together, the
children will naturally fall in line.”54 One commentator has suggested that
that “the rationale behind the parental liability laws—punishing the parents
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to reduce acts of juvenile delinquency by their children—must be based on a
series of interconnected assumptions:” first, that the nature of the child’s
behavior is directly—if not primarily—caused by the quality of the parenting
in the household; second, that we can somehow create a “universal model of
adequate parenting,” which all parents can and should adopt regardless of
their circumstances; and third, that the threat of punishment will induce
parents to adopt this government-sanctioned model of parenting.55
Critics of these statutes contend that the link between poor parenting
and juvenile crime is far less certain than their proponents suggest.56
Juveniles are no doubt also profoundly influenced by their peers, their
schools, their communities, the media, and perhaps their genetic makeup.57
In addition, the threat of criminal liability might actually negatively impact
parenting, rather than enhance it. One critic suggests that parental responsibility statutes will induce some parents to “over-parent[], that is by either
severely restricting their child’s freedom or by excessively punishing the
child.”58 Other parents might respond by “under-parenting,” that is, by
distancing themselves from their children “by filing ungovernability or similar petitions to transfer responsibility to the state.”59 In either case, the
relationship between parent and child would become more adversarial and
negative, rather than more productive and positive.60

3. Gender, Inequality and Discrimination
From the preceding discussion, one can see why we are dubious about the
value of these statutes as to their capacity to reduce crime through parental
vigilance, to signal commitment to parenting values, or to provide restitution not available through other measures. Here we note that limiting
vicarious liability to those parents within a state-sanctioned family unit
seems underinclusive as well and, therefore, discriminatory. If vicarious liability is embraced by legislatures because of its crime-reduction promise,
then it should be applied whenever there is a relationship of asymmetrical
dependency and voluntary caregiving, and not just when there is a strictly
construed version of the parent-child relationship.61 For at least in this way,
more of the deterrence will be achieved by extending vicarious liability’s
ambit to same-sex or non-married child-rearing partners, and the importance of the supervision as part of caregiving will be communicated to those
who have opted to raise or supervise minors. A narrower structure would be
to restrict the reach of parental responsibility laws to the same class of people
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who constitute voluntary “primary caregivers” that would face a duty to
rescue children.
Having already considered heteronormativity concerns, here we want
simply to recognize that women will likely bear the brunt of these duties to
supervise in light of the fact that women currently most often serve as the
heads of single-parent homes. Although women may be deemed to have voluntarily assumed their parenting duties, it is critical to understand that,
based on a variety of factors, it might be difficult to conclude that parents
can effectively control their minor children, especially in the context of a
single-parent home. For one thing, the number and/or physical strength of
some children may prove overwhelming in particular situations. The parent
might also be a victim of a child’s misconduct. Additionally, parents might
fear that reporting their children to the police will lead to the involuntary
termination of their parental rights. All these serve as additional independent reasons to be concerned with the structure of parental responsibility
statutes or ordinances. In omissions liability, the parent being held
responsible is the last lifeline to prevent real harm to vulnerable and innocent children; in the context of parental responsibility laws, by contrast, the
children are generally neither wholly innocent nor in danger.

4. Summary
Although the burdens associated with parental responsibility statutes attach
to voluntarily created caregiving relationships, and therefore deserve some
leeway, our view is that they fail to be fully justified as drafted because of the
ways in which they raise substantial concerns under our minimalism, gender,
and inequality inquiries. It bears emphasis that our critique does not affect
those criminal laws that apply to any adult who commits a culpable act or
omission that proximately contributes to the delinquency of a minor or
endangers the minor’s welfare—assuming the statutes and courts define
those terms with reasonable specificity.

•

C. Incest

At the outset, we acknowledge that the topic of incest, like that of bigamy,
which follows, is a complicated one. Our modest goal is to contribute some
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preliminary thoughts to a difficult dialogue about whether the criminal law
is an appropriate vehicle to regulate the intimate activities of mature persons. As we discussed in Chapter 4, there are various kinds of incest rules:
some regulate conduct regardless of the age of participants, some regulate
conduct regardless of the consent of the participants, and some regulate
conduct among intimates regardless of an actual blood relationship.
Unsurprisingly, there is overlap across these categories depending on the
jurisdiction.
We emphasize that our focus here is on those criminal laws that punish a
person’s conduct that, but for the family ties of the defendant, would otherwise be lawful in a given jurisdiction. We are specifically not talking about the
sexual abuse of children, which is sometimes referred to as incest but is
clearly and rightly illegal conduct regardless of the identity or family status of
the perpetrator. As we explain below, we will focus our discussion on consensual sexual conduct between adults, but our analysis also has potential
implications for how states regulate sexual conduct between minors and
adults and between minors and other minors, which we touch on toward the
end of this section.
Consistent with our positions developed in Chapter 5, we think that in
situations where genuine and mature consent between the parties is possible and where negative externalities can be eliminated, the criminal law
should prescind from application. If genuine and mature consent cannot be
presumed or achieved, then the sexual activity should be investigated and
punished largely in the way other sexual misconduct is punished—though
we have some concern that coercion is too narrowly defined in some jurisdictions. Nonetheless, we also believe that sentencing enhancements based
on breach of trust can be justified in contexts where a primary caregiver has
abused a minor child or other person who might be incapacitated (e.g., an
elderly parent or disabled adult child).62
Let’s begin by determining the objectives articulated on behalf of incest
statutes. The most commonly cited rationale for prohibiting consensual relations is that incestuous relationships have the potential to create children
with genetic problems if the parties reproduce.63 Moreover, incestuous relationships have special potential to be abusive and nonconsensual, and this
coercion may be difficult to detect, thus calling for a separate and perhaps
more severe set of penalties.64 Additionally, some have viewed the incest
taboo as a way to “prevent intrafamilial sexual jealousies and rivalries,” when
a parent figure has relations with both another parent and a child.65
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Yet, these rationales cannot account for the scope of the incest prohibition in almost all American states. For example, consensual relationships
between adult siblings who were adopted from different birth parents,
and thus share no genetic link, raise none of the concerns associated
with genetic difficulties, and raise fewer relevant concerns related to sexual
jealousies or coercion.66 It is therefore impossible to underestimate the
influence of the “disgust factor.”67 In large part, these relationships are
criminalized because Americans view them with distaste or because they
are, in some situations, religiously proscribed.68 As we develop below, we
think that at least as to some of these relationships, the state should step in
to proscribe the sexual conduct—and with regard to others, the state should
step aside and refrain from using the criminal justice system to sanction the
conduct.

1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
In most jurisdictions, incest laws apply to both voluntarily and involuntarily
created relationships—parents are prohibited from sex with their children
the same way that siblings are prohibited from having sex with each other.69
To the extent that these family ties burdens are placed on relationships that
are involuntarily created, we think these prohibitions fail one of our liberal
concerns and should be regarded very carefully before being legally implemented. However, to the extent they apply to voluntarily created relationships of caregiving, we have little problem in extending some deference to
legislative decisions to penalize these relationships.
Our reasons for doing so, however, are not predicated on the biological
issues undergirding support for most incest laws. Rather, we think a general
rule is appropriate, one that prohibits sexual relations between an adult and
any person for whom the adult provides caregiving functions such that the
other person is involved in a relationship of asymmetrical dependency—
regardless of whether the dependency relationship is established through
consanguinity. Examples of asymmetrical dependents include, on the one
hand, foster parents, adoptive parents, stepparents, and biological parents
and, on the other hand, all minors under their charge and responsibility until
that dependent is no longer under their charge and responsibility.70 Our concern is that the relationship of asymmetrical dependency lends itself to
peculiar risks of abuse such that establishing a norm of protecting vulnerable
persons from coercion or improper pressure requires a rule that may be
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overprotective in some cases. Such a law would emit a clearer signal of
which relations are prohibited than the mishmash that characterizes
current incest laws.71
This more general rule ties in with our liberal concern that seeks to
assess whether the family ties burden in question unnecessarily infringes
on one’s liberty. With respect to sex crimes, it is the lack of (intelligent
and mature) consent that should drive the liberal state’s punishment of
offenders. When a person stands in a position of asymmetrical dependency,
it is very hard to determine whether truly voluntary consent was given.
There are also complicated questions about whether persons who were
once in relationships of asymmetrical dependency, but now are not, could
voluntarily consent to have relations with persons with whom they were
once vulnerable; thus, at a minimum, some regulatory speed bumps should
be erected to ferret out the existence of genuine and meaningful consent in
those contexts.72
As to relationships between independent adults, we believe that a respect
for autonomy and limited government should permit consenting individuals
to engage in the sexual relations they deem appropriate without fear of criminal sanction.73 That is not to say we endorse any of these relations; rather, we
simply think the state should not be using the criminal law to tread upon the
intimate associational rights of mature individuals. As they stand, the current laws chill consensual activities by adults that should be unencumbered
by threats of arrest, prosecution, and punishment.74 Indeed, criminal prosecution is ordinarily unnecessary to prevent this conduct; most of these relationships will be deterred by social stigma. We recognize the concern that
incestuous relationships have the potential to be abusive and nonconsensual,75 and we think that these concerns are substantial and important. But
in the context of adults, these problems can ordinarily be punished through
the traditional crimes tracking lack of consent, i.e., the crimes regulating
sexual assault.76
We acknowledge that, in some circumstances, those available “background” laws may be unsatisfactory. For example, it is quite possible that
the coercion involved in an incestuous relationship would be psychological
rather than physical, and many states still do not consider psychological
coercion sufficient to satisfy the required elements of their rape or
sexual assault statutes.77 Thus, although our background laws forbidding
sexual assault and rape may be sufficient bases for prosecuting and punishing offenders in cases involving physical coercion, it is important to recognize that the current status of rape law may leave some non-consensual
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incestuous relationships outside the reach of criminal law sanctions. Thus,
reform of current rape laws continues to be an important goal. It is also
important to recognize that various gender inequities within households
raise questions about whether consent to an incestuous relationship could
ever truly be voluntary, but these are fact-bound inquiries. Assuming there
are such consensual relations between mature adults, then prohibiting adult
step-siblings or any other adult couple from having consensual relations is
primarily a form of squeamishness—at least from a liberal criminal justice
perspective that does not seek to impose a particularly traditional vision of
sexual morality.78
In the absence of consent between adults, as we’ve qualified it here, we
think sexual misconduct should be punished as if the crime were committed
by an acquaintance or stranger. However, we support legislative decisions to
impose breach of trust enhancements—whether treated as elements of a
crime or sentencing factors—for crimes by primary caregivers against
persons in relationships of asymmetrical dependency, where the caregiver
voluntarily assumed the caregiving relationship.79

2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
In this sub-section, we explore whether the purported objectives of the incest
prohibition match up to the laws we have, focusing on the degree of narrow
tailoring extant in the current practices. Let’s begin with the concern about
coercion. This problem, which we think is the government’s most compelling
interest, can be punished through general laws prohibiting coercive sex. Thus,
the need for articulating a specific family ties burden requires justification.
One argument associated with coercion is that it is very difficult to achieve
adequate deterrence in the family context because of the problems associated
with getting minor victims to report parental misconduct because of the
supervisory relationship. But if that’s the case, we can have, as suggested above,
heightened penalties in any context where a breach of trust with a supervisory
adult arises—whether schools, churches, or the home. In other words, the
breach of trust enhancement need not be limited to family status, even though
family status in some contexts creates the inference of betrayal of trust.
Admittedly, this strategy won’t do the work of addressing the reluctance of a
minor to report a sibling’s or cousin’s improper conduct, but that same reluctance can easily arise if it is a close family friend or neighbor who commits the
sexual misconduct.
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As to the sometimes articulated goal of preventing intrafamilial sexual
jealousy, there are reasons to doubt that this is truly a governmental interest
of the sort that can vindicate the use of the criminal sanction. For one thing,
it is hard to understand why sexual jealousy is a form of jealousy that the
state should be particularly worried about, as opposed to the jealousy and
rivalry that may arise from economic disparities, parental favoritism, or
other forms of rivalry. Second, incest laws do not currently attach to whole
clusters of possible relationships that might also give rise to intrafamilial
sexual jealousy—thereby creating serious underinclusiveness relative to this
goal. A heterosexual woman may marry a man and also sexually desire his
father or brother; a heterosexual man might marry a woman and desire her
mother or sister. If persons act on these desires, they are not subject to incest
laws in the vast majority of jurisdictions, but they will surely trigger intrafamilial jealousies.
As to the genetic concerns, there are several responses. First, for persons
not engaged in activity capable of causing genetic repercussions—gay cousins, elderly siblings, etc.—the rules prohibiting their relationships are overbroad and cannot be justified on this ground. With respect to those not
related by consanguinity, there is no basis for genetic fears at all. Admittedly,
such fears increase when talking about closely related persons, such as
brothers and sisters.80 But as others have noted, “in no other legal realm
does the government criminally prohibit two people from having children
because their offspring are more likely to inherit genetic defects.”81 Put
simply, we have long since retired the idea that eugenics preferences are a
reasonable basis for criminal justice policy.82
Related to the genetics-based fears is concern for the economic costs of
allowing incestuous relationships. In other words, some might be tempted to
justify criminal law incest prohibitions to reduce the costs associated with
increased medical care for children of consanguineous parents. But again,
the solution of using incest prohibitions is both overbroad and underinclusive. First, some couples deemed incestuous may choose not to have children or may not be able to have children, and yet their conduct would still be
subject to criminal sanction. Second, we do not use the criminal law as a tool
to reduce potential medical costs in any other context, so it would be hard to
justify its use here. When we criminalize murder or theft, it is not because we
want to keep insurance payments down; it is because murder or theft is
wrong. Third, if we were genuinely concerned about increased medical costs,
we could test all couples with high risks of disease or complications who are
contemplating having children. But this would be both an offensive policy
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to many people, and it would sweep in far more persons than those who are
blood relatives.
The preceding discussion of narrow tailoring has largely addressed family
ties burdens in the context of relations between adults. We acknowledge that
concerns about family ties burdens on persons engaged in relationships with
minors raise weightier concerns than those arising in the context of consenting adults.83 Although all of us agree that the possibility of coercion is far more
significant in this context and that it is less likely that the minor in question
is capable of truly informed consent, we disagree among ourselves how much
to credit the consent of minors who choose to have sex with adults to whom
they are related, and what measures might be taken to prove such consent to
the state.84 Although many states have a variety of statutory rape laws available to punish and deter adult-minor and minor-minor sex, these laws may
not be sufficient to address all the possible concerns arising from these relationships where incest is involved. Thus, we address below the use of family
ties burdens in these contexts.
As to sexual relations strictly among minors, we are not all of one mind—
proving the point, perhaps, that our framework for analyzing these laws
does not require a single conclusion on all family ties burdens. One of us
(Markel) thinks that sex with and between minors should also be regulated
in family-neutral ways. This would mean that either the criminal law applies
to prohibit sexual activity for all persons under a certain age or that the criminal law does not apply in the context of consensual relations among those
credited with the capacity to consent. (This would be in addition to the general rule that would prohibit sexual activity between supervisory caregivers
and dependent caretakers.) Thus, there would be no categorical rules prohibiting sexual conduct between, say, seventeen-year-olds on the basis of
family status alone. Under this view, those worried about physical or psychological coercion or abuse or retaliation can simply rely on the laws available
to punish that independent misconduct. If sexual relations are to be decriminalized for those over an age of consent, then it should be immaterial from
the state’s perspective whether they are brothers or first cousins or friends.
The key would be to ensure an absence of coercion or abuse.85
But at least one of us (Collins) finds these conclusions troubling. Sex
between minor siblings, for example, does not implicate a significant liberty
interest that is worth protecting. In addition, some of the concerns used to
justify incest bans take on heightened importance in the context of minors.
For example, because the potential public health ramifications of incestuous
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sex are admittedly non-negligible—and because it would be extremely hard
for minors to give meaningful consent to such complex sexual relations—
there may be sound reasons to preserve criminal statutes against incestuous
sex among minors. Minors, because of their emotional immaturity, are more
vulnerable to psychological coercion. In addition, minors in incestuous
sexual relationships may be less likely and able to seek outside help in ending
the relationship. It would seem far easier, for example to report one’s fortyyear-old uncle to the authorities than it would to report one’s brother.
One of us (Leib) cannot make up his mind, though his sympathies are
largely with Collins. Indeed, not only are Collins’ concerns serious, there are
serious costs associated with creating new and complicated institutions and
bureaucracies—would minors be expected to use registries too?—to channel and sanction conduct (minor sex with family members) that hardly
seems like an especially grave liberty interest for the state to protect. There is
also, finally, the reality that the juvenile justice system is a different beast
from the adult system and probably raises different concerns, which have
not been systematically examined or considered sufficiently here to reach
a clear conclusion on the merits.

3. Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination
There are a couple of important points about inequality and discrimination
that bear mention regarding the use of family ties burdens in the incest context. First, as we have noted above, incest laws appear motivated in part by
concerns about genetic repercussions in the offspring. That implicates both
heteronormativity and repronormativity—and signals to the polity that we
expect couples engaged in sex to procreate. We note, additionally, that to the
extent that the family ties burden operates ex ante in a protective manner
(of a particular model of family relations), it denies that protection to those
whose families do not fit the particular model of family relations informing
the contours of most incest statutes. Thus, if a gay couple lives in a state
where they cannot adopt as a couple together, then the incest statute will
not “protect” a child who has been adopted by X against the sexual misconduct perpetrated by X’s partner, Y—assuming that Y has not been able to
create a legally binding relationship to the child. Of course, Y is susceptible to
the general statutes prohibiting sexual misconduct, but that just shows the
general redundancy of most incest statutes. Last, we note that the incest
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statutes around the country are generally drafted and, to our knowledge,
prosecuted in manners that do not especially and unfairly burden one sex
over another.

4. Summary
Having applied our normative framework from Chapter 5, we see that in
many jurisdictions, incest laws by their scope create family ties burdens not
only in the context of consensual sexual conduct between adults, but also
when states otherwise permit consensual sexual conduct between adults
and minors, and between minors and minors. In the context of adults, and
subject to the caveats discussed above, we find this burden on the intimate
associational rights of consenting mature individuals unjustifiable because
the interests underlying incest laws can be promoted through more appropriate measures short of invoking the particular power of the criminal law. In
the context of incestuous sex between adults and minors, and minors and
minors, we are divided about whether incest laws—which create specific
family ties burdens that create liability where, in the absence of a family relationship as designated by the state, none would otherwise exist—should
survive scrutiny. That said, we agree that when sexual misconduct occurs in
a relationship of asymmetrical dependency, a sentencing enhancement is
warranted for the breach of trust created by that dependency. Those enhancements would be sensibly extended even to those secondary caregivers who
exert supervisory powers over minors—including teachers, scout leaders,
and faith group leaders.
However one redrafts criminal law in the incest arena to address the various difficult issues surrounding adult-adult, adult-minor, and minor-minor
incest, we doubt we will gain much traction with the political community
that favors these laws in the near future. In large part, these relationships
are criminalized because Americans view them with distaste or because they
are, in some situations, religiously proscribed. That said, the topic of
consensual adult incest has actually been the subject of some legal and
political discourse of late because of its links to the same-sex marriage
debate. Some have suggested—with an intention to alarm—that if we legalize
(as we have in some jurisdictions) same-sex marriage, the legalization of
incest is sure to follow.86 But in contrast to the issues of gay rights and
same-sex marriage,87 there is no committed and vociferous mainstream
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advocacy movement of which we are aware that is currently arguing for the
liberalization of incest laws.88
Similarly, there is very little legal scholarship seeking to make an affirmative case for greater recognition of intrafamilial romantic relationships;
discussions about incest usually involve simply pointing out that many of the
arguments made in favor of the criminal laws are problematic. For example,
commentators remark that the evidence related to the possibility of genetic
harm is far less certain than once believed, and, in any event, many of the
relationships currently prohibited do not trigger this concern at all.89
There are a few recent exceptions in the academic literature to this general pattern. For example, Christine Metteer argues that the individual’s constitutionally protected right to marry trumps the state’s interest in prohibiting
incestuous marriages when the parties are related only by affinity rather
than consanguinity.90 More provocative is a recent article by Ruthann Robson,
who suggests that “the proffered explanations for incest prohibitions should
be deeply problematic for any same-sex marriage advocate.”91 She argues
that attempts to justify prohibitions against incest by appealing to religion or
longstanding community mores should be soundly rejected, because “tribal
customs should not govern our current cultural mores and constitutional
notions any more than Leviticus should prevail.”92 She also argues that we
should reject the genetics justification, because it “rests upon identity
between marriage and procreation—the same logic that is used to resist
same-sex marriage.”93
Our own view of the matter is, as we have said, limited to the reach of
the criminal law. We think these criminal prohibitions, regardless of their
motivation or provenance, are problematic from our liberal minimalism
perspective, as well as from the viewpoint that considers how family ties
burdens trigger concerns of inequality and discrimination, especially in the
context of mature individuals engaging in consensual sexual relations.

•

D. Bigamy

Our analysis of bigamy takes some cues from the preceding discussion of
incest. The rationales for bigamy laws (by which we refer to the criminal bans
on the practice of polygamy) are familiar and, in America, deeply rooted.94
They are nonetheless underscrutinized,95 something we hope to remedy
below. In describing the objectives of bigamy laws, some have adverted to the
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many “[p]opular depictions of polygamists in the media and in society,
[which] generally focus on the prevalence of underage brides, accounts of
sexual abuse, and the subservient role of women in these relationships.”96
Indeed, historically, polygamy has been decried by some as a tool to
subordinate women and so bigamy laws would presumably be responsive to
those concerns. Some supporters of bigamy laws have also noted their
importance in reducing the costs of social welfare programs. The underlying
assumption here appears to be that if a person has eight spouses (and their
offspring) for whom she or he must provide care and resources, there is
greater concern that these people might become charges of the welfare state.
Last, some critics of polygamy have stated that polygamy is especially dangerous to the governance of the liberal state itself. We flesh out these claims on
behalf of bigamy below. Our perspective on how to approach this family ties
burden will, we hope, illuminate the debate—and raise questions about
whether the criminal law is the proper tool with which to respond to the
practice of polygamy.

1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
To begin, we note that bigamy laws satisfy our first liberal concern in that the
legal burden of a criminal penalty only applies to someone who has previously created a voluntary caregiving relationship. Thus, when a criminal penalty based on family status is imposed on X, who is married to Y, for also
marrying Z during an extant and valid marriage to Y, that is a burden that
can be regarded as one for which X was on notice. That notice and implicit
consent to the burden partially diminishes the problem of bigamy laws, but
it does not provide an affirmative and independent justification for these
family ties burdens. They must still undergo further scrutiny.
Our second inquiry asks whether there is some liberty at stake that a
society committed to advancing one’s liberty should respect. Our view is that
the act of plural marriage itself can be expressive of one’s basic rights to
establish intimate associational relationships without undue intrusion by
the state. We also believe that the right to terminate those marriages is a
right properly belonging to individuals within a liberal state. So, using the
terms above, if X marries Z even though Y opposes X’s second marriage to Z,
Y should be able to terminate his marriage to X via divorce for this reason.
And if X and Y had signed an agreement that X would not undertake a second
marriage, then that should be enough to keep X from marrying Z while X is
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also married to Y. But statutes simply and completely criminalizing polygamy infringe on the fundamental rights of consenting mature individuals to
enter into covenants of mutual care with other persons. Thus, if we are to
criminalize this behavior, the reasons should be very substantial.

2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
a. Coercion and Minors
Recall that the first objection to repealing bigamy laws is that polygamous
practices are thought to entail the frequent coercion of underage persons,
usually females.97 In light of the recent events involving the Fundamentalist
Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints (FLDS) community in
Texas,98 we view this as a very substantial (though obviously contingent)
consideration, especially because such girls often have had little recourse
to reach beyond the relatively insular communities in which they were
raised. To be sure, the problems that arise in prosecuting persons guilty of
misconduct—the unwillingness or inability of family members to testify
against the perpetrator, and the participation or enabling of the family members in the abuse—arise in monogamous situations too. But the problems
are especially stark where an entire community may be supportive of the
polygamist adult male and not his underage wives. Indeed, these problems
also exist for potential wives who are technically of legal age because they are
eighteen but may also face intense pressures from their communities and
have no avenues of economic or social support outside them.
There is another important consideration related to the coercion of
underage women. Some practitioners of polygamy seek to evade criminal
sanctions by simply not declaring to the state that the parties have entered
into what would otherwise be a formal marriage relationship.99 Yet, bigamy
laws are not always drafted or interpreted to target this wrong.100 Indeed,
they sometimes render the coerced parties themselves as criminals.101
That we must vigilantly guard against harm to minors does not mean that we
must necessarily prohibit the decision of three or more consenting adults to
enter into a polygamous relationship. Using broadly written polygamy bans
to fight coercion or exploitation of minors is overinclusive and facially
discriminatory because it punishes those adults with polyamorous desires
or dispositions who are willing to abide by norms requiring both consent
and maturity.
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There are other laws currently available, or that could be enacted, to
punish the commandeering of immature or unconsenting minors without
infringing upon legitimate associational rights and interests. First, as we
suggested in connection with the discussion about incest, we should make
sure the law is especially scrutinizing of and skeptical toward sexual and
marital relationships involving minors generally and especially minors or
other persons in relationships of asymmetrical dependency. Thus, under our
approach, relationships established upon pressure or coercion would be prohibited (though the “poly” aspect of this prohibition is essentially irrelevant
since it would apply to monogamous marriages too). We should also be
vigilant about allowing parental authorization of marriages below an age of
maturity and consent because that could facilitate abuse within communities committed to flouting those normative benchmarks. We emphasize,
however, that the concern for coercion of minors (and adults) is relevant in
the context of both monogamous marriages and polygamous ones. This
concern would entail, perhaps, criminal prohibitions on persons knowingly
facilitating or solemnizing marriage ceremonies regardless of whether they
involve a license.102
In sum, although we need laws that prohibit the coercion of persons into
marriage or sex, we do not believe these laws need to be drafted in such a way
that unnecessarily infringe upon the rights of mature persons to structure their
family lives in the way they feel appropriate. Rather, the government can
develop specific strategies for dealing with acute dangers of coercion of minors
or adult victims trafficked into marriages. In light of our commitment to being
minimalist about the criminal law’s reach, if policy-makers are determined to
encourage particular structures within the household, they should not do so
though the criminal law, especially when there are alternative civil options that
can incentivize monogamous marriages.
b. Economics
Another reason some might think criminalizing polygamy is appropriate
is based on the economics of social welfare. If a person has eight spouses
(and their offspring) for whom she or he must provide care and resources,
there is greater concern that these people might become charges of the welfare state. The problem with this argument is its contingent and highly speculative nature: as scholars have shown, the economics of polygamy are quite
complicated and thus might not justify any criminal encroachments on the
rights people have to intimate association.103
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First, in any given polygamous cluster, there might be economies of scale
that attach to family units that allow for optimization of human capital. One
woman who is a polygamy activist in Utah paints her participation in a
polygamous relationship in exactly such a manner.104 Her husband has eight
other wives and children with a number of them. One of the wives is employed
by the others to tend to the collective children for several years at a time
while the other wives are free to pursue careers of their choosing for longer
periods. Indeed, some research shows that women are materially better off
in societies in which polygamy is allowed or encouraged.105 To be sure, it is
not our goal to improve the lot of women at the needless expense of any
other group, but we advert to such studies simply to show that who benefits
from polygamous arrangements is a more complicated matter than often
assumed.
Second, if an economic burden on the state were a sufficient reason to
infringe upon an otherwise important liberty in associational freedom and
privacy, the state could take a more narrowly tailored measure to ensure the
financial viability of such unions, i.e., the disqualification of additional
spouses from social benefits.106 Indeed, one could insist that adding more
spouses is subject to higher taxes or proof of assets—both of which are noncriminal rules that can achieve the same end of reducing numbers on the
dole.107 Obviously, these rules should be crafted in gender-neutral terms.
Polygamous arrangements are not to everyone’s taste, but in a world in
which women, empirically, continue to shoulder the brunt of childrearing at
the cost of their careers, flexibility in marital arrangements might be a way to
minimize the social and personal costs of abiding by these extant social
norms.
c. Bigamy Laws as a Safeguard Against Defiance of the
Liberal State
As alluded to earlier, some propose banning polygamy because of the general
injuries that the practice inflicts on liberal democratic states. For example,
Professor Strassberg argues, with respect to some polygynous communities,108 that children from polygamous unions impose an unusual burden on
the state because they are often concealed; that polygamous practices
conduce to create theocratic communities that fail to abide by or support
the government’s rules; that these practices create a secrecy that leads to the
denial of individual civil rights; and, last, that these polygynous communities
fail to pay sufficient taxes.109
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These arguments, while well-motivated, are largely misplaced. Concealmentbased harms are only a challenge in the context of a state that criminalizes
polygamy. It is the threat of criminal liability that often drives the parties
underground. Putting aside social norms that will bend over time, and recognizing that these norms have already changed somewhat, there is no legal
need to conceal polygamous relations if bigamy laws are repealed. If we were
worried that people were denied their civil rights, then that would be a separate reason to intervene in any specific situation, but there is nothing inherently denigrating of civil rights by expanding options for plural marriage.
If we are worried about concrete legitimate wrongs (such as the failure to pay
taxes) resulting from the theocratic tendencies of certain polygynous communities, we have separate laws available to punish violations of any given
law. It is not as if polygamous communities are the only communities in
which fundamentalist views pose a threat to the vitality and security of a
liberal state. Using polygamy bans to remedy these harms on these grounds
is unjustifiable as a government policy.110

3. Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination
Some arguments Professor Strassberg mentions bear special scrutiny because
they run parallel to arguments opposing polygamy based on cultural or racial
bias. As various scholars have shown, with ample record in the Supreme Court’s
nineteenth-century cases to support the argument,111 opposition to polygamous
practices is often rooted in prejudice against other cultural practices.112 Although
opposition to polygamy today is not usually expressed in racial or ethnic undertones,113 it does sometimes take on a cast of hostility to religious views.114
A more powerful reason to be worried about decriminalizing bigamy is
that polygamy, in some views, serves to facilitate the subordination of
women, even if they are adults.115 Although bigamy statutes are facially
neutral to women, and thus prohibit both polygyny and polyandry,116 we
acknowledge the sociological and anthropological evidence showing that
polyandry is much rarer.117 Nonetheless, the research on this topic indicates
that the claims that polygamous relationships subordinate all its female participants go too far in light of the diverse reasons that polygamy erupts and
the diverse forms polygamy takes under different conditions.118 Moreover, it
is a mistake to resist polygamy (or more specifically, polygyny) as oppressive
to women without noting that the same norms that exist within some polygamous communities also exist within some monogamous communities.119

Dan Markel-Chap06.indd 132

2/26/09 7:32:13 PM

applying the framework to family ties burdens

133

There is also some empirical evidence indicating that abuse is no more likely
in polygynous communities than monogamous ones.120 Indeed, perhaps
because of the marginalization of polygamous practices, polygamy supporters argue that it is harder for female victims or allies of victims to report
abuse because it might lead to bad consequences for the victim.121 Of course,
this same reluctance to report abuse or coercion is a concern in monogamous relationships; but unlike in monogamous relationships, the victims
of abuse in polygamous relationships might face serious collateral consequences from the state, such as the termination of parental rights.122
Consequently, we have to sift carefully among the potential causes of
harms to women. As Professor Shayna Sigman trenchantly writes:
The belief that polygyny causes gender discrimination or a low status of
women in a given society is a classic example of the fallacy of post hoc ergo
propter hoc. That polygyny can be found in societies that treat women poorly
does not mean that the practice itself causes the gender inequality. Often,
the true culprit of oppression merely lies in limitations on property rights for
women, a practice that can be facilitated through polygamous life, but need
not be. Indeed, where polygyny can help women economically by linking
them with men who can provide more resources, it is the societies with less
gender discrimination that are found to have this arrangement.123
Moreover, there is the quite powerful point that taking away a woman’s right
to participate in a polygamous arrangement (whether with men or women
or both) is itself a way of subordinating women. Again, as Professor Sigman
observes: “prohibiting polygamy infantilizes women, declaring them incapable of providing consent and foreclosing true choice by criminalizing one
of their options for family living.”124
In response to the claim that bigamy laws work to protect women from
subordination, we note that many of the claims about how women are
subservient in plural marriages have been said many times about monogamous marriage itself and the legal institutions accompanying it. So if antisubordination is the goal, then two questions arise: first, whether, as an
empirical matter, plural marriage prohibitions in fact achieve marginal harm
reduction—or, alternatively, whether marriage as a legal institution should
be abolished.125 In light of the fact that many prominent feminists have over
the years argued for decriminalizing bigamy, including active support by
Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton,126 we should evaluate more
carefully blanket claims about the subservience of women in plural marriage
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made in the absence of hard empirical evidence—and note that empirical
evidence of polygamy’s harms in liberal democracies would be difficult to
come by in light of the prevalence of the ban on the practice.
Last, we think bigamy laws’ effects on gay unions of two or more persons
warrant attention. Obviously, to the extent gays are denied the right to marry
one partner, they are also denied the right to marry two partners simultaneously. To gays, bigamy laws just add further insult to injury since whatever
protective benefit or function the bigamy laws were designed to achieve for
heterosexuals is denied to homosexual families. Despite this problematic
discrimination, however, we note that the particular problem can be solved
either by leveling down (decriminalization for all) or leveling up (expanding
criminalization).127 Thus, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
could also be overcome by an expansion of bigamy laws, one that would
encompass and sanction the misconduct of gays who have chosen to register
their union with the state for this purpose alone or for other protections and
benefits the state might offer to homosexual couples.

4. A Solution
Assuming the liberty to enter multiple covenants of mutual care is at least
morally defensible on grounds of respecting the autonomous and honest
choices of mature persons, then it seems that the state should abandon the
business of criminalizing polygamy and let private ordering, and perhaps
civil taxes and subsidies, determine who marries whom. This would entail, of
course, that persons with same-sex poly-orientations should be able to group
together as well without fear of prosecution.
In practical terms, here is what we propose. We would start with the
decriminalization of bigamy as between mature and consenting individuals.
Partners who wanted to secure exclusivity of marital relations could
contract around such a rule through a private contract calling for, if desired,
liquidated damages. This would place the burden of talking about the preference for imposing the family ties burden on the person who wanted the
family ties burden imposed. Given our general concerns about family ties
burdens, this burden-shifting makes sense as a penalty default rule.128
Several advantages from this regime obtain. First, it encourages couples
to discuss in advance of their marriage whether both parties have a
desire to keep the union monogamous. Second, it allows couples the
flexibility to work out these issues without fear of the criminal law sanction.
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In other words, couples could create agreements in which polygamy is prohibited, but without the involvement of criminal law penalties. Third, it
allows those who want the benefits that accrue from having a penalty to opt
in to a regime of regulation by contract. To be sure, a regime like the one we
endorse still forces individuals to have conversations that might be deemed
uncomfortable, but it seems that such a statute would prove to be a powerful
information-forcing device prior to marriage. Fourth, because liquidated
damages provisions are only enforceable to the degree that they are a reasonable estimation of the damages to an individual, they can be set at a level
sufficient to communicate condemnation of the breach of trust, while still
ensuring that the breacher can remain a productive member of society and
caregiver to any dependents. How exactly one should estimate the worth of
the breach is surely a difficult question. But we suspect a common sense
judgment can be made about what might count as an impermissible penalty
clause.
That we think bigamy should be decriminalized does not mean the state
must affirmatively endorse “poly” relationships. Emphatically, the views
developed here (as in our discussion of all these family ties burdens) are limited to the proper scope of the criminal law. Our argument does not require
that the state forbear from promoting certain kinds of relationships through
the civil system—and if the state wanted to endorse the view that children
are better raised through monogamous marriages,129 then it could do so
through the use of civil subsidies and taxes, rather than criminal penalties.
We do not necessarily agree that the state should use the civil justice system
in this way, but at the very least, the civil justice system’s carrots and sticks
do not trigger the most fundamental liberty interests of citizens.
Despite the appeal of some of these recent arguments in favor of decriminalizing bigamy, opposition to the practice continues to be widespread in
American society. As of 2004, more than ninety percent of Americans still
viewed polygamy as immoral.130 If polygamy activists will have their say, they
will have to demonstrate to Americans that the parties to these unions are
genuinely consenting and that the externalities of such practices, both on
the state and on any resulting children, will be close to trivial.

•

E. Adultery

As we saw in Chapter 4, almost half the states in the United States still retain
adultery laws. Even though they are sparingly used to prosecute individuals

Dan Markel-Chap06.indd 135

2/26/09 7:32:15 PM

136

privilege or punish

outside the military context, their existence on the books could have
important collateral effects in various civil proceedings affecting child
custody, adoption, and employment. To be sure, some might view this state
of prosecutorial desuetude as a sign of progress that we are no longer
interested in pursuing “mere” morals legislation. However, there is still
support in various regions to retain these prohibitions, even if they are
largely symbolic.131 And the reasons for this support are worth consideration:
some may view adultery’s potential wrongful harm to children or to spouses
who do not consent to their partner’s non-exclusivity as profound and
worthy of criminal sanction. Indeed, a decision to commit adultery has
the potential to undermine an individual’s ability to perform necessary caregiving functions, in that one’s energies and attention will be focused outside
the family unit rather than within it. Moreover, some may view these laws as
helping to further the state’s interest in keeping the institution of marriage
strong and stable.

1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
As with bigamy laws, the current prohibitions on adultery attach only to
voluntarily created relationships—indeed, the paradigmatic one of marriage.
So in that sense, adultery laws meet the first liberal concern we highlighted
in Chapter 5. However, there are still other considerations. When adultery is
defined simply as a married person’s sexual relations with a person not his
or her spouse, then the question is whether there is some normatively
attractive liberty to commit adultery such that a liberal society should respect
it or at least tolerate it by not harnessing the condemnatory power of the
criminal law upon it. On the one hand, if adultery is performed with duplicity, it hardly warrants praise; but it still leaves the question of whether it
warrants the condemnation associated with criminal sanction, especially
if non-criminal alternatives are available, as we discuss below. On the
other hand, imagine a devoted couple wherein one person faces prolonged
illness or some emotional development precluding the desire or capacity
for sex or intimate companionship. One can easily imagine couples who
might jointly authorize, either through a prenuptial agreement, or through
open or tacit consent, to a partner’s sexual relations with someone outside
the marriage. It is hard to understand why a liberal state should be opposed
to that private ordering arrangement if harms to third parties are trivial to
non-existent.
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2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
The objective of preventing betrayals of the marriage bond can be achieved
through various non-criminal law norms, though admittedly it is hard to tell
whether these non-criminal means are equally effective (though the degree
of non-enforcement suggests that deterrence is not really the rationale). In
those states without adultery laws, however, there are still strong social
norms against cheating in one’s marriage. The strength of these social norms
should not surprise. In various states in the United States or in liberal democratic countries around the globe, strong social norms persist against stigmatized activities: gambling and private tobacco use come to mind. It is hard
to believe that the modern state could not adopt effective norm-shaping and
regulatory strategies that encourage faithful monogamous unions without
the use of the criminal law.132

3. Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination
Because only a very few jurisdictions permit same-sex marriage, it bears
emphasis that adultery laws work primarily for the benefit of partners
(and, arguendo, children) of heterosexual marriages and not for the benefit of
partners (or children) of gay unions.
Although we think adultery laws should generally be abolished based
upon the very limited state interest in proscribing this conduct, we think this
added discrimination is very problematic. We note, however, that, like the
bigamy laws, the discrimination can be overcome by an expansion of adultery laws, one that would sanction the misconduct of gays who have chosen
to register their union with the state for this purpose alone or for other protections and benefits the state might offer to homosexual couples. Yet this
expansion to alleviate discrimination sits in tension with our commitment
to minimalism.

4. A Solution
We understand the viewpoint that, at least in certain contexts involving
duplicity, adultery statutes help punish and deter injury to persons who
did not consent to extramarital sex—for example, the spurned spouse.
But what adultery laws don’t permit, and what they should, is a life in which
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both parties consent to one or both parties living in marriage but outside the
bonds of monogamy, whether permanently or temporarily. This would have
the effect of destabilizing the conflation of marriage with persistent sexual
companionship.
As with bigamy, we view adultery laws that criminalize the extramarital
sex of married persons as facial family ties burdens warranting careful scrutiny despite the fact that they are triggered by virtue of a voluntarily created
relationship of caregiving. That’s because, in the absence of such adultery
laws, the proscribed activity would otherwise be lawful. Given that adultery
laws are drafted in gender-neutral terms across the country, we do not
believe they inherently raise issues of patriarchy or gender bias against
women.133 Nonetheless, because same-sex marriage is not permitted in
almost all American jurisdictions, adultery laws protect the interests of
(potentially) betrayed heterosexual partners while not being similarly available to those in same-sex partnerships. For us, that is a basis for rethinking
adultery laws.
Assuming that adultery statutes could be made indifferent to sexual orientation, would there be any reason to retain them in some fashion? We think
the strategy we endorsed in the bigamy context is instructive. We would begin
with a default rule that decriminalizes adultery because of the way adultery
intrudes on the choices of autonomous and consenting individuals. But we
would encourage prospective partners to contract around that default rule if
they wished by agreements that called for liquidated damages.134 As with
polygamy, several advantages from this regime obtain.
First, it will give couples an undoubtedly useful incentive to have an
important conversation before marriage about whether both parties
want their relationship to be monogamous, and it will give couples the
flexibility to address these issues without fear of the criminal law sanction.
Couples could create agreements in which adultery is prohibited, not by the
criminal law, but by allowing a regime of regulation by contract. In addition,
because liquidated damages provisions are only enforceable to the degree
that they are a reasonable estimation of the damages to an individual, they
can be set at a level sufficient to communicate condemnation of the breach
of trust, while still ensuring that the breacher can remain a productive
member of society and caregiver to any dependents. The same disclaimer we
referenced above applies here too: these reasonable liquidated damages
are hard to set in the abstract but we are confident courts could find a way
to determine when the damages clauses become impermissibly high
penalties.
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It needs to be emphasized that the burden for contracting around the
default rule of permitting adultery falls upon the individual who has information regarding his or her preference for monogamous relations.135 Thus, the
person wanting the extra burden imposed has to raise the issue and force a
conversation about monogamy. We think that, in light of the difficulties raised
by many family burdens, the burden should lie with this party. This is also
consistent with our sense that if we are to have other family ties burdens like
duties to rescue or supervise, the benefits flowing from these duties should be
available for a wide range of persons who either have signaled their caregiving
commitments through parenthood or partnership or those who are not in
such relationships but nonetheless want to create a covenant of caregiving.
Admittedly, we toyed with an idea—inspired by an article by Professor
Elizabeth Emens—that parties should be able to opt into a regime of voluntary
criminal law regulation, such that breach of a contract for monogamy could
lead to criminal prosecutions for bigamy or adultery.136 But upon further consideration, we recognized the unfairness of using public resources to investigate, prosecute, and punish conduct that amounted to a breach of private
promises between individuals. The notion that average people would have to
pay more taxes or suffer the effects of diverting scarce prosecutorial resources
to prosecute the failure of a private party to live up to its contractual sexual
expectations seemed ultimately unsupportable. By contrast, even in the
absence of the “contractual criminal law regulation” of adultery or polygamy,
parties of any sexual preference can contract for monogamous commitments
on pain of liquidated damages, and private ordering could thus be made to
supplant the clunky machinery of the state’s prosecutorial apparatus.137
In sum, because we believe the protections of the criminal law should
not be arbitrarily denied to couples of different stripes, and because we
think there are serious minimalism concerns and some liberalism concerns
with categorical rules against adultery, we support the decriminalization
of adultery laws. This would put everyone on the same footing. At the same
time, it would permit parties of all sorts to contract around a world without
criminal penalties.138 As we explained above, we would prefer to set the
default rule in a way that incentivized the person wanting the family ties
burden imposed to secure the agreement of the other spouse.
Thus far, we have not said much about what criminal law consequences,
if any, should be visited upon a person who has sexual relations with a married person.139 (Recall that in some jurisdictions, adultery statutes encompass the “outside” person who intrudes upon the marital relationship.) We
think the reach of these statutes goes too far, violating our second liberalism

Dan Markel-Chap06.indd 139

2/26/09 7:32:18 PM

140

privilege or punish

principle, and that such adultery statutes should also be modified to end
criminal liability for those persons. But note that if the adultery statutes
extend criminal liability to those third persons, there is no family ties burden
imposed on the basis of that person’s familial status or familial connection to
the crime. Properly understood, those provisions of adultery laws are not
family ties burdens as we define them.

•

F. Nonpayment of Child Support

As we described in Chapter 4, criminal sanctions have been adopted across the
country to ensure that parents do not flout their obligations to provide material
support for the well-being of their children. This development has occurred, no
doubt, for a few reasons. First, it is politically attractive for elected officials to
stand against parents who neglect their children.140 Second, and more importantly, the nonpayment of child support is a serious problem in our society.141 It
obviously harms children, who rely on support payments for subsistence.
Moreover, it harms the single parents left to struggle alone for the care of their
children. And because more single parent households are headed by mothers,
it leaves women to bear most of the brunt of parenthood and its unique
challenges.142 It also harms society at large, in that taxpayers may be forced to
shoulder the burden of financially supporting those children who end up on the
welfare rolls as a consequence of the nonpayment of child support. It is, accordingly, unsurprising that our criminal justice system takes special interest in
child support debts. Additionally, when we know the “creditors” are especially
vulnerable children with very little recourse to self-help options, we can see why
it would be appealing at first blush for policymakers to look to the criminal justice system to help make sure these debts are paid. Nonetheless, we must see if
these laws stand up to scrutiny.

1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
Criminally punishing parents for debts to their children clearly triggers the
concern that most family ties burdens do: it punishes the same conduct—
failure to pay a debt—differently based on the familial status of the debtor.
This is a straightforward family ties burden. For the reasons we adverted
to earlier in Chapter 5, we think we can explain why these family ties
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burdens continue to have some appeal or at least seem somewhat
fair: because parents can be plausibly deemed to have consented to assume
certain obligations and responsibilities by having their children. The family
ties burden here is one that should be imposed on persons voluntarily
creating these caregiving relationships.
But the case of a criminally punished obligation to support one’s children
may reveal a limitation of our approach because one could plausibly retort
that it is too facile to say that the nonpayment of a contractual debt to a
phone company, for example, is the same conduct as the nonpayment of
child support. In other words, one could argue that our society has differential views about the inherent blameworthiness of these two forms of nonpayment precisely because we see them as different sorts of conduct, not as the
same conduct treated differently on the basis of status. We cannot deny that
this re-description of the burden has some rhetorical force; however, we
still think our organizing method of scrutiny helps expose something deep
and pervasive about how the criminal justice system in the United States
interacts with a normative conception of the family.
Although our first liberal concern focusing on autonomy seems met by
these laws, our second liberal concern asks whether there is some underlying liberty worthy of respect to the act of not satisfying one’s obligations to
support one’s child. Our short answer is that it depends. As we discussed in
Chapter 5, there are some situations in which we agree the obligation should
not attach. A sperm donor may be the genetic parent, but if he disclaims,
prior to the donation of the sperm, all future rights to the resulting offspring,
he should not be held to pay child support. Similarly, a parent who gives a
child up for adoption and thus terminates his or her parental rights should
not be on the hook. But someone who has voluntarily entered into a parenting relationship should not be able to enjoy the benefits associated with parenting without also facing the obligations to be a minimally competent and
supportive parent. The question is whether those obligations should be fixed
by criminal law, and if so by what kinds of sanctions.

2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
We think that the criminal sanction should be used sparingly if there are
non-criminal alternatives that might be equally effective at satisfying the
goals here. Our sense is that using the criminal justice system with respect to
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this particular duty to support is not likely to be good—or effective—use of
criminal sanctions. First, depending on the sanction imposed, criminal sanctions might risk putting “deadbeat” parents in prison, where they certainly
will not be able to earn money to help support their children. Prison and
other forms of forced separation also prevent the debtor parent from having
meaningful relationships with their children—even if their only failure as
parents was being too poor to pay support. If the sanction is a fine that
goes to the state, then that is money that might otherwise be needed for
the child.
But these criticisms of imprisoning or fining deadbeat parents do not close
the debate, especially since a pretty basic empirical question is in play. We have
earlier acknowledged that the ability of the criminal law to have an educative
or expressive effect is worth careful attention. Having a criminal statute apply
in a way that does not itself make matters worse for the child may be possible
through alternative or intermediate sanctions.143 For one thing, in these contexts, the adjudication alone may be valuable for both general deterrent and
specific communicative purposes—when a public body declares, “you have
flouted one of your most pressing obligations, the support of the children, and
you warrant condemnation for that,” that can be a powerful tool in shaping
attitudes. But it might be that alternative non-criminal measures can also
bring home that message to the offender in question, and to the public at large.
Moreover, our anxiety about using the criminal sanction promiscuously here is
that it focuses attention too narrowly on the economic aspects of parenthood,
devaluing other important contributions to parenthood. When applied mostly
to fathers, as is typical, it further reinforces outdated views about fathers discharging their parental obligations through money rather than direct caregiving.144 To be sure, some fathers who are failing to pay financial support are likely
failing to provide emotional support as well. But the fact that the criminal law
takes an interest only in financial support in these statutes can have the effect
of reinforcing gender stereotypes.
Our minimalist approach would try to ensure that we have considered
how else to reduce the incidence of nonpayment of child support. First, we
think it is worth noting that a number of other non-criminal enforcement
mechanisms already exist to induce individuals to comply with their
mandated child support payments. For example, wages can be garnished,
tax refunds can be intercepted, and licenses and passports can be suspended.145 Further, these remedies can often be pursued outside the criminal
courts, for example, through state administrative agencies or through mediation. These civil proceedings can potentially promote the important ends
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that animate the current laws with more sophisticated, more sensitive, and
less troublesome means—and without the stigma of criminal conviction,
debtor parents can more easily get the jobs, education, and housing needed
to get on their feet and meet their obligations. Primarily, these other enforcement mechanisms might be sufficient to keep deadbeat parents in their
children’s lives while at the same time ensuring that the children receive the
funding to which they are entitled.
We cannot avoid the core question, however: if these mechanisms fail,
say with repeat offenders, should enforcement through the criminal justice
system, and in particular the use of incarceration, be an option of last resort?
There is at least one study, albeit somewhat dated, that suggests that criminal sanctions can be effective in reducing the incidence of the problem.
Professor David Chambers “found a close parallel between payments and
jailing: the counties that jailed more did in fact collect more.”146 But other
mechanisms have been shown to be even more effective than incarceration,
with suspension of driver’s licenses being the most effective stick.147 That is
not to say the criminal justice system cannot play any role in regulating
parental behavior; conviction and probation may well be valuable in inducing a repeat offender to pay. But we generally do not think incarceration
should be an available sentencing option for this offense, because, among
other reasons, incarceration affirmatively impedes caregiving instead of
fostering it. More empirical evidence would be helpful in finally resolving
this issue since, if jailing were the most effective means of making deadbeat
parents pay support, we would concede that the case for criminalization and
incarceration would be stronger.

3. Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination
Although the statutes that criminally punish deadbeat dads are drafted in
gender-neutral ways, fathers are most often the ones imprisoned under these
laws.148 We think it is undeniable that punishing mostly men for failing to
pay child support contributes to a gender stereotype that assumes that men
are supposed to be breadwinners and women are supposed to be caregivers.
This system contributes to and reinforces gender stereotypes in our society—
and it therefore raises our general concerns about family ties burdens.149
Although we applaud the drafting of these laws in gender-neutral language,
we think more work can be done to take the focus off the family in particular,
and instead focus more on voluntary caregiving relationships. Because our
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general approach is to deflect attention away from state-sanctioned families
and promote the reorientation of family ties burdens to target relationships of
voluntary caregiving, we suggest broadening the ambit of whatever approach
the law takes to include all nonpayment of debts of support to those in asymmetrical relationships of voluntary caregiving. So, if we are to have a criminal
sanction imposed, its reach should encompass all individuals who have
assumed that responsibility by becoming a primary caregiver for the child in
question. That would avoid the discrimination typically occurring ex ante
against persons in same-sex or polyamorous relationships and at the same
time would extend to the children of such unions the “protective” benefit
these burdens are supposed to achieve.150

4. A Solution
We cannot deny that there are countervailing values that justify these laws in
many people’s minds. As we suggested, these debts, when unpaid, can largely
harm vulnerable children and even primary caregivers themselves. So what
does our particular framework offer to the public policy community on the
issue of nonpayment of child support? Must the legal system get out of the
business of these prosecutions?
Based on what we noted above, we would favor a solution that minimizes
the use of the criminal sanction to ensure these obligations are met.
One possibility, the use of restorative justice processes, would simultaneously
help communicate the nature of the wrong to the debtor parent while
also furnishing a forum in which the debtor can explain why the debt is
not yet paid. And, in those cases where the criminal sanction is used to
condemn unjustified selfish behavior by the debtor parent, it should be
applied using a sanction to only and all those persons who have undertaken
a voluntary caregiving role towards the child, thus using a sanction that
actually promotes or is consistent with the caregiving obligations of
the offender.

•

G. Nonpayment of Parental Support

In Chapter 4, we described the family ties burden created by criminal
statutes that punish adult children who fail to provide financial support to
their indigent parents. Because of the rarity with which prosecutions are
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brought under these laws, we will be relatively brief in our assessment, which
is, on the whole, negative.
The plain objective of these laws is, first, to ensure aid to those who are
vulnerable in old age, and second, to educate the public and to reinforce a
sense of obligation through the criminal law to parents based on gratitude or
a notion of unbargained-for reciprocity. Do these laws pass muster under our
normative framework?

1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
These laws fail our initial concern regarding voluntary caregiving because it
creates a family ties burden on a person who did not voluntarily establish a
relationship with the indigent parent. The adult child is penalized simply by
virtue of being the indigent parent’s child.
From the perspective of our second concern with liberty, we ask whether an
adult child should retain the liberty to support only those he volunteered to
support. We think the answer to this, at least from a liberal legal perspective, is
yes. Obviously, it is appropriate and praiseworthy for an adult with means to
support his parents, whether based on love, reciprocity, or gratitude. But we
think it is not the business of the criminal law to require that support, and,
when it does, it violates a basic precept by condemning a person for failing to
act gratefully. This seems too slender a reed to justify criminal sanctions.

2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
We begin by looking at the first objective of these laws. Here it is to ensure
necessary aid to indigent and vulnerable persons, usually when they are
elderly and without physical means to help themselves. To our mind, the
obligation to help such persons is one that is agent-neutral, and thus, if it is
to be undertaken, it should be undertaken and funded by the public at large;
otherwise, it discriminates against those indigent elderly persons without
children or those whose children predeceased the parents. In any event,
there is no special need for using the criminal sanction to ensure support,
when social services funded out of taxes could more readily ensure that the
public interest in protecting the indigent elderly is satisfied.
As to the second objective, we note that, given our liberal orientation, we
are doubtful that the state has an important public interest in vindicating
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norms of care based on gratitude. Assuming arguendo that we stipulate to
the compelling or important nature of the second goal—of educating the
public and reinforcing an obligation to parents based on gratitude—we do
not understand why the civil remedies available to enunciate this obligation
would be insufficient.
As with duties to support children, if the goal is ensuring norm projection
and compensation, the goal can be expressed and the money can be obtained
through civil actions or garnished through wages and tax refunds. If a
criminal penalty were to attach, such that the person went to prison or had
to pay a fine to the state, then that sanction would usually impede the first
goal of ensuring adequate resources to the vulnerable elderly parent ex post
even though it might achieve some marginal deterrence ex ante against the
prospect of adult children walking away from their parents. We would invite
empirical scholars to weigh this cost based on existing data, but we would
not really seek out new legislative experiments based on our view that
imposing this family ties burden on children is improper because of its
incompatibility with the voluntarist underpinnings of an attractive criminal
justice system in a liberal society.
Regarding the concerns about gender, inequality, and discrimination, we
note first that imposing criminal liability on those violating filial responsibility
norms discriminates ex ante against children raised by parents in those gay or
polyamorous unions that are not recognized by the state; these children are
told, effectively, that they are not viewed as “children” of this or that person to
whom they properly regard as a parent. The discriminatory injury to the child is
admittedly quite slight. But these laws also have the effect of denying to gay and
polyamorous parents the “protective” benefit these burdens are supposed to
achieve.
Although the urge to promote an ongoing ethos of reciprocal care between
parents and children is powerful in some cultures, we must bear in mind that
a child’s relationship with his parents is not voluntary in the same sense as a
parent’s relationship to his children; after all, no child asks to be born, let
alone to these parents. Thus, it is no surprise to us that many jurisdictions
are reluctant to impose such liability now, even if that position leads to
seemingly harsh results.151 Because of the voluntariness problem, an opt-in
registry makes sense in the context of adult children who wish to signal
their covenants of care with their parents. And if they want, parents can opt
to signal their ongoing commitment to their children by agreeing to face
liability for failing to protect or support them as adults.
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But, in the end, we think the current state of affairs, in which about a
dozen states use the criminal sanction to establish filial responsibility
norms,152 violates our normative framework on every dimension. Therefore,
we think these laws should be abandoned. However, if these criminal laws
are to be retained for their expressive and/or compensatory purposes, we
think that they should at least not involve fines or incarceration, and that the
reach of the law should be expanded to include, under its umbrella, persons
who would otherwise be excluded based on discrimination against children
from same-sex or polyamorous unions.
Last, we think it bears mention that although there was once wide legislative support for filial responsibility laws in both civil and criminal form, these
norms no longer act with much force. The reason for that desuetude, we
think, is an increased appreciation for the voluntarist basis for holding people
criminally liable. We also think the significance of that norm helps explain
why, for example, we almost never see family ties burdens prominently used
against persons—siblings, grandparents, aunts—who did not themselves
voluntarily undertake to create that relationship of caregiving. That norm—
of promoting voluntarily caregiving—illuminates much of the terrain we
have surveyed here, and it lends promise to the project of how better to
reform our existing laws.
∗∗∗∗∗
We hope to have accomplished three things here. Most concretely, we
have demonstrated that there are a series of burdens that defendants face in
the criminal justice system on account of their family status, when that
status is recognized as part of a state-sanctioned family unit. Although our
work in Part I on the range of family ties benefits might suggest that family
status could only help a defendant, our exploration here reveals that such a
picture is incomplete. Indeed, there are also some ways that the criminal
justice system goes out of its way to punish persons on account of their
family status. The extent of this phenomenon has not, to our knowledge,
been previously examined systematically and we hope to get scholars and
policymakers to take interest in these findings.
Second, we made an effort to organize a normative framework for
thinking through whether special penalties should attach to family status.
What we discovered is that these sorts of penalties are more palatable when
they are efforts to reinforce relationships of voluntary caregiving. Accordingly,
we developed a set of tests or questions that we used to assess these family
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ties burdens. First, did the burden fall on persons who had voluntarily created a relationship of care? Second, did the burden impinge on some liberty
that should be recognized as deserving of protection in a liberal society?
Third, were the laws drafted in such a way as to be narrowly tailored to the
governmental objectives? Fourth, were there non-criminal measures that
could be equally effective in achieving these government objectives, assuming these government objectives were sufficiently compelling or important
to vindicate through law? Last, in what ways do the existing family ties burdens contribute to concerns about gender inequality and discrimination?
Finally, we tried to spell out how our normative framework might contribute to thinking through each of the family ties burdens we were able to identify here. We recognize, however, that ultimately we cannot hope to have
analyzed each family ties burden exhaustively—for they are each embedded
within a policy space of their own and each burden functions differently to
control different kinds of conduct. Nevertheless, our hope has been to
respond to older debates and start new ones through the framework we have
adopted and the policy choices we have suggested. Indeed, we hope that
looking at these burdens synthetically will illuminate how the criminal justice system is tempted to use each particular family ties burden to punish
family status in several ways—and how we might reorient these burdens in
a more normatively attractive light.
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we believe that there very well may be appropriate places for the modern

liberal state to recognize and accommodate the significance of family life
and caregiving networks. Indeed, the general subsidization that the family
receives throughout our legal system is probably a fact of life that would be
too utopian to oppose (though we remain discomfited by the way in which
the family is too often defined in terms that are not true or respectful to the
ways many people choose to organize their circles of affection). More than
that, there is potentially some increase in compliance the legal system
achieves by having family ties benefits and burdens. But even these relatively
straightforward statements trigger some fundamental questions: how should
we be defining the term family to achieve these possible, though ultimately
speculative, gains in compliance? Is there any reason to assume that compliance would go down if we moved from a focus on family status to voluntary
caregiving? And, in any event, even if such gains existed, might there not be
a moral constraint on using the criminal justice apparatus to further a
particular conception of which relationships constitute a family?
As we hope we have shown in this book, the criminal justice system, with a
few exceptions, is not generally an appropriate place to foster a particular vision
of family life. While our criminal justice system haphazardly reflects many
values, surely its critical and appropriately dominant ones are the promotion of
accurate and fair determinations of guilt or innocence and the protection of
citizens from serious wrongful harm. As we saw in Part I, privileging individuals
because of their membership in a state-denominated family unit can threaten
these core functions. Conversely, as we saw in Part II, burdening defendants
because of family status also threatens to extend the criminal justice system
into an arena beyond its proper scope. We are mindful that a criminal justice
system can do many other things, incident to its central functions. But we have
endeavored to analyze and explain why propping up a narrow conception of the
family through facial benefits and burdens is unacceptable from the standpoints of liberalism, minimalism, and criminal justice.
149
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The conclusions we have drawn in our comprehensive investigation of
the intersection of family ties and the criminal justice system are as follows.
We think marital and other intrafamilial evidentiary privileges are troublesome; familial exemptions for harboring fugitives cannot be tolerated; and
that violence within the family cannot be punished less severely than stranger
violence. Yet we think certain benefits that family members get in pretrial
release contexts, sentencing practices, and prison visitation and furlough
policies can remain viable in a liberal criminal justice system so long as
these benefits are extended more broadly on the basis of relationships of
caregiving, rather than arbitrary familial status, which is itself highly contested, gendered, and otherwise unjustifiable.
On the burdens side of the ledger, we support decriminalization in the
cases of parental responsibility laws (based on strict and vicarious liability),
bigamy, adultery, and nonpayment of parental support; we endorse decriminalizing incest between most adults, though we are divided on certain subissues in the incest context; and we are highly skeptical of criminalization in
the nonpayment of child support context, though we concede that more
research needs to be done on just how effective criminalization is in achieving
compliance. The only area in which we are largely unconflicted about criminalization on the burden side is the omissions (duty to rescue) context.
We are open to being proven wrong through credible empirical evidence
that would show that the benefits or burdens are necessary to achieve some
compelling state goal that cannot be achieved through less discriminatory
means. At the very least, we hope our evaluation of the benefits and burdens
defendants receive throughout the criminal law encourages other thinkers
and policymakers to develop more refined and systematic thinking about
these pervasive practices. It will not do, for example, to simply suggest that
the benefits and burdens somehow balance one another out, rendering
the system equitable. For that balance to happen, there would likely have to
have been some evidence of intentional action by either legislators or courts,
even though such evidence appears scant; moreover, it would be hard to
understand, for example, what the logical nexus is that translates, say, the
burden of being susceptible to prosecution for incest into an entitlement for
testimonial privileges or harboring fugitives.1
It also bears mentioning here that the somewhat different foci of the two
Parts’ normative frameworks (essentially Chapters 2 and 5) might mislead
readers in the following way: although Part II focuses on voluntary relationships of caregiving as central to the justificatory apparatus that could render
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“burdens” legitimate, one might—in our view, mistakenly—conclude that
this justificatory apparatus could underwrite all the benefits we describe in
Part I. That is, just because we think some legitimate criminal justice burdens
may be placed upon people in relationships of voluntary caregiving does not
mean that we think the criminal justice system is necessarily the best place to
incentivize these relationships by affording caregivers all the perquisites surveyed in Part I. Rather, we carved out just a few of these benefits that make
sense to apply to such caregivers: sentencing discounts for the non-violent
irreplaceable caregiver and certain prison policies and practices. Ultimately,
the primary criminal justice values—prosecuting the guilty fairly and protecting the innocent from crime and prosecution—warrant more respect in
a liberal criminal justice system than the possibility that these family ties
benefits can contribute to promoting and sustaining caregiving relationships. So we do not think giving caregivers of any sort (within the extended
family or outside it) the right to harbor fugitives, say, is a benefit worth
extending broadly to promote caregiving relationships. When, however, the
caregiving rationale does not endanger those fundamental pursuits of fair
and accurate retribution and reasonable crime control (as it might not in
some pretrial and post-sentencing contexts, for example), we think it is
important not to run afoul of the heteronormativity and repronormativity
concerns that characterize so many of these policies as they are currently
constructed.2
∗∗∗∗∗
We cannot leave the topic of the challenges the family poses to the criminal justice system without offering a few thoughts on the special and pronounced problem of domestic violence. We have not addressed it in depth in
Parts I or II because state statutes regarding domestic violence cannot neatly
be characterized as representing either a benefit or a burden on the basis of
family status; indeed, different states take wildly inconsistent positions. For
example, one jurisdiction makes domestic violence offenders eligible for a
diversion program whereas another jurisdiction bars domestic violence
offenders from diversion even though defendants charged with other misdemeanor offenses might be eligible.3 Indeed, some jurisdictions may decide to
codify approaches to domestic violence that simply do not vary in any important way from stranger violence. In light of this diverse set of possible structures, we can only try to offer some general observations that bring to bear
the insights of the book on this important and challenging issue.
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First, any jurisdiction that might persist in treating domestic violence
offenders better than offenders who victimize acquaintances or strangers,
either through the law on the books or the law “on the streets,” clearly would
run afoul of the principles for analyzing family ties benefits that we set forth
in the first half of the book. Such practices would probably have patriarchal
origins and would certainly have gendered effects. They would thus offend
our core concerns about equality and justice. To be sure, our analysis has
focused on facial benefits, and the law “on the streets” falls a bit outside the
purview of our book. Still, at least in this application, it is easy to see how we
would react to such a family ties benefit as a matter of principle.
Second, any jurisdictions that utilize traditional, circumscribed notions
of the family in their domestic violence statutes would also run afoul of the
concerns about discrimination and heteronormativity that we have discussed in this book. For example, Professor Ruth Colker undertook a comprehensive survey of state domestic violence statutes in 2006.4 She concluded
that four states—Delaware, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina—
only extend certain protections of their domestic violence statutes to opposite sex or married partners, thereby excluding individuals in same sex
relationships who are not married.5 Some other states, such as Massachusetts
and New Mexico, limit coverage to individuals in a long-term romantic relationship.6 Like Professor Colker, we would endorse using a functional
approach to determining which individuals should receive the protections of
domestic violence statutes. If individuals voluntarily perform primary caregiving roles to another, then they should be included within the coverage of
a state’s domestic violence statutes, regardless of whether they are part of a
formal heterosexual marriage relationship. Thus, for those individuals who
choose to utilize the registry that we described in Chapter 5, in which people
opt into certain obligations of caregiving to affected parties, we would fully
support including as part of the obligations covered by that registry a willingness to be bound by any reasonable state statutes proscribing domestic
violence or state statutes that especially burden those voluntary caregivers
in their domestic violence regulation.
Yet, there are more subtle and difficult issues raised by domestic violence
statutes, to which our normative frameworks can also make a modest contribution. In some jurisdictions, domestic violence statutes can be construed
as a family ties burden upon a defendant rather than as a family ties benefit.
That is emphatically not to suggest that domestic violence laws are currently
doing a good job of protecting women; as Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer
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has forcefully argued, “the disconnect between battering as it is practiced
and battering as it is criminalized is vast and it is significant.”7 But on its
face, as Professor Ruth Colker has argued, “the law is not ‘neutral’ with
respect to domestic violence; it now articulates the presumption that domestic violence is worse than other kinds of violence.” She adds that “this evolution in the law has not been accompanied by the development of a theory
to explain why we have an enhanced, rather than neutral, law of domestic
violence.”8
Although the full articulation of such a theory would be far beyond the
scope of this project, we hope that we have contributed some ideas to a
dialogue about when and why such an enhanced law might be appropriate.
The criminal justice system possesses its greatest moral force for intervention in relationships between individuals when it is necessary to protect
persons from wrongful harms. Omissions liability, as we discussed in Part II,
is a classic example. By entering into a relationship of voluntary caregiving,
presumed in the case of a parent-child relationship and available for voluntary entry in the case of mature adults, we argued that one has signaled a
willingness to be a first responder when a party to the relationship is in peril.
If an individual has signaled a willingness to be a first responder, to rescue a
vulnerable member of the relationship from harm, that individual has also
signaled a willingness to forego being the actual cause of any harm and that
individual’s exploitation of—and failure to protect—the consequent vulnerability is itself an independent wrong that exacerbates the wrong of harming
in the first place. Breaking a covenant of care by inflicting injury is thus a
greater moral wrong than inflicting injury on an individual to whom such a
specific covenant of care is not owed because exploitation of a particular
vulnerability is a separate wrong. Accordingly, enhanced penalties (or separate charges) for that breach would seem to be appropriate to reflect the
greater moral wrong that has been committed.
Ultimately, the issues surrounding the criminalization of domestic violence are tremendously complex and difficult, and we do not mean to suggest here that we have addressed them in any sort of comprehensive way. We
have obviously not adequately addressed issues related to race or class—or
the ways in which criminalization may itself be threatening to women’s
autonomy, to name just a few of the important questions that are beyond the
scope of our limited efforts here. We simply wish to suggest that domestic
violence policy may implicate some of the concerns about the criminal justice system’s reflexive reliance on family status in setting legislative policy
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that we have discussed throughout this book, and we hope that legislators,
courts, and policymakers will take a hard look at some of the questions that
we have suggested might be useful in analyzing any particular policy a state
is considering implementing regarding criminal justice and the family.
∗∗∗∗∗
In sum, whether benefits or burdens, privileging or punishing, is at issue,
the core inquiry is in a fundamental sense the same: how should family status
be used by the criminal justice system? We conclude that, in general, it
should only rarely and cautiously serve as a vehicle for directly promoting
the institution and goods of family life. The American family is a far more
complex entity today than our current system of benefits and burdens
acknowledges. Thus, in the final analysis, family ties benefits and burdens
should be viewed with skepticism for two reasons. First, they undermine the
core functions of a fair and attractive criminal justice system within a liberal
democracy. Second, using the criminal justice system to reflect and constitute traditional ideals of the family is ineffective at best and, more often,
plainly and perniciously discriminatory.
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sympathetic to Antigone’s plight because the edict she was flouting was unreasonable and oppressive, and an especial affront to the social norms of Greek times,
which required proper burial for the dead lest their souls wander forever after. See
Duncan, supra intro., n. 16, at 18. Thus, Antigone’s defiance of Creon may be viewed
as rebellion against an unjust law, whereas Sheinbein’s father, for example, cannot
fairly protest the justice of the relevant law prohibiting murder.
Although we use the phrase “the American criminal justice system,” there are
actually many criminal justice systems in the United States operating at the local,
state, and federal level under a host of laws, ordinances, principles and policies.
Consequently, not all the practices we describe exist around the country in every
single system. In most instances, we try to explain how pervasive the reach is of
each family ties benefit or burden we examine.
The family status in question is the status classification defined by the government of the jurisdiction involved. Our normative posture is to refrain from defining the family in the criminal justice system because the criminal law should
generally be drafted in terms that are neutral to the status of a family member.
As we explain, our concern is that that the state’s definitions of who counts as
family within the criminal justice system tend to exclude persons who, from a
functional perspective, should not be excluded.
See Donald Braman, Doing Time on the Outside (2004).
See Sandra Enos, Mothering from the Inside: Parenting in a Woman’s
Prison (2001) (descriptive treatment of challenges of parenting in prison).
See Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner
Reentry (2003).
Here, we develop an account drawing on several sources, including Linda
McClain’s work. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, The Place of Families: Fostering
Capacity, Equality and Responsibility (2006); Linda C. McClain, The Domain
of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: Families, Schools and Sex Equality, 69 Fordham
L. Rev. 1617, 1624–27 (2001).
For examples of scholarship advocating such benefits, see Leslie Acoca &
Myrna S. Raeder, Severing Family Ties: The Plight of Nonviolent Female Offenders
and Their Children, 11 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 133 (1999); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender
and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in
the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 Pepp. L. Rev. 905
(1993) [hereinafter Raeder, Gender and Sentencing]; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal
Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2045 (1995).
When we use the term inaccuracy, we are using that term to refer to the idea that
justice is not being accurately realized (in terms of the effective prosecution of
the guilty and exoneration of the innocent). In this sense, inaccuracy might also
indicate an unjustified leniency (or harshness), which is a matter that can also
be seen when considered in the context of equality issues.
For the most part, our discussion centers on legal policy issues, which are, in many
cases, more appropriately developed by legislatures. However, our argument does
address the issue of new intrafamilial privileges, as well as the use of some common
law defenses, which are typically addressed in the courts in the first instance.
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Part 1. Privileging Family Status

1. In the course of our exposition, we tend not to use the word “privilege” to help
avoid confusion between the species and the genus; evidentiary privileges are just
one example of these family ties benefits. Some might think these benefits merely
“respect” family ties rather than benefit them, but we think that because these
benefits have real consequences (as opposed to simply conveying attitudes of respect), it is better to characterize them as actual benefits (or in the case of our
titles, privileges).

•

Chapter 1. A Survey of Family Ties Benefits

1. See Louisiana v. Taylor, 642 So. 2d 160 (La. 1994) (describing facts of case). The
Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately carved out an exception to the spousal privilege in cases in which the spouse was the victim of the charged crime and the
evidence supported a conclusion that the spouse was refusing to testify because
of fear or coercion.
2. 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
See generally United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
3. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
4. The law has several sources for testimonial privileges. Most commonly, the common law is the root of them. The attorney-client privilege, for example, is one of the
oldest recognized privileges in the common law—and every court recognizes it
to some extent. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).
The Fifth Amendment is another source of a testimonial privilege in that it gives
persons a privilege against self-incrimination. US Const. amend. V (“No person
shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”).
5. As a general rule, federal courts are cautious before creating new mechanisms to
allow people to refuse to help the justice system. State systems, by contrast, tend
to be a bit more generous, recognizing clergyman-parishioner and doctor-patient
privileges, as well as journalist-source and accountant-client privileges rejected
under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. See generally 2 Scott N. Stone & Robert K.
Taylor, Testimonial Privileges § 3 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining the accountant-client
privilege and where and when it applies); id. § 6 (addressing the clergy-penitent
privilege); id. § 7 (doctor-patient privilege); id. § 8 (journalist-source privilege).
6. See, e.g., Regan, supra intro., n. 24, at 2119.
7. To see which states have adopted this privilege and which version, see 2 Stone &
Taylor, supra chap. 1, n. 5, § 5.02, nn.4, 8, 12, 13.
8. “[I]t hath been resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either
against or for her husband.” 1 E. Coke, A Commentarie upon Littleton 6b
(1628); see also 8 Wigmore, supra chap. 1, n. 2, § 2227. Some have contested this
story and have argued that the immunity has its roots in petit treason, the crime
of violence against a head of household. See Wigmore, supra, at § 2227.
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9. See Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450,
1564 (1985) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
10. 290 U.S. 371, 380–82 (1933).
11. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
12. Id. at 78.
13. Id. at 79.
14. 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980). The Court’s claim is not always true; prosecutors can
threaten spouses and offer them fairly substantial incentives to testify against
their loved ones, even if the relationship is otherwise strong.
15. To see which states have adopted this privilege and in what way, see 2 Stone &
Taylor, supra chap. 1, n. 5, § 5.09.
16. 291 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1934).
17. 340 U.S. 332, 333–34 (1951).
18. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, (Ernst Behler ed., Gary
Handaerk trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1995) (1878) (“Marriage as a long conversation. In entering into a marriage we should put the question to ourselves: Do you
believe that you will enjoy conversing with this woman all the way into old age?
Everything else in marriage is transitory, but most of the time together is spent
in conversation.”).
19. See, e.g., Maureen P. O’Sullivan, An Examination of the State and Federal Courts’
Treatment of the Parent-Child Privilege, 39 Cath. Law. 201 (1999); Catherine J. Ross,
Implementing Constitutional Rights for Juveniles: The Parent-Child Privilege in Context, 14 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 85 (2003); Amee A. Shah, The Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege—Has the Time for It Finally Arrived?, 47 Clev. St. L. Rev. 41 (1999);
Erica Smith-Klocek, A Halachic Perspective on the Parent-Child Privilege, 39 Cath.
Law. 105 (1999); Shonah P. Jefferson, Note, The Statutory Development of the Parent-Child Privilege: Congress Responds to Kenneth Starr’s Tactics, 16 Ga. St. U. L. Rev.
429 (1999); Kimberly L. Schilling, Note, Intrafamilial Communications: An Analysis
of the Parent-Child Privilege, 37 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 99 (1999).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 1998) (no recognition
of privilege when the defendant father was charged with gun crimes and abusing children with those guns; protection of this family unit not warranted); In re
Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997) (no confidential communication privilege
in child-parent relationship because the overwhelming majority of states and
federal courts reject the privilege); In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993) (no recognition of the mother’s asserted right not to testify against her adult son, particularly
when she benefited from her son’s illegal activity); In re Doe, 842 F.2d 244 (10th
Cir. 1988) (no parent-child privilege recognized); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d
1253 (6th Cir. 1985) (children have no right not to testify against parents and can
be forced to do so); In re Santarelli, 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1984) (no federal support for a family privilege); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (no
“family” privilege so a five-year-old had to testify against his mother).
21. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983) (recognizing a parent-child privilege); see also cases cited infra chap. 1, n. 29.
22. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
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23. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997).
24. See generally Kelly Korell, Testimonial Privilege for Confidential Communications
Between Relatives Other Than Husband and Wife—State Cases, 62 A.L.R. 5th
629 (1998).
25. Idaho Code Ann. § 9-203(7) (2008) (“Any parent, guardian or legal custodian
shall not be forced to disclose any communication made by their minor child
or ward to them concerning matters in any civil or criminal action to which such
child or ward is a party.”). The privilege does not apply in all cases, including cases
involving allegations of child abuse.
26. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-138a (2008) (“In any juvenile proceeding in superior
court, the accused child shall be a competent witness, and at his or her option
may testify or refuse to testify in such proceedings. The parent or guardian of
such child shall be a competent witness but may elect or refuse to testify for
or against the accused child except that a parent or guardian who has received
personal violence from the child may, upon the child’s trial for offenses arising
from such personal violence, be compelled to testify in the same manner as any
other witness.”).
27. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 233, § 20 (2008) (“An unemancipated, minor child,
living with a parent, shall not testify before a grand jury, trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, against said parent, where the
victim in such proceeding is not a member of said parent’s family and who does
not reside in the said parent’s household.”).
28. Minn. Stat. § 595.02.1(j) (2008) (“A parent or the parent’s minor child may not
be examined as to any communication made in confidence by the minor to the
minor’s parent. . . . This exception may be waived by express consent to disclosure
by a parent entitled to claim the privilege or by the child who made the communication or by failure of the child or parent to object when the contents of a
communication are demanded.”). The statutory privilege in Minnesota does not
apply in all circumstances, including cases involving allegations of child abuse or
the termination of parental rights.
29. See In re A & M (People v. Doe), 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (common
law recognition of a parent-child privilege through the constitutional right to
family privacy); People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
(extending the parent-child privilege to an older child; holding that the privilege
is not limited to minors); In re Ryan, 474 N.Y.S.2d 931, 931 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984)
(recognizing a grandmother as a parent for parent-child privilege purposes). But
see People v. Hilligas, 670 N.Y.S.2d 744, 747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (rejecting Fitzgerald
for independently living adults).
30. See Diehl v. Texas, 698 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex. App. 1985) (Levy, J., dissenting);
Belmer v. Virginia, 553 S.E.2d 123, 129 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (Elder, J., dissenting).
31. See Idaho Code Ann. § 9-203(7).
32. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-138a (2004).
33. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20 (2005).
34. Compare Idaho Code Ann. § 9-203(7) with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20.
35. See Minn. Stat. § 595.02.1(j) (2004).
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36. Joe Lawlor, What’s a Parent To Do? Escaped Convict Case Raises Questions, Flint
J., June 11, 2008, http://www.mlive.com/flintjournal/index.ssf/2008/06/whats_a_
parent_to_do_escaped_c.html.
37. For similar examples of a brother making the same decision as David Kaczynski,
see Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Elise Ackerman
& Marianne Lavelle, Thicker Than Blood, U.S. News & World Rep., Dec. 1, 1997,
at 30, 32 (describing the case of Joe Cantu, who turned his younger brother in to
the police after hearing his brother laughing about the fact that he had just participated in the gang rape and murder of two young girls); Linda Grace-Kobas, Death
Penalty Offers Families No Closure, Law School Speakers Say, Cornell Chron., Mar.
20, 2003, available at http://www.news.cornell.edu/Chronicle/03/3.20.03/death_
penalty_forum.html (describing case of Bill Babbitt, who told the police that he
believed his brother Manny had killed an elderly woman and then was horrified
when Manny, a paranoid schizophrenic, was eventually executed for the crime);
Serge F. Kovaleski, His Brother’s Keeper, Wash. Post, July 21, 2001, at W10.
38. See Beth Shuster, Veteran LAPD Officer Aided Fugitive Son, Panel Finds, L.A. Times,
Mar. 27, 1996, at B3. The sergeant ultimately received a thirty-three-day suspension. See also Andrew Blankstein, Member of Robbery Ring Convicted, L.A. Times,
Apr. 25, 1997, at B4.
39. See Mandy M. Goodnight, Vernon Deputy Sentenced to Jail, Alexandria Daily
Town Talk (Alexandria, La.), May 24, 2003, at 4A. The deputy was convicted of
assorted criminal charges related to his assistance and sentenced to spend one
year in prison.
40. See David Chanen, Woman Charged As Accomplice to Her Sons in Shooting Death,
Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Dec. 15, 1998, at 5B. For other examples,
see Ackerman & Lavelle, supra chap. 1, n. 37, at 30 (describing how the brother
of Thomas Capano, a well-known political figure in Delaware, helped him dump
the body of his former mistress into the ocean); M. Hernandez, Woman Sentenced
for Role in Killing, Ventura County Star, Apr. 26, 2005, at 2 (describing how a
mother, who had witnessed her son stab a man to death, helped her son flee to
Mexico to avoid arrest); Ed Pope, Police Charge Father in Fugitive Insurance Fraud
Case, San Jose Mercury News, Mar. 2, 2000 (describing how a father destroyed
evidence to prevent police from locating his daughter, who was charged with
participating in a $10 million insurance fraud scheme).
41. See William Booth, Kaczynski’s Brother Expresses Sadness, Relief in Aftermath of
Plea; Accuser Still Feels Powerful Sibling Connection, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1998,
at A3; Don Oldenburg, What If He Were Your Brother? When David Kazcynski
Fingered the Unabomber Suspect, He Became the Star in a Morality Play, Wash.
Post, Apr. 11, 1996, at C1.
42. See Oldenburg, supra chap. 1, n. 41 (describing comments by G. Gordon Liddy).
We were unable to locate any rigorous empirical work attempting to answer the
question of what most Americans would do if they learned a family member had
committed a serious crime. USA Today conducted a telephone poll of 305 adults
in 1990 that was prompted by the Charles Stuart case in Boston, in which Stuart
murdered his pregnant wife and famously accused a black man of committing
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43.

44.

45.

46.

the crime. Stuart became a suspect only after his brother went to the police.
Eight percent said they would not turn in a family member accused of murder;
79 percent said that they would. Tom Squitieri & John Larrabee, Poll: 79% Say
They’d Turn in Kin Who Killed, USA Today, Jan. 15, 1990, at 3A. The newspaper
acknowledged two problems with the survey: first, the outcome might well
have been affected by the outrageous facts of the Stuart case itself. See id.
(quoting criminologist James Fox, who stated that “[t]hese poll results would
have been very different if the survey had been done last year. . . . It’s not what they
would do, but what they would have liked the Stuarts to do.”). Second, “experts”
acknowledged that the results might “reflect the ‘socially desirable response’ rather
than the real-life action” that people would take if actually confronted with the
situation. Id. We suspect that relatives’ decision-making would vary on two
vectors: the severity of the crime and the degree of closeness of the relative
(whether closeness is measured in emotional closeness or bloodline closeness).
It probably would be hard, for example, to turn in a child for all but the most
heinous crimes, and it would be comparatively less heart-wrenching to turn in a
distant cousin when a more serious crime is involved.
In the Enron case, for example, Enron Chief Financial Officer Andy Fastow and
his wife Lea were both indicted in connection with the fraud. See Carrie Johnson,
Prosecutors Making Fraud Cases Relative: Government Targets Family of Accused,
Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 2003, at A1. In the Adelphia case, prosecutors indicted the
founder of the company and his two adult sons. Id. Similarly in ImClone, executive
Sam Waksal pled guilty to fraud charges “in an attempt to spare his daughter and
his [eighty-year-old] father from being charged with insider trading.” Id. Johnson
also cites the case of Aldrich Ames, whose deal to plead guilty to espionage
charges included a promise of leniency for his wife. Id.
A principal in the first degree is a person who physically commits the offense. Joshua Dressler defines a “principal in the second degree” as “one who is
guilty of an offense ‘by reason of having [intentionally assisted]... in the commission thereof in the presence, either actual or constructive, of the principal in
the first degree.’” Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 464
(3d ed. 2001).
Dressler describes an accessory after the fact as “one who, with knowledge of
another’s guilt, intentionally assists the felon to avoid arrest, trial, or conviction.”
Id. at 465. Although most states have eliminated the various common law categories of principal and accomplice liability, many states still treat accessories after
the fact as a separate category of offender. Id. at 432–33.
The states that provide exemptions for family members are Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 777.03 (2008); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/31-5 (2009); Ind. Code
Ann. § 35-44-3-2 (2009); Iowa Code Ann. § 703.3 (2009); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 520.110 (2008); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 274, § 4 (2009); Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 195.030 (2008); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-4 (2008); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
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§ 14-259 (2008); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-1-4 (2008); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13,
§ 5 (2008); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-19 (2008); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-11-6 (2009);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 946.47 (2008).
See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 777.03. Iowa is more restrictive in that it only exempts
spouses from criminal liability. See Iowa Code Ann. § 703.3. Illinois and North
Carolina do not include grandparents or grandchildren within their exemptions.
See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/31-5; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-259. Indiana
does not include grandparents, grandchildren, or siblings. See Ind. Code Ann.
§ 35-44-3-2.
These states are Arkansas, New Jersey, Washington, and Wyoming. See Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-54-105 (West 2007); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-3 (West 2007); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.76.070 (West 2007); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-202 (West 2007).
Washington, for example, typically treats rendering criminal assistance to a murder suspect as a Class C felony, but only as a gross misdemeanor if committed by
an immediate family member. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.76.070.
See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 777.03 (1)(a).
See id. § 777.03 (1)(b).
See William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *38–39 (“So strict is the law where
a felony is actually complete, in order to do effectual justice, that the nearest relations are not suffered to aid or receive one another. If the parent assists his child,
or the child his parent; if the brother receives the brother, the master his servant,
or the servant his master, or even if the husband relieves the wife, who have any
of them committed a felony, the receivers become accessories ex post facto. But a
feme-covert can not become an accessory by the receipt or concealment of her
husband; for she is presumed to act under his coercion, and therefore she is not
bound, neither ought she, to discover her lord.”); Leo Gerard Smith, Note, Family
Member Exemption for Accessory After the Fact, 20 J. Fam. L. 105, 107–09 (1981)
(discussing common law exemption for wives).
Model Penal Code § 242.3 cmt. at 237 (1980).
Id.
See Smith, supra chap. 1, n. 51, at 123–24 (discussing the treatment of family
member exemptions in the federal system).
21 F. Supp. 281, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1937).
Id.; see also Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947). In Haupt, the defendant
was charged with treason for aiding his saboteur son during World War II, but the
Supreme Court noted that the possibility the defendant’s acts were motivated by
“parental solicitude” rather than “adherence to the German cause” was certainly
a relevant factor for the jury’s consideration. Id. at 641.
State v. C.H., 421 So. 2d 62, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
See State v. Lucero, 541 P.2d 430, 434 (N.M. 1975).
United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 733–34 (9th Cir. 2002).
See id.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 737.
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63. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility, and Commitment to Children: The New
Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1111, 1165 (1999) (“One of the
most deeply embedded principles in American family law is the principle of family
autonomy, which limits the state’s intervention in the affairs of the intact family.”);
Carl F. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1835–39 (1985) (discussing the “legal tradition of noninterference
in the family”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert F. Scott, Parents As Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L.
Rev. 2401, 2406 (1995) (noting that academic commentators have begun to argue
that “the latitude given to parents in rearing their children is. . . excessive, allowing some parents to inflict unmonitored and unsanctioned harm on their children”
and that “the tradition of legal protection of parental rights has deep historical
roots”). But see Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control,
1880–1920, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 101, 101 (2006) (revising the “feminist understanding
of the legal history of public responses to intimate homicide by showing that, in both
the eastern and the western United States, men accused of killing their intimates
often received stern punishment, including the death penalty, whereas women
charged with similar crimes were treated leniently” for the period under review).
64. See generally Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 801 (2001) [hereinafter
Coker, Crime Control].
65. See Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper
Inferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 Hastings L.J. 1465,
1485 (2002–2003) (stating that since the mid-1970s, marital immunity for sexual
offenses was eliminated in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia).
66. See generally Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Domestic Violence: The
Criminal Justice Response (2d ed. 1996) (describing reform efforts in police
and prosecutors’ offices); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 Yale L.J.
2, 7 (2006) (appraising critically the “use of protection orders to prohibit the
cohabitation and contact of intimate partners” where domestic violence has
occurred).
67. See Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy
Against Family Violence from Colonial Times to the Present 173 (1987)
(noting that “no other piece of modern social legislation has been so quickly adopted by all the states”).
68. See State v. DeLeon, 813 P.2d 1382 (Haw. 1991); see also Deanna Pollard,
Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 575, 641 n.415 (2003) (discussing the DeLeon case).
69. Pollard, supra chap. 1, n. 68, at 641.
70. Id. at 621.
71. Id. at 634–35. Professor Pollard’s article contains an excellent discussion of
different approaches states take in evaluating parental claims that the injuries
they inflicted upon their children should not be considered child abuse because
they were simply disciplining their children. Id. at 635–46. She also notes that,
despite mounting evidence about the dangers posed by spanking, ninety percent
of American parents still hit their children. Id. at 577.

Dan Markel-Endnotes.indd 164

2/26/09 7:29:16 PM

notes to chapter 1

165

72. See id. at 586.
73. See Legal Reforms, Center for Effective Discipline, at http://www.stophitting.
com/laws/legalReform.php (visited November 21, 2008).
74. See Model Penal Code § 3.08 (1985); see also Pollard, supra chap. 1, n. 68, at 641
(discussing the Model Penal Code’s adoption of a parental discipline defense).
75. Tamar Lewin, What Penalty for a Killing in Passion?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1994.
76. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who
Kill, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 71, 72 (1992) [hereinafter Coker, Heat of
Passion].
77. People v. Thompkins, 240 Cal. Rptr. 516, 518–19 (Ct. App. 1987) (“At least as early
as Manning’s Case (1793) 83 Eng. Rep. 112, an archetypical illustration of adequate provocation to invoke the common law heat-of-passion theory for voluntary manslaughter has been the defendant’s discovery of his wife in bed with
another man.”); see also Coker, Heat of Passion, supra chap. 1, n. 76, at 72; Laurie
Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat of Passion Manslaughter and
Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1679, 1692–96 (1986).
78. Girouard v. State, 321 Md. 532, 538 (1991).
79. People v. Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. 1989) (“In Illinois, adultery with a spouse
as provocation generally has been limited to those instances where the parties are discovered in the act of adultery or immediately before or after such an
act, and the killing immediately follows such discovery.”); People v. McDonald,
212 N.E.2d 299 (Ill. 1965) (mitigation available only to persons who kill lawful
spouses, not girlfriends or mistresses).
80. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-207 (b).
81. Tripp v. Maryland, 374 A.2d 384 (Md. 1977) (“The modern tendency is to extend
the rule of mitigation beyond the narrow situation where one spouse actually
catches the other in the act of committing adultery.”).
82. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 Yale L.J. 1331, 1332 (1997)
83. Id. ( footnotes omitted).
84. See generally Wayne A. Logan, Knowledge As Power: Criminal Registration and Community Notification Laws in America ( forthcoming 2009).
85. See Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan’s Law, 31 Law & Soc. Inquiry 267,
291 (2006). Corrigan notes this exclusion was supported by rape care advocates
in order to promote victim confidentiality. Even if the exclusion does protect
victims, however, it clearly gives offenders the obvious benefit of avoiding
identification as a sex offender to friends, employers, and other members of
the community. It bears emphasis, however, that charging decisions (like prosecuting a sex offender for incest rather than rape or sexual abuse) really do not
come within the ambit of our discussion, since they are not a formal family ties
benefit. Indeed, as Chapter 4 reveals, incest is a family ties burden, as we define
that term.
86. See Anderson, supra chap. 1, n. 65, at 1486.
87. See id. at 1472–73.
88. Id.
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89. See Associated Press, Child Molester Charged in Assault on Boy, 5, Miami Herald, Jan. 21, 1987, at 10A. We recognize this story does not necessarily involve
a family ties benefit, but it illustrates the kind of risks associated with such
benefits in the context of pretrial release.
90. For an overview of pretrial release patterns, see Marc L. Miller & Ronald F.
Wright, Criminal Procedures 847–80 (3d ed. 2007).
91. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. 3142 (g)(3)(A) (2000)).
92. See, e.g., Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.2(a)(1) (2006) (requiring court to consider a
range of factors in determining pretrial release, including “the age, background
and family ties, relationships and circumstances of the defendant”); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 903.046(2) (West 2001) (mandating court to consider “[t]he
defendant’s family ties[and] length of residence in the community”); Watson
v. State, 158 S.W.3d 647, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (noting that the Court of
Criminal Appeals has determined that a court in setting bail should consider,
among other things, the “defendant’s: work record, family ties, . . . length of
residency”).
93. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/110-10(b)(10) (2002).
94. See Suk, supra chap. 1, n. 66, at 2 (describing use of protection orders as a form
of “state-imposed de facto divorce that subjects the practical and substantive
continuation of intimate relationships to criminal sanction”).
95. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/110-10 (c).
96. United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
97. Id. at 126; see also Karin Bornstein, Note, 5K2.0 Departures for 5H Individual
Characteristics: A Backdoor out of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 24 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 135, 135 (1993); Gregory N. Racz, Note, Exploring Collateral
Consequences: Koon v. United States, Third Party Harm, and Departures from
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1462, 1480 (1997).
98. Christopher J. Mumola, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report: Incarcerated Parents and Their Children NCJ 182335, at 1 tbl.1 (reporting
figures for 1999, “an estimated 721,500 State and Federal prisoners were parents
to 1,498,800 children under age 18”), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/iptc.pdf.
99. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). In his remedial opinion, Justice
Breyer highlighted the provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which says that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character,
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence.” Id. at 252.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Menyweather, 431 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“[F]amily circumstance is a discouraged factor under the Guidelines.”); U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.6 (2000) (stating that “family ties and
responsibilities and community ties are not ordinarily relevant” in deciding if
a departure is warranted); see also United States v. Aguirre, 214 F.3d 1122, 1127
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(9th Cir. 2000) (referring to family circumstance as a “discouraged” factor). See
generally Melissa E. Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 Va. L. Rev. 385 (2008) (canvassing
family circumstances departures in federal courts).
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996).
United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1994) (price fixing); United
States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970, 974 (1st Cir. 1993) (drug distribution); United States
v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 1992) (bribery and theft); United States v.
Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1991) (drug offenses); United States v. Pena, 930
F.2d 1486, 1494–95 (10th Cir. 1991) (drug distribution); see also United States v.
Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1993) ( fraud case).
United States v. Aguirre, 214 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding four-level
departure “based on the fact that there is an 8 year-old son who’s lost a father
and would be losing a mother for a substantial period of time”). However, in
cases where another parent (aside from the defendant) was available, courts
routinely rejected the downward departure by the trial court. See, e.g., United
States v. Miller, 991 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir. 1993). But see United States v. Chestna,
962 F.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that, although defendant was single
with four small children, this was not “an unusual family circumstance”); United
States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1992) (declining to view a single
mother of two minor children as warranting extraordinary family circumstances);
United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that “the
imprisonment of a single parent was not extraordinary,” even where the woman
had five minor children).
See Roger W. Haines, Jr., Frank O. Bowman III, & Jennifer C. Woll, Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Handbook 1445 (2006) (addressing whether “the
departure effectively will address the loss of caretaking or financial support”);
United States v. Leon, 341 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 2003); see also United States v.
Roselli, 366 F.3d 58, 68–69 (1st Cir. 2004) (looking at whether “there are feasible
alternatives of care that are relatively comparable” to the defendant’s).
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.6 cmt. n.1(B) (2006).
The implication is that if the departure simply reduces rather than eliminates
the difficulty, the departure should not be awarded. Thus, courts have been
reluctant, given the state of the law, to confer departures to minimize all the disruptions typically caused by incarceration of a family member. See, e.g., United
States v. Wright, 218 F.3d 812, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Today we conclude that
a downward departure for extraordinary family circumstances cannot be justified when, even after reduction, the sentence is so long that release will come
too late to promote the child’s welfare.”). This state of affairs leads some judges
to believe that the law they must apply here is quite “cruel.” United States v. Jurado-Lopez, 338 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254 n.17 (D. Mass. 2004) (Gertner, J.) (excoriating
case law prohibiting departures for ordinary family responsibilities as “cruel”).
Commentators often agree. See Raeder, Gender and Sentencing, supra intro., n. 24,
at 960; Myrna Raeder, Remember the Family: Seven Myths About Single Parenting
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107.

108.

109.
110.
111.

112.
113.

114.
115.

116.

Departures, 13 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 251 (2001) [hereinafter Raeder, Remember the
Family]; Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family,
and the Community, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. 169, 169 (1996) (stating that section 5H1.6 “is so cruelly delusive as to make those who have to apply the guidelines to human beings, families, and the community want to weep”).
United States v. Spero, 382 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming downward
departure for defendant who provided critical care for autistic son and other
three children, notwithstanding that defendant had a spouse); United States v.
Jebara, 313 F. Supp. 2d 912, 919–20 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (splitting defendant’s sentence between incarceration and home confinement due to judge’s view that
a short-term disruption to the defendant’s children would be tolerable but not
a long-term one).
See, e.g., United States v. Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95, 104 (3d Cir. 2000) (invalidating a
Section 5H1.6 downward departure for a single mother of five children (one afflicted with some neurological disorders)). Sweeting might be distinguished on
account of the defendant’s substantial criminal history and the severity of the
penalty under the guidelines, which in this case exceeded five years.
United States v. Menyweather, 431 F.3d 692, 703–08 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting).
Id. (criticizing lower court’s departure on grounds of family responsibilities
because the sentence failed to adequately reflect seriousness of the offense).
See, e.g., United States v. Duarte, 901 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that trial
court may properly consider defendant’s stable family ties and responsibilities
in setting sentence within the prescribed range).
See Dan Markel, Luck or Law? The Constitutional Case Against Indeterminate
Sentencing Schemes 28–38 (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Final Report on the Impact of United States
v. Booker on Federal Sentencing (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
booker_report/Booker_Report.pdf (summarizing results).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2000).
Menyweather, 431 F.3d at 700 (noting that, after Booker, district court judges
“have the discretion to weigh a multitude of mitigating and aggravating factors
that existed at the time of mandatory Guidelines sentencing, but were deemed
‘not ordinarily relevant,’ such as age, education and vocational skills, mental
and emotional conditions, employment record, and family ties and responsibilities”) (citation omitted). Thus, for example, “[t]he difficulty of providing appropriate care for a child of a single parent may, when balanced against factors
such as the nature of the offense, § 3553(a)(1), deterrence to criminal conduct,
§ 3553(a)(2)(B), and protection of the public, § 3553(a)(2)(C), warrant a sentence
outside the Guidelines.” Id. at 700.
Linda Drazga Maxfield, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Final Report: Survey
of Article III Judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 8 (2003),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/judsurv/jsfull.pdf (“More than half of all
judges would like to see more emphasis at sentencing placed on an offender’s
mental condition or the offender’s family ties and responsibilities.”); cf. Stanton
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118.
119.
120.
121.

122.

123.
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Wheeler et al., Sitting in Judgment: The Sentencing of White-Collar
Criminals 154 (1988) (quoting a judge who explains that “[w]hether there are
people who are dependent on him or her [i.e., the defendant], . . . whether there
is going to be an injury to others if I incarcerate him: that has a profound effect
on me and when I sense that, I am more inclined to be lenient”).
See, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 990–91 (E.D. Wis. 2005)
([D]efendant is fifty years old, had no prior record, a solid employment history, and is a devoted family man. He has two children, one of whom is still
in school. Prior to his recent marriage, he was a single father who did an excellent job of raising two daughters. He also provides care and support for his
elderly parents. His father suffers from Alzheimer’s disease and is particularly
dependent on defendant—defendant is one of the few people he still recognizes.
Defendant’s mother is also elderly and suffers from depression. I concluded that
defendant’s absence would have a profoundly adverse impact on both his children and his parents.”); United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 383 (D. Mass.
2005) (“Measuring a departure for ‘extraordinary family obligations’ now in the
light of Booker and the purposes of sentencing (particularly the likelihood of
recidivism), I would find that Momoh qualified for a downward departure on
these grounds.”). But see Myrna Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker
World, 37 McGeorge L. Rev. 691, 716 (2006) (contending that “many judges are
not exercising their Booker discretion” and that “a relative handful of judges” are
responsible for most of the family ties departures”).
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
United States v. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct 558 (2007).
Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1190, 1191 (2005).
See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 3003(b)(4) (West 2007) (including family ties within a list of “suitability factors” that the Parole Board is to consider in awarding
parole).
State v. Killpack, 276 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Iowa 1979); State v. Warner, 229 N.W.2d 776,
782–83 (Iowa 1975); see also State v. McKeever, 276 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Iowa 1979)
(“Punishment must fit the particular person and circumstances under consideration; each decision must be made on an individual basis, and no single factor,
including the nature of the offense, will be solely determinative”).
For example, in Washington, the state guidelines contain “no provision comparable to U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6,” which, as discussed above, expressly discourages
the consideration of family ties and responsibilities. State v. Law, 110 P.3d 717
(Wash. 2005). Rather, the Washington sentencing scheme “explicitly prohibit[s]
such considerations” when considering departures. Id. at 725. The state simply
requires a “substantial and compelling reason[]” to depart from the state guidelines. Id. at 733 (Sanders, J., dissenting); see also People v. Coleman, No. 231299,
2002 WL 1340891, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. June 18, 2002) (holding that under the
sentencing statute in Michigan, a court may depart from minimum sentence if
it finds “substantial and compelling reasons” to do so; defendant’s family ties did
not constitute a reason to depart downward).
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124. Malone v. State, 58 P.3d 208, 210 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that when
jury decides punishment for noncapital offenses “there simply is no provision
allowing for mitigating evidence to be presented in the sentencing stage of
the trial. This is a limitation enacted by our Legislature, and the limitation
is undoubtedly constitutional. . . . [A] criminal trial is not to be based upon
so-called ‘character’ evidence, and the same principle applies to sentencing
proceedings”).
125. The courts in Florida must also bear in mind that the “primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation and other traditional considerations continue to be desired goals of the criminal justice system but must
assume a subordinate role.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701.
126. See Commonwealth v. Langill, No. ESCR2002-729, 2003 WL 22459077, at *3
(Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2003) (enumerating a list of mitigating factors, including family ties and responsibilities, in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211E § 3(d));
Commonwealth v. Morris, No. ESCR2002-1227, 2003 WL 22004943, at *6 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 2003) (legislature’s intent was for the court to refer to the
nonexclusive list of mitigating factors found in Massachusetts Sentencing Act,
which included family ties and responsibilities of offender).
127. State v. Luke, 917 So. 3d 1226, 1228 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that, when sentencing an offender, courts should consider, inter alia, “age, family ties, marital
status” but noting that “[t]here is no requirement that specific matters be given
any particular weight at sentencing”); State v. Douglas, 914 So. 2d 608, 610 (La.
Ct. App. 2005) (“The important elements which should be considered are the
defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of offense and the likelihood of
rehabilitation.”); State v. Fultz, 591 So. 2d 1308, 1310 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding sentence after trial court considered “defendant’s age, employment, family
ties and responsibilities, and criminal history”).
128. Pennsylvania’s sentencing guidelines themselves do not suggest specific mitigating factors, see 204 Pa. Code § 303.1 (2006), but the law in Pennsylvania does
require consideration of alternatives to incarceration, and the rules for probation state that courts should, when deciding whether to impose probation
instead of incarceration, consider whether “[t]he confinement of the defendant
would entail excessive hardship to him or his dependents.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. § 9722 (2006).
129. Utah has sentencing guidelines that courts are encouraged to use as a
starting point. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(7)(e) (2002) (“In determining a just
sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravating
and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.”).
Those guidelines state that courts may consider mitigating a sentence
when an adult offender has “exceptionally good . . . family relationships . . .
[or i]mprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender or dependents.”
Utah Sent’g Comm’n, 2006 Adult Sentencing and Release Guidelines
17 (2006), available at http://www.sentencing.utah.gov/Guidelines/Adult/
AdultGuidelineManual2006.pdf.
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130. Wisconsin has a purely advisory guidelines system in place, and the guidelines provide that courts may mitigate the sentence of a defendant when he
has “strong and stable ties to family and community.” See Wis. Sent’g Comm’n,
Wisconsin Sentencing Guidelines Notes 7 (2003), available at http://wsc.
wi.gov/docview.asp?docid=3297.
131. State v. Turner, No. M2003-02064-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2775485, at *6 n.2
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 1, 2004) (“[T]his court has stated that . . . work ethic and
family contribution are entitled to favorable consideration under Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-35-113(13).”); see also State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d
36, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (“The defendant would normally be due some
favorable consideration based upon his family contributions and work ethic.
Because, however, the ‘help’ he provided to young people was improperly motivated, the factor is inapplicable here.”). The sentencing statutes in Tennessee
also permit sentence mitigation if the defendant committed the offense in order
to “provide necessities for the defendant’s family or the defendant’s self.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-113(7) (2006).
132. State v. Johnson, 640 P.2d 861, 867 (Ariz. 1982) (“[S]entencing judge listened to
the mitigating evidence before him and apparently concluded that appellant’s
family ties, military record, and good reputation did not offset the seriousness
of appellant’s murderous design.”).
133. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16 (2006). North Carolina’s Sentencing Guidelines
permit mitigation of sentences when “[t]he defendant supports the defendant’s
family” and when the “defendant has a support system in the community.” Id.
134. La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 894.1.B(31) (2006).
135. See, e.g., State v. Baker, No. 02-1332, 2003 WL 22339644, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15,
2003) ( finding no abuse of discretion where trial court, which was required to state
on the record its reasons for sentencing in a particular way, said to defendant, in
explaining its imposition of sentence, that “you lack a stable residence; you have
no family ties to the area, or [sic] no substantial family ties to the area”).
136. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 7300.4A(1) (2003); see also Daniel Glaser, The Effectiveness of a Prison and Parole System 366 (1964)
(interaction with family members promotes rehabilitation); Am. Correctional
Ass’n, Manual of Correctional Standards 542 (1966) (stating that family
members “should be permitted and encouraged to maintain close contact with
the inmate”); Am. Prison Ass’n, A Manual of Correctional Standards 342
(1954) (parole success depends on family ties during incarceration); Comm’n on
Accreditation for Corrections, Manual of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions 88 (1981) (same). The Bureau provides in its bill of
rights for inmates that inmates “have the right to visit and correspond with
family members and friends.” Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement
5270.07 § 541.12(5) (1987).
137. See generally Virginia L. Hardwick, Note, Punishing the Innocent: Unconstitutional Restrictions on Prison Marriage and Visitation, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 275, 295–98
(1985) (arguing that families have a constitutional right to see their imprisoned
family members).
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138. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1984) (“Prison inmates have
no absolute constitutional right to visitation.”); Craig v. Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656,
674 (D. Nev. 1975) (“So long as there are reasonable alternative means of communication, a prisoner has no First Amendment right to associate with whomever he
sees fit.”); see also Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 124 F.3d 774, 779 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing and
following Bellamy); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977) (leaving visitation regulations to prison administrators); Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F. Supp.
1564, 1581 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (citing and following Newman); Thompson v. Bland,
664 F. Supp. 261, 262 (W.D. Ky. 1986) (same); White v. Keller, 438 F. Supp. 110, 115
(D. Md. 1977) ( finding that the incarcerated have no right to visitation).
139. See Griffen v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 122–23 (N.Y. 1996) ( finding a prison policy
that required attendance in a religiously oriented substance abuse program to qualify for the prison’s Family Reunion program to violate the Establishment Clause);
McMurry v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 742, 764 (W.D. La. 1982) (rejecting policy preventing children under fourteen from seeing their jailed parents); Laaman v. Helgemoe,
437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977) (holding that “visitation privileges may be curtailed as a punishment for disciplinary infractions” but “may not be so great as to
infringe upon inmates’ First Amendment rights to familial association”).
140. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
547–48 (1979); Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536, 538 (N.Y. 1987) (ruling that a
prison can exclude inmates with HIV/AIDS from family visitation programs); In
re Dyer, 20 P.3d 907, 912 (Wash. 2001) ( finding that prison authorities have wide
discretion to administer an extended visitation policy because “[i]t is not in the
best interest of the courts to involve themselves in the ‘day-to-day management
of prisons, often squandering judicial resources with little offsetting benefit
to anyone. Courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state
officials trying to manage a volatile environment.’” (quoting Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995))).
141. But see Jeremy Travis, Families and Children, Fed. Probation, June 2005, at 31,
37 (“[M]any prisons narrowly define the family members who are granted visiting privileges.”).
142. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) (upholding prison regulations
that impose two-year visitation bans and regulations that excluded visits by
minor nieces and nephews and children as to whom parental rights had been
terminated). As the regulations upheld in Bazzetta did allow visits between an
inmate and her own children, grandchildren, and siblings, the Court did “not
imply . . . that any right to intimate association is altogether terminated by incarceration or is always irrelevant” in evaluating the legitimacy of prison policies.
Id. at 131. In Bazzetta, however, the Court found a legitimate penological interest
in excluding certain extended family members from visitation. Id. at 126–27.
143. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 7300.4A(1) (2003).
144. See Lanette P. Dalley, Imprisoned Mothers and Their Children: Their Often Conflicting Legal Rights, 22 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 1, 40–43 (2001); Philip M. Genty,
Permanency Planning in the Context of Parental Incarceration: Legal Issues and
Recommendations, 77 Child Welfare 543, 545–46 (1998); Heidi Rosenberg,
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California’s Incarcerated Mothers: Legal Roadblocks to Reunification, 30 Golden
Gate U. L. Rev. 285, 325–26, 329–30 (2000).
See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 361.5(e)(1) (West 2007); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §
384-b(2)(b), 7( f) (McKinney 2007).
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 5270.07 (1987).
Id. § 570.32(a)(2).
Id. § 570.31(a)(1). Such furloughs are also granted “to enrich specific institution
program experiences.”
Id. § 570.32(a)(1) (defining immediate family as “mother, father, step-parents,
foster parents, brothers and sisters, spouse, and children”).
Id. § 570.32(a)(3).
28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000).
Notably, it is easier to accomplish this accommodation for men than it is for
women; there are many fewer prisons with female populations. See Myrna S.
Raeder, A Primer on Gender-Related Issues That Affect Female Offenders, 20 Crim.
Just. 4, 18 (2005) [hereinafter Raeder, A Primer].
196 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Raeder, A Primer, supra chap. 1, n. 152, at 11, 18.
Id. at 17.
Id.; see also Myrna S. Raeder, Creating Correctional Alternatives for Nonviolent
Women Offenders and Their Children, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 377 (2000).
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 5553.06, Escapes/Deaths Notification (updated 1999).
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 5355.03, Parenting Program
Standards (updated 1995).
Id.
It bears mention that our study of family ties benefits in this book is more focused than the one we wrote about in our article in 2007. See Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties,
2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1147 [hereinafter Markel, Collins & Leib, Family Ties]. There
we wrote about the criminal justice system’s promotions of family interests
without focusing our inquiry, as we do here, on the issue of whether a defendant’s family status is examined by the law in question. Here we are focused
on facial family ties benefits to defendants, though we acknowledge that this
analysis may imperfectly survey that landscape.

Chapter 2. A Normative Framework for Family Ties
Benefits

1. See, e.g., Travis, supra chap. 1, n. 141, at 37 (“[M]any prisons narrowly define the family
members who are granted visiting privileges. Michigan’s corrections department, for
example, promulgated regulations in 1995 restricting the categories of individuals
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2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

who are allowed to visit a prisoner. The approved visiting list may include minor
children under the age of eighteen, but only if they are the prisoner’s children,
stepchildren, grandchildren, or siblings. Prisoners who are neither the biological
parents nor legal stepparents of the children they were raising do not have this
privilege. . . . Many prisoners’ extended family networks, including girlfriends and
boyfriends who are raising prisoners’ children, are not recognized in these narrow
definitions of ‘family.’”). See generally Murray, supra chap. 1, n. 100.
As we explain in Chapter 3, we find the bright-line marriage rule impossible
to justify. Others agree that same-sex partners ought to be granted the same
privilege rights that married couples get. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Brannen, Unmarried with Privileges? Extending the Evidentiary Privilege to Same-Sex Couples,
17 Rev. Lit. 311 (1998) (arguing that same-sex couples should be entitled to
claim spousal privileges); Elizabeth Kimberly (Kyhm) Penfil, In the Light of Reason
and Experience: Should Federal Evidence Law Protect Confidential Communications Between Same-Sex Partners?, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 815, 845 (2005) (“[T]he debate
between those who would protect communications between same-sex partners and those who would not more readily resembles the paradigmatic dispute
between Antigone and Creon. Those who, like Creon, believe the current, stateimposed laws are inviolate will refuse the privilege. Those who, like Antigone,
believe the eternal laws of family loyalty and ethical choice supercede the state’s
current pronouncement of the law will seek to apply the privilege.”); Nancy D.
Polikoff, Ending Marriage As We Know It, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 201, 202 (2003)
(advocating “sweeping reform” in rewarding diverse adult relationships, rather
than just marriage).
Of course, the exclusion of people here is not a problem unique to the criminal law
context. And the fact of a benefit’s underinclusiveness is not a sufficient reason to
jettison the benefit, but rather is a potential reason to expand who receives it.
It bears mention, though, that many jurisdictions confer a right to a willing spouse
to testify.
See Chapter 5.
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.6 cmt. n.1(B) (2006).
Consequently, in the federal context, it might appear that family ties actually work
against some defendants because of the broad network of persons on which they
might rely. On this view, this could seem more like a burden on defendants with
family ties than a benefit to them. We disagree. By narrowing the class of offenders
who might benefit from family ties departures to simply those who occupy a role
of irreplaceable caregiver, the cases implementing the 5H1.6 provision help ensure
that defendants with family ties are not benefited vis-à-vis those similarly situated
defendants without any special family ties or responsibilities.
The federal courts, in other words, expand the notion of family capaciously
for purposes of sentencing but restrict it for purposes of extending evidentiary
privileges.
See George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships
3 (1993).
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10. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, in Harmful
Thoughts: Essays on Law, Self, and Morality 199–200 (2002) (originally
published at 105 Harv. L. Rev. 959 (1992)).
11. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Alone Together: Law and the Meanings of
Marriage 15–29 (1999); Regan, supra intro., n. 24, at 2067–89.
12. These accounts of the self have their roots in the early communitarian theories
of Charles Taylor and Michael J. Sandel. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self:
The Making of the Modern Identity 3–24 (1989) (developing the idea that
selves have “inescapable frameworks” that any theory of justice and the state
must accommodate); Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity 37–39
(1991) (developing the idea of the self with “horizons of significance”); Michael
J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982) (developing the idea of
the “encumbered” self).
13. For more on the distinction between associative and general duties, see Samuel
Scheffler, Families, Nations, and Strangers, in Boundaries and Allegiances:
Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought 48, 49–50
(2001).
14. A variant of this argument is offered by Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 144, 147 (2003) [hereinafter
Hills, Constitutional Rights]. Drawing on Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 38–69 (1986), Hills suggests that state officials should defer to decisions
made by competent “private governments”—of which the family is an example.
Hills, supra, at 193–96. Such private governments promote individual freedom
and should be accorded special associational rights and liberties. Hills’s presumption that families’ internal decision-making processes should command deference holds so long as the decision at issue would be more likely to be handled
appropriately by the private government than by the state. In what follows, we
ultimately contest the notion that the family and its internal decision-making
process should receive any deference by the state in the criminal law context.
This is ultimately no real challenge to Hills, who concedes that deferring to private governments may be inappropriate if such deference does not improve decisions. See id. at 195–96. Nevertheless, with Hills, we are mindful that the state can
draw on the family’s comparative expertise and efficiency—and appreciate that
these reasons may sometimes help as a basis for distributing certain benefits or
burdens in the realm of distributive justice institutions.
15. See Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 Cambridge L.J. 145 (2008) (“If the criminal law
tracks the community’s intuitions of justice in assigning liability and punishment, it is argued, the law gains access to the power and efficiency of stigmatization, it avoids the resistance and subversion inspired by an unjust system, it
gains compliance by prompting people to defer to it as a moral authority in new
or grey areas (such as insider trading), and it earns the ability to help shape
powerful societal norms.”); see also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility
of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453 (1997).
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16. Plato, The Republic 155–68 (Francis MacDonald Cornford ed. 1945).
17. Linda C. McClain, Care As a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and
Republicanism, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1673, 1674 (2001).
18. Linda C. McClain, Negotiating Gender and (Free and Equal) Citizenship: The Place
of Associations, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1569, 1569 (2004); see also Martha Fineman,
The Autonomy Myth, at xviii (2004) (“It is very important to understand the
roles assigned to the family in society—roles that otherwise might have to be
played by other institutions, such as the market or the state.”). Although space
constraints have prevented us from giving the subtle and important work of
McClain and Fineman its due, we think it important to give a flavor of this form
of argument in the text.
19. See Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an
Ethic of Care 3 (1993); Deborah Stone, Why We Need a Care Movement,
Nation, Mar. 13, 2000, at 13, 15.
20. Stone, supra chap. 2, n. 19, at 15.
21. Some feminists remain suspicious of the “ethic of care” because it seems intrinsically gendered—and using the state to promote care might only further ensnare
women in particular into the hard work of caring. See Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What To Do About It 179
(2000).
22. McClain, supra chap. 2, n. 18, at 1569.
23. See Braman, supra intro., n. 20, at 6–7.
24. See Nancy Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation
(2000); Hendrik Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A History (2000).
25. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 491, 530
(2005) (arguing that we can furnish respect for intimate relationships through
various means—and need not pursue all strategies at once in every issue area).
26. Samuel Scheffler, Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism, in Boundaries and
Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought,
supra chap. 2, n. 13, at 121.
27. Cf. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Power to Govern Men and Things: Patriarchal
Origins of the Police Power in American Law, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 1277, 1345 (2004) (describing the patriarchal genealogy of the modern police power and noting that
a clear view of the origins of state power can help achieve the legitimate use of
power).
28. See Trammel v. United States, 440 U.S. 40 (1980) (describing the origin of the privilege).
29. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); see also Lehr v. Robertston, 463 U.S. 248,
256 (1983) (“The intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite
variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with
strength, beauty, and flexibility.”).
30. See generally Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal Justice System’s Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 Iowa L.
Rev. 131 (2007).
31. See Wayne Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 321 (2003).
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32. Terry Davidson, Conjugal Crime: Understanding and Changing the Wifebeating
Pattern 99 (1978); Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 339; see also Mason Thomas, Child
Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives,
50 N.C. L. Rev. 293, 295 (1972) (explaining that doctrine of patria potestas also
gave a father the right to “kill, mutilate, sell, or offer his child in sacrifice”).
33. Pleck, supra chap. 1, n. 67, at 17–33.
34. Id. at 27–29; see also Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 340.
35. See generally Elizabeth Pleck, Criminal Approaches to Family Violence,
1640–1980, in Family Violence 19, 19–57 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry,
eds., 1989) (describing the history of reform efforts in matters of family violence).
Pleck notes that “[t]he greater the defense of the rights and privileges of the
traditional family, the lower the interest in the criminalization of the family.”
Id. at 20.
36. See, e.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146–48 (1871); Commonwealth v. McAfee,
108 Mass. 458, 461 (1871).
37. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating As Prerogative and Privacy, 105
Yale L.J. 2117 (1996).
38. Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 341 (“Child abuse, by mothers and fathers alike,
similarly continued without significant intervention.” (citing 1 Joel Prentiss
Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law §§ 878–891 (Little Brown
5th ed. 1872) (elaborating upon the chastisement right in families))); Robert
W. Ten Bensel et al., Children in a World of Violence: The Roots of Child Maltreatment, in The Battered Child 3 (Mary Edna Helfer et al. eds., 5th ed. 1997)
(providing historical survey of child abuse). As Logan explains, it was not until
the widespread use of x-ray technology, which could discern evidence of abuse
that children were too afraid to discuss, that the tide changed, and jurisdictions began adopting criminal laws against child neglect or abuse. Logan, supra
chap. 2, n. 31, at 342–43.
39. According to Logan, “[m]arital rape, as of the mid-1980s, largely remained a legal
impossibility, with the drafters of the influential Model Penal Code expressing
concern over ‘unwarranted intrusion of the penal law into the life of the family.’”
Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 347; see also Model Penal Code § 213.1 cmt.
8(c) (1985).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring units of government to “encourage or mandate arrests of domestic violence offenders based on probable cause that an offense has been committed” to be eligible for certain
grants); Miller & Wright, supra chap. 1, n. 90, at 331–40 (discussing changes
in police responses to domestic violence); Lawrence W. Sherman et al.,
Policing Domestic Violence: Experiments and Dilemmas (1992); Deborah
Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic Violence, 43
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1843, 1851–56 (2002); Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope:
The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1505,
1518–19 (1998).
41. See R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, 33 Am.
J. Crim. L. 339, 348 (2006) (distinguishing soft from hard no-drop policies).
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42. See Coker, Crime Control, supra chap. 1, n. 64, at 803–05; Linda G. Mills, Killing
Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 Harv. L. Rev.
550, 569–70 (1999); Suk, supra chap. 1, n. 66, at 45. But see Annalise Acorn, Surviving the Battered Reader’s Syndrome, or: A Critique of Linda G. Mills’ Insult to
Injury: Rethinking Our Responses to Intimate Abuse, 13 UCLA Women’s L.J. 335,
340 (2005); Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41, at 350 (surveying counter-arguments and
studies supporting claim that welfare and autonomy of women are improved
through tough policies on domestic violence).
43. Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny from the Wolf: Elder Abuse and Neglect—the
Legal Framework, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 77 (1998); Audrey S. Garfield, Note, Elder Abuse
and the States’ Adult Protective Services Response: Time for a Change in California,
42 Hastings L.J. 859 (1991).
44. Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere While
Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 325 (1999); Ruthann
Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory,
20 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 567 (1990); Symposium, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Transgender Communities and Intimate Partner Violence, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J.
121 (2001).
45. Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 347; see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent:
A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1373, 1482 (2000) (noting the “partial norm and uneven” reform of marital rape law).
46. Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 347 (citing Murray A. Straus, Beating the
Devil Out of Them: Corporal Punishment in American Families (1994);
Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal
Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 353
(1998); David Orentlicher, Spanking and Other Corporal Punishment of Children by
Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing Children, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 147 (1998)).
47. Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 372 (citing Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes,
Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey III (2000))
(estimating that 4.8 million women experience every year some form of sexual or physical abuse, and that annually about 2.9 million men endure physical
assaults by their partners).
48. Id. at 348.
49. If our skepticism toward family ties benefits were implemented in law and practice, we might see the state’s criminal justice system serve as a vehicle to interrupt and upend patterns of private patriarchy and domination. But this would
only be a first step; as Laura Rosenbury pointed out to us in a comment on an
earlier draft, reducing private patriarchy would not address the various ways the
state’s institutions historically perpetuated its own kind of public patriarchy.
50. See supra chap. 1.
51. Fletcher, supra chap. 2, n. 9, at 81 (arguing that the perjury rationale for the
intrafamilial privileges might justify it where other rationales fail).
52. See 5 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 338 (1827).
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53. Cf. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 283 (1983).
54. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule is an
essential part of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
55. Moreover, with the right alternative measures available, some scholars have suggested that there is good reason to revisit the wisdom of the exclusionary rule.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure:
First Principles 20–31 (1997).
56. See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and Antidiscrimination Law, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1194, 1198 (2000) (noting that liberal
discourse normally entails commitments which respect that “individuals, and
not groups, are the primary political units and bearers of rights; [and] that equality means, first and foremost, the right of every individual to ‘equal respect and
concern’ in pursuit of her conception of the good”).
57. See Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1421, 1452–74 (2004) [hereinafter
Markel, Against Mercy].
58. This account draws from Jean Hampton’s discussion in Jeffrie Murphy & Jean
Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy 157–61 (1988), and Markel, Against Mercy,
supra chap. 2, n. 57, at 1453–56.
59. Of course, the degree of disruption to the equality norm is diminished if the
liability of the offender is established and the leniency affects only the sentence
incrementally rather than the fact of being adjudged guilty.
60. Indeed, various feminist scholars have emphasized the importance of holding
women accountable when they are offenders. See Kay Levine, No Penis, No Problem, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 357, 385 n.125 (2006); cf. Martha Mahoney, Women’s
Lives, Violence and Agency, in The Public Nature of Private Violence 59, 64
(Martha Fineman & Roxanne Mykituik eds., 1994) (discussing how it is “so difficult” for us “to see both agency and oppression in the lives of women”).
61. Thus, when family members receive punishment discounts on account of who the
victim was, we are saying that their victim is not worth the same amount as she
would have been if the victim were not a family member. Cf. Andrew von Hirsch,
Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments 73 (1976) (“[D]isproportionately
lenient punishment for murder implies that human life—the victim’s life—is not
worthy of much concern.”).
62. But see Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982) (arguing that the rhetoric of equality should be abandoned). It is true that Peter
Westen cleverly shows why the concept of equality itself is, in some very real
sense, tautological, circular, and uninteresting. That likes should be treated alike
is also not actually true as an independent moral principle: if someone said to
treat all murderers to green lollipops equally, we would think they were crazy, not
egalitarians. His very reasonable point is that the substantive moral rules that tell
us who are relevant equals and how to treat any one individual from that class
contain all the relevant data to perform any moral calculus. The equality principle
only contains what we already know—that the rule that prescribes conduct or
treatment of one person in a group would likewise apply to anyone else with
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the same relevant conduct or orientation. Id. at 572–73. He delightfully argues
that “justice” fares little better, rendering “equal justice under law” one big empty
redundancy. See id. at 558.
Still, we think Westen’s thesis goes too far when he calls equality (and by extension, justice) an “empty vessel with no substantive moral content of its own.”
Id. at 547. For our purposes, the ideal of equality is a proxy for the uncontroversial claim that the criminal justice system’s intrinsic legitimacy rests on its
ability to treat all fairly, without favoring certain classes of citizens because of
morally irrelevant characteristics. Having a family—like being of a certain race
or religion—may be psychologically relevant to a person’s identity; but it is
often morally irrelevant from the standpoint of determining criminal liability. The
principle of equality functions as a stand-in for the more general point that a
person’s status as a family member ought not, in principle, be a mitigating or
aggravating factor in the administration of punishment. Making assumptions
that family members are entitled to a special brand of criminal justice is inconsistent with the criminal justice system’s focus on distributing punishment for
culpability without favoring the status of an offender.
More generally, we are sympathetic to the response to Westen’s article made
by Kent Greenawalt. See Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1167, 1169–70 (1983) (“The applicability of the principle
[of equality] provides an additional moral reason for complying with an
established standard of how people are to be treated. In many situations the
principle also affects the substantive conclusions that can properly be reached,
bearing on whether differences in ultimate treatment are warranted and, if
so, on the methods for determining how choices among individuals are to be
made. [And s]omewhat less directly, the principle also affects how justifications
of unequal treatment should proceed and what should be done in instances
of uncertainty over whether people are relevantly alike or unalike.”). But see
Peter Westen, To Lure the Tarantula from Its Hole: A Response, 83 Colum. L. Rev.
1186 (1983).
63. See generally Darryl Brown, Third Party Harms in Criminal Law, 80 Tex. L. Rev.
1383 (2004). Importantly, we recognize that many aspects of the criminal justice system have a disparate—and profoundly troubling—impact on family life
in minority communities. See, e.g., Braman, supra intro., n. 20, at 1–11 (providing
an ethnography of effects of incarceration on family and community life in the
District of Columbia); Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families:
The Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1005 (2001);
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1271 (2004). We also recognize that
our current sentencing regime has particularly harsh consequences for incarcerated mothers and their children. See, e.g., Raeder, supra chap. 1, n. 117, at 678–99.
Rather than use the criminal justice system to confer benefits just on members of
favored groups such as traditional nuclear families, however, we believe a better
response would be more sanity with respect to drug law enforcement, less harsh
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sentencing policies, expanded use of the coercion or duress doctrines, and
greater use of alternatives to incarceration. See, e.g., Dan Markel, Are Shaming
Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the
Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 2157 (2001) [hereinafter Markel,
Shaming Punishments]; Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative
Sanctions: Reflections on the Future of Shaming Punishments and Restorative Justice, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1385 (2007). Additionally, if we want to direct benefits to improve family life, we believe it more appropriate to do so through the distributivejustice institutions of social policy and not through criminal justice “benefits”
that are indirect and potentially more costly along other dimensions.
Bentham, supra chap. 2, n. 52, at 338.
Id. at 340.
“Criminal families” exist well beyond the Godfather trilogy. For a good introduction to scholarship about criminal families, see Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian
Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (1993).
United States v. Menyweather, 431 F.3d 692, 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting).
United States v. Guy, 174 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the trial court
acknowledged that incarcerating the defendant would impose hardship on her
family but was averse to creating a situation “where a person could steal with
relative impunity and not expect incarceration simply because they come from a
large family, or have responsibilities for a large family”).
Cf. Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, The Family and the Law 368 (1965) (quoting
Dwight Eisenhower, who, when considering clemency for Ethel Rosenberg’s espionage conviction, noted that “if there would be any commuting of the woman’s
sentence without the man’s then from here on the Soviets would simply recruit
their spies from among women.”).
For example, do states with particularly vigorous parental discipline defenses
have a higher rate of child abuse? In states that exempt family members from
prosecutions for harboring fugitives, are prosecutors encountering significant
obstructive activity from family members?
Importantly, we do not rank the relative importance of these concerns. Nor do we
argue that a benefit must trigger a certain number of the relevant considerations
to offend our normative framework.

Chapter 3. Applying the Framework to Family Ties
Benefits

1. This refers to sentences to be served by an “irreplaceable caregiver” that are delayed until a point when the need for care is diminished or alternative means of
care are secured.
2. Developments in the Law, supra chap. 1, n. 9, at 1577.
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3. Id.
4. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958).
5. See, e.g., Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United
States 544 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that spousal immunity “was never supported by
any but specious reasons”); 8 Wigmore, supra chap. 1, n. 2, § 2228 (arguing that
spousal immunity is “the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible
obstruction to truth in practice”); David Medine, The Adverse Testimony Privilege:
Time to Dispose of a “Sentimental Relic,” 67 Or. L. Rev. 519 (1988).
6. See 2 Stone & Taylor, supra chap. 1, n. 5, § 5.08.
7. Regan, supra chap. 2, n. 11, at 90. Most importantly, the spousal privilege disadvantages victims of domestic abuse, especially in a post-Crawford landscape. See
generally Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41 (describing how Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004), makes it much more difficult to prosecute domestic abusers).
8. It is worth noting that there are often exceptions to the spousal privileges: they
tend not to apply in cases involving spousal violence, child abuse, or neglect.
Regan, supra chap. 2, n. 11, at 91. But see Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41, at 367–69
(citing Ala. Code § 12-21-227; D.C. Code Ann. § 14-306; Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-23;
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 223, § 20; and Mo. Ann. Stat. § 546.260, which codify adverse testimony privileges without any exception for crimes committed by
one spouse against the other—and Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-21; N.H. R. Evid. 504;
N.C. Gen Stat, § 8-57(c); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-30; and W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 57-3-4, which codify spousal-communications privileges without such an exception). There are a lot of nuances to how the spousal privileges apply—and those
details extend beyond our immediate concern here. For the specifics regarding
how these privileges frustrate law enforcement in the domestic violence context,
see Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41. Federal courts tend to create an exception for joint
criminal enterprises. See Regan, supra chap. 2, n. 11, at 91 (citing United States v.
Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730–31 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239,
1243 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Broome, 732 F.2d 363, 365 (4th Cir. 1984)).
Some states have followed suit. See State v. Witchey, 388 N.W.2d 893, 895–96 (S.D.
1986); Wolf v. State, 674 S.W.2d 831, 841–42 (Tex. App. 1984). But see Johnson v.
State, 451 So. 2d 1024, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); State v. White, 480 A.2d 230,
232 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). We endorse that exception because it speaks
directly to our fourth consideration, namely, that the privileges risk creating more
successful criminal activity.
9. Need for Parent/Child Privilege, 22 Champion 10, 11 (Apr. 1998) (proposal by the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers for enactment of a statutory
parent-child communication privilege by Congress and state legislatures).
10. 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1326 (D. Nev. 1983).
11. Id. at 1304 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)).
12. Id. (citing Susan Levine, Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47
Fordham L. Rev. 771, 782–83 (1979)).
13. Jessica Perry, Note, The Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: An Argument for Qualified Recognition, 37 Brandeis L.J. 97, 106 (1998/1999).
14. Id.
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15. Id.
16. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1326.
17. The generally acknowledged purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to
encourage ‘full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the
administration of justice.’” Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403
(1998) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)); see also
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 68 cmt. c (2000)
(“The rationale for the [attorney-client] privilege is that confidentiality enhances the value of client-lawyer communications and hence the efficacy of legal
services.”).
18. United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that the
parent-child privilege could be analogized to the marital privileges insofar as they
both contribute to family “harmony”).
19. Another option some have pursued is to claim the privilege under the First
Amendment. See In re Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 579, 1982 WL 597412, at
*1 (D. Conn.) (recognizing a parent-child privilege under the Free Exercise Clause
because of the Jewish law’s prohibition from having parents testify against their
children); see also Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d
244, 248 (10th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the claim of a fifteen-year-old Mormon who
invoked the Free Exercise Clause to avoid testifying against his mother). But
see Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802, 804 (2d Cir. 1971) (refusing to grant
such a privilege because the court was skeptical of the genuinely religious basis of the claim despite claimant’s invocation of potential “divine punishment”
and “ostracism from the Jewish Community”). Some have also suggested that
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination should be held to protect people from being forced to testify against their family members. See, e.g.,
Margaret Carlson, Should a Mom Rat on Her Daughter?, Time, Feb. 23, 1998, at 25.
20. Courts routinely apply the criteria adumbrated by John H. Wigmore in his evidence treatise. 8 Wigmore, supra chap.1, n. 2, § 2192. The “Wigmore Test” considers four factors: (1) the communication must originate in confidence that it will
not be disclosed; (2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3) the relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered; and (4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the
litigation. Id.
21. All of these arguments appear in In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir.
1997).
22. Developments in the Law, supra chap. 1, n. 9, at 1474.
23. For an effort to think through how we might furnish testimonial privileges to
friends, see Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of
Friendship, 1984 Duke L.J. 631, 643–54. Levinson argues that it might be a good
idea if people could choose to give a limited number of “privilege tickets” to
whomever they want—thereby, deciding for themselves where they most need
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24.

25.

26.
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

a relationship of trust. See id. at 654–62. The value of friendship and family in
political and legal life is further explored in Ethan J. Leib, The Politics of
Family and Friends in Aristotle and Montaigne, 31 Interpretation: J. Pol. Phil.
165 (2004), and Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 631 (2007)
[hereinafter Leib, Friendship], in which Leib argues that many areas of the law
should confer upon the friend special status and consideration.
It is worth noting that at least one commentator would like a “qualified”
parent-child privilege that would apply only in criminal contexts rather than
civil contexts because the “stress placed on the family bond would be greater
where criminal punishment was at stake.” Perry, supra chap. 3, n. 13, at 114. In
our view, precisely because much more tends to be at stake in the pursuit
of criminal justice, the familial privileges are especially inappropriate in the
criminal context.
“[I]t hath been resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either
against or for her husband.” 1 E. Coke, A Commentarie upon Littleton 6b
(1628); see also 8 Wigmore, supra chap. 1, n. 2, § 2227.
See 8 Wigmore, supra chap. 1, n. 2, § 2227.
See Developments in the Law, supra chap. 1, n. 9.
Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 347. See generally Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t It a
Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1032 (1996). There are exceptions, both at common law, and today in many
jurisdictions, for crimes against spouses or others in the household. See Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41, at 361 n.170, 367 n.205 (citing Ak. R. Evid. 505(A); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4062; Cal. Evid. Code § 970; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107;
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-84A; Haw. Rev. Stat § 626-1; Idaho Code Ann. § 193002; Ky. R. Evid. 504; Md. Code Ann., Crts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-106; Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 600.2162; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-505; Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 49.295; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-17; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57; Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2945.42; Or. Rev. Stat. § 40.255; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5913; Tex. R.
Evid. 504(B); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-271.2; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.60.060 (1); W.
Va. Code Ann. § 57-3-3; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-104); see also State v. Taylor, 642
So. 2d 160, 166 (La. 1994) (creating an exception by judicial construction); Stubbs
v. State, 441 So. 2d 1386 (Miss. 1983) (same); State v. Benson, 712 P.2d 252 (Utah
1985) (same). Still, as Cassidy notes, a number of jurisdictions permit no such
exception. Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41, at 367–68 (citing Alabama, the District of
Columbia, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Missouri).
See Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41, at 352 (describing how Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004), makes it much more difficult to prosecute domestic abusers).
8 Wigmore, supra chap. 1, n. 2, § 2192. See generally United States v. Bryan, 339
U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
We are indebted to Michael O’Hear for this point.
We are somewhat skeptical of the capacity for decision-rule doctrines in the law
of evidence and crimes to influence most people’s primary conduct. See Paul
H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science
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Investigation, 24 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 173 (2004). But there might be pockets in the population that are especially susceptible to these rules, such as the
families involved in organized crime; these families are repeat players and can
obtain counsel to guide their conduct.
Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 Yale L.J. 1307, 1333 (2003).
Regan, supra chap. 2, n. 11, at 91.
Mary Coombs mentioned, in her comments upon an earlier version of this
argument, that although we emphasize that the spousal privileges are family ties
benefits, we disregard the reality that the state cannot take a neutral position in
this context: if the state did not give the “innocent” spouse a testimonial privilege,
the state’s prosecutors would have an extra tool (and an extra sharp one, at that)
in coercing testimony from a defendant because the state could always leverage
pressure against the innocent spouse. We think that there remain two neutral positions, neither of which the state adopts in its current solicitude for family status.
Either the state could afford testimonial privileges to a wide circle of persons that
extend beyond the spousal context or it could afford no one such privileges. We
prefer the latter approach because we see no reason to give criminals access to
confessors, who may both help defendants evade capture and avoid confession to
law enforcement. We do not see this preferred neutral policy as a burden on family status because any defendant who trusts any intimate will give the prosecutors a tool for coercion all the same. Most important for our purposes here is not
neutrality as between defendant and state but neutrality as between defendants
with family networks and those without.
Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-106(a) (West 2006); cf. Cal. Code Civ. Pro.
1219(c) (West 2007) (sentencing victims of domestic violence guilty of contempt
for counseling or community service).
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in
Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 597 (1989) (questioning the merits of the attorney-client privilege); see also Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 473–75, 477,
479 (J. Bowring ed., 1842) (arguing that the attorney-client privilege serves to let
the guilty go free).
See Chapter 1.
See Charles Daniels & Teresa Storch, Criminal Law, 14 N.M. L. Rev. 89, 105 (1984)
(citing Wayne LaFave, Criminal Law 716 (4th ed. 2003)).
See State v. Mobbley, 650 P.2d 841, 843 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (Lopez, J., dissenting).
State v. C.H., 421 So. 2d 62, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 737 n.17 (9th Cir. 2002).
The Florida court recognized the issue that “some immunized family members
might render assistance to an offender for reasons other than familial affection”
but simply noted this did not render the statute “fatally overinclusive” under its
constitutional analysis. C.H., 421 So. 2d at 65.
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).
See, e.g., Thomas, supra chap. 2, n. 32, at 293 (describing the maltreatment of
children from ancient Greece through twentieth-century America).
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47. See, e.g., Pleck, supra chap. 1, n. 67, at 6; Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 Marq. L. Rev. 569, 572–81 (1992).
48. See Franklin Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 521,
523–24 (1987) (using a hypothetical to suggest that if a stranger slapped a child,
it would be considered assault and battery, but the matter would be treated very
differently by the legal system if a mother slapped her own child).
49. See Thomas, supra chap. 2, n. 32, at 293 (noting “our reluctance to believe that
parents—whom we expect to love and protect their offspring—could maltreat or
abuse their own children, sometimes even fatally”). Thomas further notes that
“[o]ur laws and legal systems have developed over hundreds of years around the
notion that parents will love and protect.” Id.
50. See, e.g., Ira Lupu, The Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1317, 1324 (1994) (“[I]t is now clear that the psychological
influences at play in family life are not limited to the positive sentiments of
affection and concern.”). For example, the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse
and Neglect Information concluded that there were approximately one thousand
four hundred child abuse and neglect fatalities in the United States in 2002, although that number is in all likelihood too low because these cases are traditionally underreported. See Admin. for Children & Families, Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Child Maltreatment 51 (2002), available at http://www.acf.
hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm02/cm02.pdf.
51. See Pollard, supra chap. 1, n. 68, at 621–22.
52. Id. at 621.
53. Id. at 602–13.
54. See Marc Miller & Ronald Wright, Criminal Procedures: Prosecution
and Adjudication, Cases, Statutes and Executive Materials 104 (3d ed.
2007) (discussing studies and statistical evidence of effect of release on acquittal
rates and sentences).
55. Raeder, A Primer, supra chap. 1, n. 152, at 8 (“Where are the children? Although
it is estimated that nearly 20 percent of women are arrested in the presence of
their children, relatively few police departments have developed protocols for
child-sensitive arrest practices. Whether or not a woman had her child with her
when she was arrested, jurisdictions vary widely about obligations of police and
Child Services. Thus, although not typically thought of as a function of defense
counsel, it is important to find out whether the female defendant has minor
children, and, if so, their location, because many of these women are not in intact families. In other words, counsel should assume that many women will not
have voluntarily revealed to the police that they have children or disclosed their
whereabouts, given the realistic fear that their children may become involved in
the foster care system, triggering the ASFA timeline leading to termination of
family rights. Ascertaining that a woman’s children are safe will both let her focus
on assisting in her defense, and ensure that she does not face child endangerment charges if no one is at home or someone unreliable is watching the children.”) (citation omitted); id. (encouraging lawyer to see if there “are any programs
that will house both mother and child”). See also Clare M. Nolan, Cal. Res.
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57.
58.

59.

60.
61.
62.

63.
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Bureau, Children of Arrested Parents: Strategies to Improve Their Safety and Wellbeing (2003), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/03/11/03011.pdf.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
See, e.g., supra chap. 1 (discussing Johnson case at text accompanying
note 123).
As previously urged by one of us (Markel), the competence criterion must be satisfied at the time of the criminal offense, the trial, and during the punishment
to satisfy the moral requirement that punishment be intelligible to the offender.
Specifically, the offender must have freely undertaken the criminal action and
known (or reasonably should have known) that his conduct was unlawful at the
time he committed the crime; at the time of adjudication, the offender had to
either freely and knowingly plead guilty or have the competence to assist in the
preparation of his case for trial; and at the time at which the punishment is inflicted, he had to be able to understand that he is being punished for his unlawful
actions. See Markel, Against Mercy, supra chap. 2, n. 57, at 1445–46; see also Dan
Markel, Executing Retributivism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. ( forthcoming 2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263683 (addressing offender competence in the
context of punishment theory). Moreover, the sentence would need to be within
the proper bandwidth of proportionality compared to the severity of the offense
and other offenders punished for a comparable offense.
Reducing the sentence or relieving liability may be appropriate if the offender
had diminished capacity or if the crime was committed under duress because
of a relationship with the primary offender or because of a history of domestic
violence within the relationship. Similarly, if there can be a causal connection
drawn between the feature of a person that elicits someone’s compassion (i.e.,
the mother was stealing to feed her children) and the choice to commit the
crime, then that too might be a reason for a legitimate departure. Or, if there is
some other reason related to the merits of the case that warrants less punishment: for example, the offender has reduced the social cost of his wrongdoing by
coming forward to the government. Absent these considerations, we can insist
on a meaningful distinction between factors about someone’s background that,
in the main, should not mitigate the sentence and factors surrounding someone’s
criminal action with which an attractive vision of criminal justice is properly
concerned. Markel, Against Mercy, supra chap. 2, n. 57, at 1466–67. Of course, all
this assumes there are no justifications or excuses for the offender either.
See Raeder, Gender and Sentencing, supra intro., n. 24, at 908–09; Raeder, Remember
the Family, supra chap. 1, n. 106, at 251; Weinstein, supra chap. 1, n. 106, at 169.
See, e.g., Philip M. Genty, Damage to Family Relationships As a Collateral Consequence of Parental Incarceration, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1671, 1680 (2003).
See generally Darryl Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 Cal. L. Rev.
323, 343–48 (2003) [hereinafter Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis]; Darryl Brown, Third
Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1383, 1407 (2002).
Cf. Paul Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 911, 919 (1997) (arguing that “[parental] training prevents more crime
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64.

65.

66.

67.
68.
69.

70.

71.

72.

than the deterrent effect of prison”). On the related claim that lengthy terms of
incarceration are criminogenic and counterproductive, see Brown, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, supra chap. 3, n. 62, at 346.
See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of
Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 407,
459 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 711–16 (2005).
Of course, we also think there are a variety of noncarceral punishments that
might be appropriate for many nonviolent crimes. One of us (Markel) has
written on this earlier. See Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra chap. 2, n. 63.
To prevent the offender from trying to delay sentencing indefinitely, we might
want to restrict the length of the deferral. Thus, if the crime occurs at T1, and the
defender only has one child who is four years old, the defendant would be permitted to defer sentencing for fourteen years. This limit would apply even if the
defendant subsequently had more children after T1. During those fourteen years,
the offender would effectively be on probation, such that if the offender violated
other conditions of the delayed sentencing, the offender would then go to prison.
This does not eliminate the imposition of harms on children but it reduces, in
part, the likelihood of such harm being realized.
See, e.g., Raeder, A Primer, supra chap. 1, n. 152, at 8–9. Indeed, Raeder herself typically
centers her critique on the costs incarceration poses on nonviolent offenders.
See id. at 3–8.
A similar point may be made about the introduction of victim impact or defendant impact evidence. For example, some jurisdictions limit who may offer statements on behalf of victims or defendants to family members only. Although we
are personally divided over the desirability of victim or defendant impact evidence, we all agree that statutes or policies that permit only family members to
offer statements are too narrowly crafted.
Raeder refers to these programs as options for mothers with children. See generally
Raeder, Remember the Family, supra chap. 1, n. 106; Raeder, Gender and Sentencing,
supra intro., n. 24.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement 7300.4A(a), Visiting Regulations;
see also Glaser, supra chap. 1, n. 136, at 362; Am. Correctional Ass’n, supra
chap. 1, n. 136, at 542; Am. Prison Ass’n, supra chap. 1, n. 136, at 342; Comm’n on
Accreditation for Corrections, supra chap. 1, n. 136, at 68; Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, Program Statement 5270.07, § 541.12(5), Inmate Rights and Responsibilities (1987).
See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 585 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 547–48 (1979); In re Dyer, 20 P.3d 907, 912 (Wash. 2001) ( finding that prison authorities have wide discretion to administer an extended visitation policy
because “[i]t is not in the best interest of the courts to involve themselves in
the ‘day-to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources
with little offsetting benefit to anyone. Courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment.’”
(quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995))).
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73. See Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement 7300.4A(1).
74. Brenda McGowan & Karen Blumenthal, Why Punish the Children?
A Study of Children of Women Prisoners 50–53 (1978); Genty, supra
chap. 3, n. 61, at 1680.
75. McGowan & Blumenthal, supra chap. 3, n. 74, at 50–53; Genty, supra chap. 3,
n. 61, at 1680.
76. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000).
77. Kelly Bedard & Eric Helland, The Location of Women’s Prisons and the Deterrence
Effect of “Harder” Time, 24 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 147–49 (2004). Notably, Bedard
and Helland are able to show that the “harder” time actually serves a deterrent
effect; so what may look like a “tax” on families may in the end be an indirect way
to keep the family together. Id. at 148–49. They conclude: “[t]he evidence suggests that an increase in average prison distance leads to a decrease in crime. A
40-mile increase in the average distance to a female penitentiary reduces female
violent crime, property crime and murder rates by 6.9, 2.3 and 13.3%, respectively.”
Id. at 165.
These results are very provocative and suggest that a “family sensitive” location policy may actually recommend having the state place women far away from
their families as an indirect way to deter their participation in crime. The results
of Bedard and Helland’s study suggest how empirical work could usefully illuminate the relationship between family ties and criminal justice. Still, it is important
to acknowledge that Bedard and Helland appreciate the externalities associated
with using remote prison locations for their deterrent effect and do not ultimately
endorse using “harder” time as a way to keep families together:
The evidence presented in this paper suggests remote prison locations and/
or restricted visitation as low cost crime deterrence mechanisms. However,
our estimates do not quantify the welfare implications of this change.
Increasing the distance to women’s prisons (or an outright ban on visitation)
has clear externalities. There is ample evidence that a mother’s incarceration
has adverse effects on her children. It therefore seems quite likely, although
not certain, that even more severe restrictions on maternal visitation would
exacerbate an already bad situation for the children of female inmates. As
such, the secondary effects therefore render the long-run general equilibrium
effects of prison location on crime rates ambiguous.
Id. at 166 (citation omitted).
78. These programs are particularly important because of the disproportionate
harm that incarceration can visit upon mothers and their children. For
example, women are more likely to face termination of parental rights if
sent to prison than men, because women are more likely to have sole custody
of their children and therefore not to have ready access to another suitable
caregiver.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d).
80. See, e.g., supra chap. 2, n. 70.
81. Cf., e.g., Bedard & Helland, supra chap. 3, n. 77, at 165–66.
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82. Elizabeth Scott and Amitai Aviram shared the reaction that average citizens
may view certain family ties benefits as ways by which the state tries to induce
compliance with the overall legal regime. Cf. Robinson & Darley, supra chap. 2,
n. 15, at 497–99; Robinson, supra chap. 2, n. 15. In other words, absent these benefits and privileges, confidence in the legitimacy of the criminal justice system
would erode precipitously. In some such situations, prosecutors might end up
exercising their discretion to decline exacting “full justice” because they would
face the threat of jury nullification. These suggestions are provocative—as far as
they go. But we think that the elimination of the unjustified family ties benefits
can be explained in a moral vocabulary (accuracy, equality, crime reduction)
that would resonate with much of the population. Just as government has successfully disturbed and altered social norms involving racism or sexism, so too
could institutions of criminal justice shape social norms and not just uncritically
reflect them. In any event, it may turn out this concern about noncompliance is
exaggerated; we need empirical work to study whether jurisdictions without family ties benefits are suffering from higher crime rates than those with them, and
whether those jurisdictions that have either adopted or abandoned such benefits
found any noticeable differences within their own jurisdiction.
83. For example, the punishment discounts given to parents, on the one hand, rupture equality norms and, on the other hand, may work to reduce harms that
young children may endure in the absence of a parent.
84. For instance, we are aware that families often help in the reintegration of offenders into society, but we doubt that families would refuse to offer that help in the
absence of family-specific privileges extended during the course of investigating,
prosecuting, and punishing the predicate criminal activity.

•

Part 2. Punishing Family Status

1. Justin Boggs, Parents of Slain Victorville Child Receive Long Prison Terms, Daily
Press, Dec. 30, 2005. For examples of other recent cases where mothers have
been prosecuted for failing to protect their children from harm inflicted by another, see also Bill Scanlon, Mom Guilty in Baby’s Death, Rocky Mountain
News, Dec. 22, 2007 (describing the case of Molly Midyette, whose ten-weekold son died after beatings inflicted by his father); Steven Ellis, Court Upholds
Murder Conviction for Failing to Protect Son, Metropolitan News-Enterprise,
Mar. 12, 2008 (describing the case of Sylvia Torres Rolon, who was convicted
of second degree murder after failing to protect her one-year-old child from a
horrific night of abuse inflicted by her boyfriend).
2. We recognize that this group of burdens may fall into something of a different
category than parental responsibility laws or omissions liability, in the sense
that a desire to enforce a certain vision of public morality might motivate a state’s decision to utilize the power of the criminal law. We think it is
important to recognize, however, that the state is promoting a certain vision
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of family within both categories of burdens, in that it is essentially trying to
foster an environment in which caregiving can flourish, and that we need to
consider whether the use of the criminal law in these contexts in fact effectively serves that goal. In addition, these two categories of burdens are linked
in the sense that the existence of a certain family relationship is a prerequisite for imposing liability, and thus both categories warrant analysis under
our framework.
We acknowledge that, in some instances, victims may feel that they, as well as
defendants, have been harmed by family ties burdens.
There are some exceptions—largely those associated with incest and obligations
to pay parental support—that we discuss infra in Chapter 5.
We recognize this stands at odds with current constitutional doctrine that permits promiscuous use of severe criminal sanctions. See generally Sherry F. Colb,
Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All Other Rights?, 69
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 781 (1994); Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law As a Last Resort, 24
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 207 (2004).
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973); Linda K. Kerber, Women
of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America
138-55 (1980).

Chapter 4. An Overview of Family Status and
Criminal Justice Burdens

1. That’s not to say that vicarious and omissions liability are only triggered in the
familial context. Some states authorize vicarious liability prosecutions against
corporations for the crimes of their employees and omissions liability usually
encompasses various situations beyond failure to rescue a family member.
2. For those readers wondering, our view is that state statutes criminalizing polygamy raise problems to those statutes prohibiting incest between consenting and
competent adults. In the absence of a marital connection to a third person, X may
marry Y. In states prohibiting polygamy, X may not marry Y on account of the prior
relationship X entered into with Z.
3. In addition to creating criminal liability, family status is used in some jurisdictions
as a basis for inferring a breach of trust that serves as an aggravating factor at
sentencing. See, e.g., R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 740-41 (Can.) (“the offence
involved domestic violence and a breach of the trust inherent in a spousal relationship. That aggravating factor must be taken into account in the sentencing”).
4. See Diana Marrero & Shana Gruskin, Mom Arrested in Child’s Death; Police: Woman
Ignored Danger by Leaving Daughter with Boyfriend, Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel,
June 21, 2002, at 1B. One of the fascinating aspects of this case is that the boyfriend was eventually acquitted in the child’s death, so only the mother’s omission
was punished. See Susannah Nesmith, 3 Years Later, Man Cleared in Baby’s Death,
Miami Herald, Feb. 11, 2006, at B4.
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5. Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 6.2 (4th ed. 2003); see also David Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 Tex. L. Rev.
653, 655 (2006) (“The common law approach is straightforward. Absent a limited
number of specific exceptions, there is not duty to rescue, regardless of the ease
of rescue and consequences of non-rescue.”)
6. A very small number of states have adopted so-called “Good Samaritan” statutes, imposing criminal liability in limited circumstances upon those who fail to
rescue persons in emergency situations. See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519; R.I.
Gen. Laws § 11-56-1 (1998).
7. 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
8. See State v. Walden 293 S.E.2d 780, 786 (1982) (denying “that parents have the
legal duty to place themselves in danger of death or great bodily harm in coming to the aid of their children”); Dressler, supra chap. 1, n. 44, at 114; Andrew
Ashworth, The Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions, 105 L.Q. Rev. 424 (1989)
(discussing the requirement that the rescue must be an easy one).
9. Larry Alexander, Criminal Liability for Omissions: An Inventory of Issues, in Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (S. Shute & A. Simester
eds., 2002); see, e.g., R. v. Conde, (1867) 10 Cox Crim. 547, 549 (Cent. Crim. Ct.).
10. At common law, other status relationships could trigger a duty to rescue as well,
such as the duty of a ship captain to the passengers. See generally LaFave, 1 Subst.
Crim. L. § 6.2 (2007); State v. Mally, 366 P.2d 868 (Mont. 1961).
11. See Alexander, supra chap. 4, n. 9.
12. See, e.g., Muehe v. State, 646 N.E.2d 980 (Ind. 1995); see also Michelle S. Jacobs,
Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for Mothers Under Failure to Protect
Statutes, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 579, 586–87 (1998) (describing parents’
duties to their children).
13. See, e.g., State v. Schultz, 457 N.E.2d 336 (Ohio 1982) (upholding involuntary manslaughter conviction for mother who failed to protect her child during brutal
beating by live-in boyfriend); Smith v. State, 408 N.E.2d 614 (Ind. 1980) (upholding
conviction of involuntary manslaughter for mother who failed to protect her son
from repeated abuse by her live-in boyfriend).
14. See, e.g., People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206 (1907).
15. See State ex rel. Kuntz v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 995 P.2d 951, 956
(Mont. 2000).
16. See Alexander, supra chap. 4, n. 9.
17. Compare Leet v. State, 595 So. 2d 959, 963 (Fla. App. 1991) (holding that the
live-in boyfriend of a child’s mother owed a legal duty to the child to prevent
abuse by the mother after establishing a “family-like relationship”) with State v.
Miranda, 878 A.2d 1118, 1131 (Conn. 2005) (overruling lower court’s conclusion
that live-in boyfriend had duty to rescue his girlfriend’s child despite years of a
“familial relationship with victim’s mother;” the problem of not using crisp legal
categories is it will be too tempting to assign liability to “other members of the
extended family, to longtime caregivers who are not related to either the parent or victim, to regular babysitters, and to others with regular and extended
relationships with the abusing parent and the abused victim”).
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18. E.g., Cornell v. State, 159 Fla. 687, 32 So. 2d 610 (1947) (conviction of grandmother
for manslaughter by gross negligence for death of grandchild turned on facts independent of status).
19. Jill Smolowe, Parenting on Trial: A Couple Is Fined for a Son’s Crimes, Time, May
20, 1996, at 50.
20. Id.; see also Pamela K. Graham, Note, Parental Responsibility Laws: Let the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1719, 1740-41 (2000).
21. See Leila Atassi, Parental-Responsibility Law Strikes a Chord: Maple Heights’ Stance
Draws Broad Response, Clev. Plain Dealer, Apr. 30, 2006, at B1 (discussing
widespread interest in a new parental responsibility law); see also Naomi Cahn,
Pragmatic Questions About Parental Liability Statutes, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 399; Linda
Chapin, Out of Control? The Uses and Abuses of Parental Liability Laws to Control Juvenile Delinquency in the United States, 37 Santa Clara L. Rev. 621 (1997);
J. Herbie DiFonzo, Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Crime, 80 Or. L. Rev. 1
(2001); Susan S. Kuo, A Little Privacy, Please: Should We Punish Parents for Teenage
Sex?, 89 Ky. L.J. 135 (2000); Eve M. Brank et al., Parental Responsibility Statutes:
An Organization and Policy Implications, 7 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 1 (2005); Tammy
Thurman, Parental Responsibility Laws: Are They the Answer to Juvenile Delinquency?, 5 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 99 (2003).
22. More often, however, parents are targets via other avenues for the misdeeds of
their children: “statutory civil penalties for property damage caused by their
children, eviction from public housing if criminal activity has occurred in their
homes, and increased exposure to civil lawsuits filed by victims of youth violence.”
DiFonzo, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 3. A survey of the civil liability regimes around
the country can be found in Brank et al., supra chap. 4, n. 21. For a discussion
of these efforts to impose tort liability on parents for the acts of their children,
see Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The Justice of Parental Accountability: Hypothetical
Disinterested Citizens and Real Victims’ Voices in the Debate Over Expanded Parental Liability, 75 Temp. L. Rev. 375 (2002). See also Chapin, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at
629–638 ( focusing on criminal statutes).
23. See Jerry E. Tyler & Thomas W. Segady, Parental Liability Laws: Rationale,
Theory and Effectiveness, 37 Soc. Sci. J. 79, 79 (2000) (noting that the Massachusetts Stubborn Child Law of 1646 authorized the imposition of fines on parents
whose children were caught stealing); see also Cahn, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at
405–06 (noting that “[s]tates have been enacting laws holding parents criminally
liable for the delinquent acts of their children for almost a century,” primarily
through the enactment of statutes making it a criminal offense to contribute
to the delinquency of a minor). Cahn adds that parents were frequently prosecuted in juvenile courts under these laws during the first half of the twentieth
century. Id. at 406–07.
24. Leslie Joan Harris. An Empirical Study of Parental Responsibility Laws: Sending
Messages. But What Kind and to Whom?, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 5, 6–7 (“This kind of
law is more than one hundred years old, and lawmakers seem to ‘discover’ the
idea of using parental responsibility laws to prevent teenage crime every couple
of decades or so.”).
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25. Paul W. Schmidt, Note, Dangerous Children and the Regulated Family: The Shifting
Focus of Parental Responsibility Laws, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 667, 675 n.62 (1998).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-3; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.577(1) (West 2003).
28. Id.; see also Brank et al., supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 9–10 (giving examples from Georgia and Iowa).
29. N.Y. Penal Law § 260.10 (criminal liability for parent who “fails or refuses to exercise reasonable diligence” in controlling child).
30. See Act of June 21, 1995, No. 702, § 2, 1995 La. Acts 1854, 1855-56 (codified
at La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:92.2 (West Supp. 1997)) (“Improper supervision of
a minor by parent or legal guardian”). See generally LaFave, 2 Subst. Crim. L.
§ 13.4.
31. Schmidt, supra chap. 4, n. 25.
32. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.577(1).
33. See Maple Heights Parental Responsibility Ordinance No. 648.20; No. 698.02 (providing for sentence of 180 days in prison).
34. Maple Heights v. Ephraim, No. 90237, slip op. at 7, (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2008).
35. See Silverton, Oregon Criminal Code § 9.24, available at http://www.codepublishing.com/OR/silverton/silver09.html#9.24 (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
36. See Leila Atassi, Parents to Pay for Youths’ Crimes, Clev. Plain Dealer, Apr. 19,
2006, at B1 (quoting Mayor Hector).
37. See Idaho Code § 32-1301 (authorizing counties and cities to establish ordinances based on failure to supervise a child). The Idaho legislature authorized strict
liability but permitted affirmative defenses based on certain factors: whether
the parent was the victim of the juvenile misdeed; whether the parent reported the misconduct; and whether the parent took reasonable precautions to
supervise the child.
38. We have seen some estimates in the literature suggesting that in the last
decade there were about seventeen states with criminal parental responsibility
laws. But these numbers are misleading because some of the statutes cited are
just general “contributing to the delinquency of a minor” statutes, which apply to
all adults, not just parents or legal guardians.
39. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.577; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:92.2. Louisiana subjects
parents to up to six months’ imprisonment for permitting an unlicensed minor
driver to drive a vehicle if the minor ends up involved in an accident that resulted
in death or serious bodily injury to another person. The statute also makes it
a crime for a parent, “through criminal negligence,” to permit “the minor to associate with a person known by the parent” to be a gang member, a convicted
felon, or a drug dealer or user. A parent convicted under this particular provision
faces up to thirty days in a jail and a $250 fine. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:92.2

(defining the crime of the improper supervision of a minor by a parent or
legal guardian). The statute allows a parent to escape liability under these
latter provisions if the parent sought assistance from various agencies in
modifying the child’s behavior or if the parent referred “the child to appropriate
treatment or corrective facilities.” Id.
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40. See, e.g., Corpus Christi, Tex., Code § 33-48 (1985) (parental duties include “[k]eeping
illegal drugs and illegal firearms out of the home; [p]roviding reasonable supervision of the minor child; and [ f]orbidding the minor from keeping stolen property,
or illegally possessing firearms or illegal drugs” (subsection letters omitted)); Elgin,
Ill., Mun. Code tit. 10, ch. 10.66 (1995) (punishing parents who “willfully, knowingly or recklessly permit any minor” to possess “illegal drugs or drug paraphernalia,” or “commit an act tending to break the peace,” violate curfew, or “engage in
street gang related criminal activity”); see also Peter Applebome, Parents Face Consequences As Children’s Misdeeds Rise, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1996, at A1 (observing
proliferation of “dozens” of ordinances in towns near Chicago in “last two years”).
41. E.g., Salt Lake City, Utah, Code §§ 11.60.010-.060 (1995); St. Clair Shores, Mich.,
Code of Ordinances § 20.565.
42. See Schmidt, supra chap. 4, n. 25, at 682 n.102 (1998) (providing examples).
43. See State v. Akers, 400 A.2d 38 (N.H. 1979); Doe v. Trenton, 362 A.2d 1200, 1203
(N.J. 1976).
44. See Akers, 400 A.2d at 39.
45. Trenton, 362 A.2d at 1203.
46. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
47. See Cal. Penal Code § 272 (1988 amendment). The amendment was enacted in
response to the perception that California was in the throes of a “gang crisis.” See
Williams, 853 P.2d at 510.
48. Id. at 509. The privacy challenge was dropped over the course of the litigation and
not ruled upon by the California Supreme Court.
49. See id. at 511. The Court rather summarily rejected the overbreadth challenge.
See id. at 516–17.
50. See id. at 513.
51. See Harris, supra chap. 4, n. 24, at 17 (“Anecdotal evidence shows these laws are
almost never enforced and soon fall out of favor, only to be rediscovered in a few
years. The next section of this Article reports on an empirical study of the enforcement of parental responsibility laws in Oregon that supports the anecdotal
evidence.”). Harris’ study of Oregon shows that about one-third of the municipalities participating in the survey had parental responsibility laws, but they were
rarely, if ever, enforced. Id. at 22–23.
52. See Schmidt, supra chap. 4, n. 25, at 684 (citing as example Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.
577(3)-(4)).
53. Jeff Jacoby, Hypocrisy on Adult Consent, Boston Globe, Aug. 28, 2005, at C11
(quoting sentencing judge).
54. Id. See also Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005).
55. See Courtney Cahill, Same Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics
of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest
Taboo, 99 N.W.U. L. Rev. 1543, 1546 (2005) (“[T]he very term ‘incest’ is a powerful
way to provoke an almost visceral disgust toward any relationship to which it is
compared.”).
56. People v. Baker, 69 Cal. 2d 44, 49 (1968); State v. Scion Barefoot, 31 S.C.L. 209,
228–29 (S.C. App. 1845) (stating that at English common law, incest did not void
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57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

a marriage but made it voidable); Graham Hughes, The Crime of Incest, 55 J. Crim.
L. Criminology & Police Sci. 322, 323–25 (1964).
According to one recent survey, adult consensual consanguineous pairings are
not prohibited in Rhode Island, Ohio, and New Jersey. Note, Inbred Obscurity:
Improving Incest Laws in the Shadow of the “Sexual Family,” 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2464,
2469–70 (2006) (discussing the three American jurisdictions) [hereinafter Note,
Inbred Obscurity].
States can also prohibit marriage between various pairings of relatives through
their domestic relations statutes, even if they do not attach criminal penalties
to the relationship. See Margaret Mahoney, A Legal Definition of the Stepfamily: The Example of Incest Regulation, 8 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 21, 27 (1993) (noting “the
ban on incestuous relationships is enforced under two types of state regulations”:
first, the civil laws denying recognition to marriages between certain relatives,
and second, the criminal statutes that “punish attempted marriages, as well as
sexual activity outside of marriage”). We focus here on the criminal statutes.
41 Am. Jur. 2d Incest § 11 n.2 (providing citations). The defendant’s awareness
relates to his knowledge of the relationship, not his knowledge of the law that
punishes incest.
Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57, at 2465 (“The criminal incest laws
in the vast majority of states apply to [consensual] incest as well by making the
crime distinct from the crime of rape.”).
See Brett McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 Cardozo Women’s L.J. 337 (2004)
(compiling the various state laws on incest). Ohio only targets parental figures
for criminal liability for incest, and New Jersey does not penalize the parties
to incest when both are 18 or older. Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57,
at 2469 nn.38–39.
Id. at 349.
See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 670 NW.2d 802, 813 (Neb. App. 2003) (discussing
Nebraska statute).
See McDonnell, supra chap. 4, n. 61 (compiling the various state laws on incest).
Id.
See id.
Elise Soukup, After Gay Marriage, Polygamy Activism Rises, Newsweek, Mar.
20, 2006, at 52.
See 11 Am. Jur. 2d Bigamy § 1. Interestingly, some states don’t require X to actually marry Y in order to be guilty of bigamy; extramarital cohabitation suffices to
trigger liability. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy
and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277, 308 n.158 (2004).
Some states also punish the single person who knowingly marries the spouse of
another person. See 11 Am. Jur. 2d Bigamy § at §1-3. This type of legislation is not
a family ties burden as we define it because the state is not treating defendant X
any differently on account of X’s family status or connection; rather, it’s because
of X’s would-be spouse’s prior family connection. That’s not to say such legislation
does not raise its own problems, but we are focused on those statutes that place
burdens on persons because of their familial status.
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69. We use bigamy to refer to the criminal laws prohibiting the practice of polygamy,
or taking on more than one spouse, regardless of gender. For a collection of bigamy statutes, see Emens, supra chap. 4, n. 68, at 290 n.51.
70. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson & Gretel C. Kovach, Daughter of Sect Leader Gets Additional
Protection, N.Y. Times, June 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/us/
04polygamy.html (discussing conviction of FLDS sect leader, Warren Jeffs).
71. Jonathan Turley, Of Lust and the Law, Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 2004, at B1.
72. This qualification is important because if anti-fornication laws exist in a given
jurisdiction then adultery is not really a family ties burden but a redundancy—assuming that fornication is sexual relations between non-married partners and
that adultery is defined as sexual relations between a married person and another person who is not the spouse. For our particular purpose, we are focused on
adultery laws that operate in jurisdictions in which fornication (defined as sexual
relations outside marriage) is not prohibited. To the extent that jurisdictions impinge on all consensual sexual relations outside marriage between mature individuals, there is no specific family ties burden, but it goes without saying that our
liberal commitments would trigger hostility to such laws, which persist in various
forms in ten states and the District of Columbia. See Emens, supra chap. 4, n. 68,
at 290 n.49 (collecting statutes).
73. Adultery laws also occasionally raise issues like those discussed supra chap. 4,
n. 68 because some jurisdictions retain laws punishing an unmarried person from
engaging in sexual relations with a married person. Our analysis is restricted to
those laws punishing only those married persons engaged in extramarital sex.
74. See Emens, supra chap. 4, n. 68, at 299 n.107 (citing study reporting that 35 percent
of American married men and 20 percent of American married women have
adulterous sex).
75. See id. at 290 n.49 (collecting the statutes of twenty-three states plus the District
of Columbia that continue to criminalize adultery).
76. Lynn D. Wardle, Parental Infidelity and the “No-Harm” Rule in Custody Litigation,
52 Cath. Univ. L. Rev. 81, 95 n.57 (2002) (“According to the Washington Post/
Kaiser/Harvard Survey Project in 1998, eighty-eight percent of Americans
believe that adultery is immoral, while only eleven percent find it morally
acceptable.”).
77. See Emens, supra chap. 4, n. 68, at 290, n. 49.
78. See John F. Kelly, Virginia Adultery Case Roils Divorce Industry: Conviction Draws
Attention to Little Used Law, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 2003, at B1, B8; John F. Kelly,
Va. Man Challenges State’s Adultery Law; ACLU Joins Appeal, Cites Privacy Issue,
Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 2004, at B8.
79. See Melissa Ash Haggard, Adultery: A Comparison of Military Law and State
Law and the Controversy This Causes Under Our Constitution and Criminal
Justice System, 37 Brandeis L.J. 469, 469–70, 476–77 (1998); James M. Winner,
Beds with Sheets but No Covers: The Right to Privacy and the Military’s Regulation of
Adultery, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1073, 1073–74 (1998).
80. See generally C. Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters but Should Marriage? Adultery,
Fraternization, and Honor in the Military, 9 UCLA Women’s L.J. 177 (1999);
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81.

82.

83.

84.

85.
86.

87.

88.
89.
90.

91.

Military Gets New Rules on Adultery: It’s Still a Crime, but Not All Cases Will Be
Prosecuted, Chi. Trib., July 29, 1998, available at 1998 WL 2880547.
See, e.g., Bradley Graham, Military Leaders Worry Privately About Impact: Some
Troops Offended by Double Standard, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1998, at A10, available
at 1998 WL16556190.
Cf. Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced”
Sodomy Laws, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 103 (2000) (arguing that even unenforced
laws are not harmless because they create a criminal class).
Outside of Massachusetts and Connecticut, same-sex marriage is illegal in the
United States, and thus adultery laws probably apply as a class only against those
who are married, i.e., heterosexuals. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans
in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1. In light of the recent
events surrounding Proposition 8 in California, the status of same-sex marriage is
still unresolved in that state, most especially for the 18,000 same-sex couples who
were legally married before the passage of Proposition 8. Bob Egelko, Anti-gay
Marriage Group Steps Up for Prop. 8, S.F. Chron., Nov. 11, 2008, at B-2.
Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of Alaska, Parent Sentenced for
Failure to Pay Child Support (Feb. 9, 1999), available at http://csed.state.ak.us./
PressReleases/fisher.html.
Id.
Obviously, the failure to pay the government one’s tax liabilities is criminal. But
private parties cannot generally trigger the criminal justice system to enforce
debts outside the child support context.
See Posting of Nate Oman to Concurring Opinions, Debt, Status and Fatherhood,
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/05/ (May 25, 2007, 12:34 EST); see
also Ronald K. Henry, Child Support at a Crossroads: When the Real World Intrudes
upon Academics and Advocates, 33 Fam. L.Q. 235, 240 (1999) (stating that “the collection tactics practiced for child support debt are tolerated for no other form of
debt in American society”).
18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000).
Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act, Pub. L. No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618 (1998).
Scott Sussman & Corey Mather, Center on Fathers, Families, and Public
Policy, Criminal Statutes for Non-Payment of Child Support by State 1
(2003), www.cffpp.org/publications/pdfs/crimstat.pdf. States have also tried a
number of other measures to enforce child support orders, from garnishing wages to suspending drivers’ licenses to booting cars. See Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
991, 1000 (2006) (describing various efforts); see also Jennifer Goulah, Comment,
The Cart Before the Horse: Michigan Jumps the Gun in Jailing Deadbeat Dads, 83 U.
Det. Mercy L. Rev. 479, 486 (2006) (describing how some states post “wanted”
posters of deadbeat dads and others send birthday cards, reminding parents of
their child’s birthday and urging them to pay).
See generally Ann Britton, America’s Best Kept Secret: An Adult Child’s Duty to Support Aged Parents, 26 Cal. W. L. Rev. 351, 351–52 (1990); Shannon Frank Edelstone,
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Filial Responsibility: Can the Legal Duty to Support Our Parents Be Effectively Enforced, 36 Fam. L.Q. 501 (2002); Katie Wise, Caring for Our Parents in an Aging
World: Sharing Public and Private Responsibility for the Elderly, 5 J. Legis. & Pub.
Pol’y 563 (2002); Andrea Rickles-Jordan, Filial Responsibility: A Survey Across
Time and Oceans, 9 Marq. Elder’s Advisor 183 (2007); Matthew Pakula, A Federal Filial Responsibility Statute: A Uniform Tool to Help Combat the Wave of Indigent Elderly, 39 Fam. L.Q. 859, 860 (2005); Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility
Statutes: Legal and Policy Considerations, 9 J.L. & Pol’y 709, 710 (2001).
See Cal. Penal Code § 270c (1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-4 (2007); Ind.
Code Ann. § 35-46-1-7 (2004); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 530.050 (2007) (Kentucky);
Md. Code, Fam. Law §§ 13-101, 13-102, 13-103 (2006); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 273,
§ 20 (2000); Mont. Code Ann. § 40- 6-301 (2007); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-326.1
(2005); Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.21 (2003); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-10- 1 (2006); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 202, 203 (2006); Va. Code Ann. § 20- 88 (2007). See generally
Rickles-Jordan, supra chap. 4, n. 91.
See Terrance A. Kline, A Rational Role for Filial Responsibility Laws in Modern Society?, 26 Fam. L.Q. 195, 196 (1992) (noting that “no state appears to enforce” filial
responsibility laws).
See Cal. Penal Code § 270c (2008).
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 273, § 20 (2007).

Chapter 5. A Framework for Analyzing Family Ties
Burdens

•

1. Cf. John Rawls, A Theory Of Justice 10-15 (rev. ed. 1999).
2. Cf. e.g., R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 740-41 (Can.) (discussing the breach of
trust associated with violence against one’s spouse as an aggravating factor in
determining culpability).
3. But cf. Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting Negligent Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 807 (2006) (discussing results of a study
showing that in practice, parents who lose children because of their negligent conduct are often treated more leniently than unrelated caregivers who cause death).
4. As we discuss in the next Chapter, one can design policies to accommodate these
concerns in several ways.
5. See Fletcher, supra chap. 2, n. 9, at 3 (1993).
6. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of Self, 105 Harv. L. Rev.
959 (1992).
7. See Regan, supra intro., n. 24; Regan, supra chap. 2, n. 11.
8. See Hills, Constitutional Rights, supra chap. 2, n. 14, at 147.
9. Of course, in cases in which family ties burdens are liability-creating statutes on
the basis of status—such as bigamy, incest, or nonpayment of child support—these
family burdens are creating a new class of criminals: persons without family status
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10.
11.
12.
13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

engaged in this conduct would not be criminals. But this kind of criminogenesis is different from the way in which some of the family ties benefits created
incentives to perpetrate misconduct that would be punishable regardless of the
defendant’s family status.
There is also a plausible story to tell in which family ties burdens increase systematic inaccuracy in the criminal justice system. Because proving the elements
of these crimes will often turn family members against one another, it may be
harder to achieve truth-telling by relevant players, increasing judicial error rates.
Yet this is not the sort of inaccuracy we generally had in mind in the first Part of
the book; we weren’t talking about systemic inaccuracy there but inaccuracy in
individual cases.
See generally Markel, Against Mercy, supra chap. 2, n. 57.
On heteronormativity, see, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal
Tax Policy, 101 W. Va. L. Rev. 129 (1998).
See generally Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1
(2005).
See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 181, 183–84 (2001); Symposium, The Structures of Care
Work, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1389 (2001); Martha T. McCluskey, Caring for Workers,
55 Me. L. Rev. 313 (2003); cf. Sasha Roseneil, Why We Should Care About Friends: An
Argument for Queering the Care Imaginary in Social Policy, 3 Soc. Pol’y & Soc’y 409,
411 (2004); Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 Wis. Women’s L.J. 57 (2002).
Cf. Larry Alexander, Consent, Punishment, and Proportionality, 15 Phil. &
Pub. Affairs 178 (1986) (analyzing a “consensual theory of punishment” that
“substitute[s] consent for moral desert as the justification for imposing punishment on specific individuals”).
Cf. Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms 24 (2000) (discussing how an actor’s
willingness to bear certain costs or consequences can be a way of “establishing or
preserving one’s reputation”).
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137, 139 (Cal. 1983) (“As a rule, one has no
duty [under tort law] to come to the aid of another.”); 3 Fowler V. Harper
et al., The Law of Torts § 18.6 (2d ed. 1986); Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law
§ 6.2 (4th ed. 2003).
The metaphor here reaches a bit too far since admittedly we don’t live life as
single adults whom the state is otherwise and implicitly always watching closely, ready to step in at any point as part of its own duty to rescue or support.
Nonetheless, with every marriage or choice to parent, the actors are explicitly
or implicitly stating their intention to care and support the other person in the
relationship.
For disturbing counter-examples, consider the allegations made against
Warren Jeffs, who was charged in a scheme of forcing young girls into marriages
with older men, some of whom were closely related to the brides. See, e.g., John
Dougherty, Polygamist Is Indicted in Assault of a Child, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008,
at A14; John Dougherty & Kirk Johnson, Sect Leader Is Convicted as an Accomplice
to Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A18.
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19. See generally Hendrik Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A History (2000)
(charting changes in law and its effects on the American institution of marriage).
20. See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75
Temp. L. Rev. 709, 777-800 (2002) (explaining why marriage might be viewed as
compulsory).
21. See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The Justice of Parental Accountability: Hypothetical Disinterested Citizens and Real Victims’ Voices in the Debate over Expanded
Parental Liability, 75 Temple L. Rev. 375, 415 (2002) (“Parents, generally speaking,
have made a choice to parent... This choice, in most cases, represents voluntary
action....”).
22. Some have argued that women have little freedom to reject society’s expectations that they will choose to mother. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Family
Bonds: Adoption, Infertility and the New World of Child Production
35 (1993) (“Women are taught from birth that their identities are inextricably
linked with their capacity for pregnancy and childbirth and that this capacity is inextricably linked with mothering.”); Robson, supra chap. 5, n. 20, at 814.
Others may perceive a religious obligation to procreate and parent despite their
desire to do otherwise.
23. See Ethan J. Leib, A Man’s Right to Choose (an Abortion?), 28 Legal Times 60
(2005) [hereinafter Leib, Right to Choose]. Although it is undoubtedly true that
most “deadbeat” fathers are not individuals who had children against their
will—in the sense that they attempted to use birth control, had semen stolen
from them in a sexual act without vaginal penetration, or were encouraged in
sexual situations by partners who were dishonest about their fertility status—
it is still likely true that many fathers have support obligations to children that
they affirmatively would have chosen not to have were the reproductive freedom
choice solely within their discretion.
24. Michael M. O’Hear, Yes to Nondiscrimination, No to New Forms of Criminal
Liability: A Response to Collins, Leib, and Markel, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1437 (2008)
25. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Do Families Need Special Rules of Criminal Law?, 88 B.U. L.
Rev. 1426 (2008) [hereinafter Hills, Families].
26. 18 U.S.C. §1346.
27. We do not disagree with Professors Hills and O’Hear that even paradigmatic
cases of choice or consent in relationships—like the parent-child and spousespouse relationship—leave us with line drawing problems in some individual
cases. Since we think of our analysis as primarily targeted at legislators designing these types of liabilities, we think the arguments of Professors Hills and
O’Hear trying to undermine the choice involved with being a parent are perfectly
admissible to that audience. Still, we continue to think that, difficulties notwithstanding, we can impute voluntariness to the parent-child relationship in
a world where access to birth control, abortion, and adoption exist. Professor
Hills may be right that there are implicit “normative goals that lead us so
easily to infer that consent exists” in these relationships. See id. But that does not
vitiate our understanding of them as voluntary nor does it undermine our
attribution of meaning and value to that voluntariness, complicated though that
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29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.
35.

voluntariness may be. See generally Ethan J. Leib, Responsibility and Social/Political
Choices About Choice, 25 Law & Phil. 453 (2006) [hereinafter Leib, Responsibility]. Moreover, whatever problems there are with imputing voluntariness to
parenthood, three of the seven burdens—adultery, bigamy, and duty to rescue—
are also implicated in the spousal context, where imputing voluntariness is
generally less troublesome.
The age of the person matters as does the mental competence; we can imagine excluding from criminal liability those whose competence was below a
minimum standard.
We use the term covenants instead of contracts, because we do not think there
has to be bilateral exchange or consideration to make the declaration of intent to
care for another legally binding in this context.
One of us has written that an opt-out should be available to fathers before birth
under certain circumstances. See Leib, Right to Choose, supra chap. 5, n. 23. But
this is a very special case—and it presumes a lack of consent on the part of the
father of ever entering the relationship of father-child. Obviously, different concerns are presented when an adult consents to care for a child—and then attempts to withdraw such consent.
For a provocative discussion of what parents owe their children (which
also explains why parents cannot opt out), see Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert
E. Scott, Parents As Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2401 (1995). One of us has also
argued for a mandatory duty to rescue for friends within tort law. See Leib,
Friendship, supra chap. 3, n. 23, at 685–87. Because of the liberty interests
implicated by the criminal law, it does seem useful to have a registry for these
purposes.
For more details on how one such registry could function, see, e.g., David L.
Chambers, For the Best of Friends and for Lovers of All Sorts, A Status Other than
Marriage, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1347 (2001). Vermont and Hawaii already
have “reciprocal beneficiary” statutes that cover some of this territory. See Haw.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 572c-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2005); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1301–
06 (2002). To our mind, the state could create a legal registry that could easily
be configured to signal who is in one’s circle of care and what obligations one has
assumed.
See, e.g., Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably
Rescue in American Tort Law, 87 Tul. L. Rev. 1447, 1452-55 (2008). We may disagree with the no-duty-to-rescue pattern for other reasons, but if we are to have
it and its exceptions, as they are, the doctrine should at least be operationalized
in a way that better promotes the underlying interests.
O’Hear, supra chap. 5, n. 24.
By rejecting unilateral voluntariness, it’s unclear whether Professor O’Hear would
also forbid bilateral exchanges that conventionally create omissions liability,
such as when X hires Y to be his private nurse. There is also an irony here: O’Hear
gives us a hard time for purportedly expanding criminal law liability, but it is
his alternative model of “vulnerability and proximity” without a voluntariness

Dan Markel-Endnotes.indd 202

2/26/09 7:29:57 PM

notes to chapter 5

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.
41.
42.

203

side-constraint that might very well expand liabilities even further than our
model.
So, for example, when children grow up, there might not be a basis for uncritically
extending these duties anymore, at least according to Professor Markel. But to
Professors Collins and Leib, there are some situations in which the vulnerability
persists, such as with incest. Yet, even in these cases, the voluntariness of the relationship still plays a role too in assessing whether it makes sense to criminalize
status-based obligations.
Given the tradeoffs involved, we are open-minded about a general duty to
perform costless rescues. We recognize that such a law would violate our
voluntariness requirement but we are less concerned about that prospect
because a general duty to rescue would not use status-based characteristics
to impose criminal liability, our principal concern in this book.
We put aside the standard cases in omissions liability in which X creates the peril
to Y or X waves Z away from rescuing Y. But one standard case, that of contract,
does warrant more emphasis. We were puzzled by Professor Hills’s suggestion
that the criminal law of omissions treats families differently from contractually
bound “providers of caregiving services.” Hills, Families, supra chap. 5, n. 25. This is
not a correct statement of the law, as we discussed in Chapter 4. If someone hired
a nurse or even a neighbor for the purpose of caregiving, that contract would in
fact be a sufficient basis for criminal liability in many jurisdictions if that person
failed to perform an easy rescue. In some sense, that person is no different than X
who waves Z away from rescuing Y.
We acknowledge Professor O’Hear’s concern that the opt-in registry discussed in
the piece is unlikely to be widely used, especially among the lower socioeconomic
strata of society. See O’Hear, supra chap. 5, n. 24. That, perhaps, shows a limit of
the registry. But the fact that not all poor homosexual couples may enjoy the ex
ante benefit of a duty to rescue via a registry is not itself a reason to deny that
benefit to those poor homosexual couples who do (or, more importantly, their
children). Thus, something like the registry is still necessary to avoid the facial
discrimination and inequality that results without it. Moreover, we are somewhat
puzzled at why the registry would not provide sufficient information to subscribing parties about their duties, as O’Hear laments. See id. Signing up is actually
quite likely to force that information—and would furnish the state with the
opportunity to instruct parties about their responsibilities.
Hills, supra chap. 5, n. 25.
See supra chap. 2; Markel, Collins & Leib, Family Ties, supra chap. 1, n. 161, at
1187–88.
We should note that one can be a liberal about the criminal justice system—
meaning here, concerned with consent—but status oriented in other areas of the
law, such as family or civil law. More importantly, to adopt a moral theory about
obligation that is non-liberal in the context of family and other close relationships does not decide the question about how the related legal system should be
designed. When one takes to institutional design, the choice about how much
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43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

•

to build off of voluntarism and how much to build off of a relational obligation
is very much contingent on context. See Leib, Responsibility, supra chap. 5, n. 27.
For more on building a moral theory of obligation relationally rather than from
consent, see Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 Phil. & Pub.
Affairs 189 (1997).
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 220 (rev. ed. 1999) (“Each person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive system of equal basic liberty compatible with
a similar system for all”); J.S. Mill, 21 Collected Works of John Stuart Mill
262 (J. M. Robson ed., 1963) (“[T]he burden of proof is supposed to be with those
who are against liberty; who contend for any restriction or prohibition.... The a
priori assumption is in favour of freedom.”).
The phrase “equally effective” is important. We acknowledge that the criminal law
involves powers of norm expression; therefore, we must assess carefully whether
non-criminal alternatives affecting social norms carry similar expressive force.
Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: ‘Proportionality’ Relative to What? 89 Minn. L. Rev. 571(2005);
Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 Duke L.J.
263 (2005); Youngjae Lee, The constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment,
91 Va. L. Rev. 677 (2005).
Cf. generally Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as a Last Resort, 24 Ox. J. Legal Stud. 207 (2004); Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization 55 (2008); Nils
Jareborg, Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 521,
524 (2005).
If the burden was not imposed on individuals based on their family status,
it is not a family ties burden in the sense we mean, even if the policy ends up
substantially hurting those with families. We again refer the reader to our earlier stated conviction that most problems that have a disparate impact on
families are best regarded as problems that need to be addressed in the criminal justice system for all those concerned, regardless of whom they affect. So
if one has a particular problem, for example, as we do, with the war on drugs
and how it often leads to over-incarceration, the solution is not to have a bandaid for families but rather to fix the underlying policy of over-incarceration.

Chapter 6. Application of the Framework to
Family Ties Burdens

1. Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that
“the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest.... And neither rights
of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the
general interest in [a] youth’s well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict
the parent’s control.... [T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental
freedom and authority in thing’s affecting the child’s welfare”).
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2. See Sherry F. Colb, When Oral Sex Results in a Pregnancy: Can Men Ever Escape
Paternity Obligations?, FindLaw, Mar. 9, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
colb/20050309.html.
3. One’s response here hinges on whether one believes that a person who takes precautions against pregnancy still assumes the risk of being commandeered into
parenting by the state and the other partner. It might be a remote but foreseeable
risk; thus, the question then is whether it is just to impose this consequence on
the person. Perhaps one should be able to insure against the risk though it raises
moral hazard issues. Professor Collins is of the view that a man should be on the
hook unless his sperm was effectively purloined through deception or coercion.
Professors Leib and Markel think a man should not be commandeered into parenting obligations by the criminal law’s apparatus if he takes due care prior to
and during sex: e.g., he discusses the issue with a partner in advance of sexual
relations using reliable birth control methods, and the woman agrees then that if
birth control fails, the man will not be responsible for more than his fair share of a
post-conception abortion.
4. June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family
Identity, 65 La. L. Rev. 1295 (2005).
5. Indeed, the child at issue in Jones, 308 F.2d at 307, resided with a family friend at
the time of his death.
6. See generally Laura Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 833
(2007).
7. In establishing the criteria to answering this question, legislators, prosecutors, or
courts may want to consider a variety of factors including: co-residence between
the defendant and the minor, whether the defendant provides financial support
to child, whether the defendant has formally terminated parental rights
or instead makes statements to the public or the government regarding the
relationship for purposes such as taxes or other government benefits. On the
features that generally trigger legal recognition of parenthood, see David D.
Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and
Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 125, 132–43 (2006).
8. The other aspects of the omissions liability doctrine should attach: e.g., the rescue has to be one that is actually achievable and doesn’t pose undue risks to the
rescuer.
9. Cf. Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1311 (2006);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing
Civil Marriage, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1161, 1164 (2006).
10. 75 Am. Jur 2D Trespass § 157 (2008).
11. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922).
12. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841,
854-55 (1984).
13. See Hyman, supra chap. 4, n. 5.
14. We leave aside for now whether the age of majority for this purpose should be
dropped from 18 to a lower age, such as 16.
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15. The problem with this rationale is it might be said about any norm of responsible
behavior; there really is not a single unified theoretical account that adequately
explains what the boundaries of criminal law are. See Antony Duff, Theories
of Criminal Law, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Still, that most
parents will comply is not a good reason not to have the law. Will the law “crowd”
out otherwise trust-based conduct, as some have suggested?
It is hard to see how it would, even if there is some value in compliance
outside the law. For discussion of the “crowding” thesis—and its rejection, see
Ethan J. Leib, Friends As Fiduciaries, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 665 (2009) [hereinafter
Leib, Friends As Fiduciaries]; Ethan J. Leib, Friendship As Relational Contract
( forthcoming 2009); Frank Cross, Law and Trust, 93 Geo. L.J. 1457, 1545 (2005)
(“Whatever the intuitive appeal of the claims that legalization undermines
trust, they cannot be sustained once they are subjected to scrutiny and empirical
testing.”).
16. On latitude to parenting, see Murray, supra chap. 1, n. 100.
17. Mississippi prohibits “[a]doption by couples of the same gender.” Miss. Stat. §
93-17-3(2). Florida goes further and prohibits all “homosexuals” from adopting,
whether coupled or not. See Fla. Stat. ch. 63.042(3). However, about half the
states “now permit same-sex couples to raise children together through secondparent adoptions or through entry into marriage or a marriage-like union.” David
D. Meyer, supra chap. 6, n. 7, at 135.
18. That’s not to deny that ex ante Larry may feel denigrated on the basis of sexual
orientation discrimination.
19. Of course, some opponents would rely on more attenuated causal theories of
harm if children are entrusted to the care of homosexual couples or those in
polyamorous unions. E.g., Press Release, Christian Inst., Blair’s Gay Adoption
Plans Will Harm Children (May 7, 2002), http://www.christian.org.uk/pressre
leases/2002/may_7_2002.htm.
20. The fact that a mother is often charged in the failure to protect scenario is a
powerful example of the “mother-blaming” phenomenon that affects not only
our legal institutions, but also our cultural norms about parenting. As Professor Becker states, “[M]others are expected to be much better and more powerful
parents than fathers, always putting their children’s needs above their own and
protecting their children from all harm.” See Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing
Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for the Acts of Others, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 13, 15 (1995); see also Naomi
Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemma of Criminalization, 49
DePaul L. Rev. 817, 822 (2000) (arguing the criminal justice system treats mothers
more harshly); Jane Swigart, The Myth of the Bad Mother: The Emotional
Realities of Mothering 6 (1991) (“[W]e live in a society that simultaneously
idealizes and devalues the mother.”).
21. See Murray, supra chap. 1, n. 100.
22. We are grateful to Professor Murray for alerting us to this point.
23. Cf. Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 375 (1996); Erik Eckholm, Older Children Abandoned Under Law for Babies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 2008,
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at A21 (showing parents abandoning children well past infancy when they are
promised immunity from prosecution for neglect).
See Nancy S. Erickson, Battered Mothers of Battered Children: Using Our Knowledge
of Battered Women to Defend Them Against Charges of Failure to Act, in 1A Children and Families: Abuse and Endangerment 197, 199 (Sandra Anderson-Garcia
& Robert Batey eds., 1991) (“[B]ased on sheer numbers alone, one could predict
that women will be prosecuted for this category of failure to act more frequently
than men.”).
One commentator has argued that “society particularly expects that the mother
will be the child’s protector” and that “[t]he mother is expected to suppress any
individual needs or identity of her own in order to serve and protect the needs
of her child.” Jacobs, supra chap. 4, n. 12, at 587; see also Becker, supra chap. 6,
n. 20, at 15 (arguing that “[t]here is a profound tendency in our culture to blame
mothers (not fathers) for all problems children face (and all problem children)”).
Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of Criminalization, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 817, 822 (2000).
See Bernardine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the
Margins, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 1, 3–4 (1995) (discussing domestic violence and child abuse as strong predictors of each other).
Cf. Nicholson v. Scopetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (disapproving of a city agency’s practice of removing children from a custodial parent based on a parental
failure to prevent the child from witnessing domestic violence).
See Becker, supra chap. 6, n. 20, at 19 (noting that women are sometimes murdered after leaving an abusive spouse).
See id.
See id. at 31–32 (urging the provision of stronger “safety nets” for women in
abusive situations); see also Linda Gordon, Feminism and Social Control, in
What is Feminism? 63, 69 (Juliet Mitchell & Annie Oakley, eds., 1986) (“Good
social policy could address the problem of wife beating in part by empowering
women to leave abusive situations, enabling them to live in comfort and dignity
without men.”).
Becker, supra chap. 6, n. 20, at 32. It is important to note that Becker also argues
that “we must also change other parts of the social and legal system to make it
easier for women to escape abusive households with their children.” Id.
See id. at 21 (arguing that the mother “is in a much better position than the child
to prevent abuse and owes a duty of care to her children”).
As Mary Becker has written, “[T]he assumption should be that the adult who
was not literally a hostage—not literally coerced at every available second—could
have acted to end abuse,” at least by picking up the phone and calling 911. Becker,
supra chap. 6, n. 20, at 55.
There may be some cases in which the more passive parent is just as culpable
as the actual abuser, by providing active encouragement or a weapon or
the like.
See, e.g., Nina Callaway, Your Wedding Vows: Samples of Wedding Vow Wording,
About.com, http://weddings.about.com/cs/bridesandgrooms/a/vowwording.htm
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37.
38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

(traditional language wording includes “to have and to hold from this day forward, for better or for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health, to
love and to cherish; from this day forward until death do us part.”) (last visited
Sept. 28, 2008).
Cf. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.
See, e.g., People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 295, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907) (reversing manslaughter conviction of man who failed to aid his lover after she overdosed on
morphine because he owed her no legal duty). Indeed, some states have recently
recognized that limiting liability to formal legal relationships would be plainly underinclusive. State v. Caton, 739 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“Whether
a person stands in loco parentis is a factual question. The term does not signify
a formal investiture....” (citation omitted)); Leet v. State, 595 So. 2d 959, 963 (Fla.
App. 1991) (concluding that the live-in boyfriend of a child’s mother owed a legal
duty to the child to prevent abuse by the mother after establishing a “family-like
relationship” for an extended and indefinite period). We believe all states need
to move in this direction and have a proposed a clear mechanism by which they
could do so.
Another reading, which we find somewhat implausible, is that it exhibits special
faith in the spouses of black persons that they are more motivated to undertake
rescues without the threat of legal sanction for failure to do so. Cf. O’Hear, supra
chap. 5, n. 24.
In light of the extent of discrimination against gay individuals in this country,
we think it far too risky just to hope that courts in all states would extend the
same protections and obligations to individuals in a homosexual relationship
as they would to individuals in heterosexual relationships. As a point of comparison, states are split about whether to allow same sex partners to recover
in tort for wrongful death or infliction of emotional distress. See D. Kelly
Weisberg & Susan Appleton, Modern Family Law: Cases and Materials
404 (3d ed. 2006).
We note that some civil union laws, such as Vermont’s, offer same-sex couples
the same panoply of rights and responsibilities that exist with heterosexual marriages. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002). In such a situation, we think there
is still a residual discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by denying the
word marriage to such partnerships but that discrimination does not extend to
our core area of concern, the criminal justice system, because the obligations run
on the same tracks. That said, the discrimination persists against those involved
in voluntary and committed polyamorous relationships or in non-sexual unions
who nonetheless seek to enter covenants of care with each other. Cf. generally
Leib, Friendship, supra chap. 3, n. 23; Laura Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106
Mich. L. Rev. 189 (2007) (arguing that a failure to recognize friendship impedes
the elimination of state supported gender role expectations).
By decoupling omissions liability and marriage, we do not run the risk of
punishing what amounts to a purely private breach of contract through
criminal law. Since there is no bilateral exchange or consideration with
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our omissions registry but only a declaration to the state with binding consequences, the state may decide to punish those who make false claims to the
state or those who lull the state’s agents into complacency vis-à-vis a particular person. The lulling notion, of course, applies only to those few situations in
which the state already has reason to be mindful of the vulnerability of a
particular person.
At least one of us has some sympathy with the idea that voluntary friendships
can trigger substantial legal duties. See Leib, Friendship, supra chap. 3, n. 23; Leib,
Friends As Fiduciaries, supra chap. 6, n. 15. Few of these envisioned duties for
friendship are criminally punishable upon breach but, admittedly, some are. Leib’s
approach to friendship—and his resistance to registries in that context—is, in some
ways, inconsistent with the approach taken here. To the extent that the approaches
differ, Leib is willing to concede that the use of a registry for criminal law liability
may be the better way to allocate friendship’s burdens. But the private, civil law
is another story.
Brank et al., supra chap. 4, n. 21.
E.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 32-1301 (2006); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:92:2 (2004).
Brank et al., supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 3 (noting that “all of the states have some
form of civil parental liability”); Chapin, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 633–34 (discussing
compensation and deterrence rationales of civil liability statutes).
United States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
See Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of
Pinkerton, 57 Amer. Univ. L. Rev. 585 (2008).
See, e.g., Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from An Ever
More Expanding Ever More Troubling Area, 1 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 1, 7
(1992) (criticizing Pinkerton).
Kreit, supra chap. 6, n. 48.
See Posting of Dan M. Filler to Concurring Opinions, Strict Liability for Parents,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/07/strict_liabilit.html (July
6, 2006) (stating that these proposals raise questions both about effectiveness
and morality). There apparently have been few recent empirical studies assessing
the effectiveness of these laws. See Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States
1994-1996, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/reform/ch2_d.html (bemoaning the lack
of data about whether these statutes are effective) (last visited Sept. 28, 2008); see
also Chapin, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 653–54.
See Posting of Dan M. Filler, supra chap. 6, n. 51.
Harris, supra chap. 4, n. 24, at 5.
See Courtney L. Zolman, Comment, Parental Responsibility Acts: Medicine for Ailing Families and Hope for the Future, 27 Cap. U. L. Rev. 217, 229 (1998) (citing statement by Nia Keeling, a family outreach worker); see also Tyler & Segady, supra
chap. 4, n. 23, at 80 (citing the statement “[s]how me a bad kid and I’ll show you
a bad parent,” made at a city council meeting in Southfield, Michigan, that ultimately authorized a parental responsibility ordinance).
See Chapin, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 624.
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56. For a discussion of whether poor parenting is in fact a substantial contributing
factor to juvenile delinquency, see id. at 664–71.
57. See DiFonzo, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 44; see also Cahn, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 425–27
(identifying other causes of juvenile delinquency, such as “deficiencies in early
childhood education, peer pressure, and inadequate job opportunities”); Amy
L. Tomaszewski, Note, From Columbine to Kazaa: Parental Liability in a New
World, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 573, 582–85 (discussing how factors like the media and
biology might contribute to juvenile delinquency).
58. DiFonzo, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 47; see also Cahn, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 416 (suggesting that some parents do such a poor job of parenting, such as engaging in physical
abuse, that their children might reject their supervisory efforts).
59. DiFonzo, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 48. See also Eckholm, supra chap. 6, n. 23.
60. Id. DiFonzo also argues that jailing a parent deprives the youthful offender and
any siblings of a parental influence in the home; this criticism is less persuasive if
the parenting at issue was truly inadequate or even affirmatively harmful.
61. Asymmetrical dependency refers to relationships where one person possesses
substantial authority and responsibility over another person who is largely dependent for his or her well-being on the authority-wielding person. Martha
Fineman elaborates upon this notion. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century
Tragedies 8 (1995). Our vision of who stands in relationships of asymmetrical dependency does not rest necessarily upon residency, but we recognize its
general significance.
62. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.3 (1992) (providing a sentencing
enhancement for abusing a position of trust). Notice that use of sentencing enhancements this way are fine under our framework: they are not family ties burdens because they apply to all positions of trust. More, they would usefully undercut one way
in which this burden is actually used to benefit intrafamilial sex abusers, as we suggested in Part I. Leib discusses how this provision can be used to protect friendship
as a caregiving relationship in Leib, Friendship, supra chap. 3, n. 23, at 690 n.324.
63. E.g., Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is
Oedipus Free to Marry?, 18 Fam. L.Q. 257, 259 (1984). This may help explain why
adopted children are sometimes excluded from such prohibitions.
64. See Cahill, supra chap. 4, n. 55, at 1569. Cahill cites a number of courts that referenced these rationales in upholding incest laws. See, e.g., In re Tiffany Nicole M,
571 N.W.2d at 878 (citing both the possibility of “genetic mutation” and the need
“to protect children from the abuse of parental authority”); State v. Kaiser, 663 P.2d
839, 843 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (same). McDonnell cites a related concern of preventing the family from becoming “oversexualized,” with family members viewing other
members as potential sexual partners. McDonnell, supra chap. 4, n. 61, at 353.
65. See Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57, at 2464 n.10 (citing Benton v. State,
461 S.E.2d 202, 205 (Ga. 1995) (Sears, J., concurring) (on point of reducing rivalry);
id. at 2465 n.13 (citing Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of
Kinship 479 (Rodney Needham ed., James Harle Bell & John Richard von Sturmer
trans., 1969)).
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66. See McDonnell, supra chap. 4, n. 61, at 352 (describing how many incestuous
relationships pose no genetic problems and suggesting that states could take a
more narrow approach by allowing incestuous couples to marry but making it
illegal for them to have children). McDonnell does not grapple with the question
whether such a statute would be constitutional. Margaret Mahoney makes the
point that the genetic issue also cannot justify those state statutes criminalizing
relationships between stepparents and stepchildren. See Mahoney, supra chap. 4,
n. 58, at 28.
67. See Cahill, supra chap. 4, n. 55 (discussing how disgust and revulsion drive much
of incest regulation).
68. See Mahoney, supra chap. 4, n. 58, at 28 (describing how “community norms” and
religious history serve as common rationales for incest legislation).
69. As we noted above, three states do not punish consensual adult sibling sexual
conduct.
70. Professors Collins and Leib would add that persons who once had a relation of
asymmetric dependence should be precluded from future relations not involving asymmetry. Professor Markel disagrees; in his view, genuine and mature consent may plausibly exist even between adults who were once in a relationship of
asymmetric dependence.
71. See Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57, at 2469–70 (detailing the confusing pattern of incest laws).
72. In other contexts, Professor Markel suggests possibilities including registering
the relationship with the government if it fits into a certain category of risk and
requiring participants to the relationship to take a sex-education course. See infra
chap. 6, n. 84. These might be appropriate in this context as well.
73. Here we largely agree with the observation from Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 597 (2003), in which he noted that the reasoning
of the Court’s majority opinion makes it difficult to resist the conclusion we draw
regarding consensual adult relations.
74. See Posting of Dan Markel to PrawfsBlawg, The Sex-Ed License, Redux,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/the-sex-ed-lice.html
(Feb. 19, 2008) (discussing shadow effects of incest, adultery, and polygamy laws);
Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 Emory L.J. 691 (2006) (lamenting shadow
effects on consensual activity in statutory rape context).
75. See Cahill, supra chap. 4, n. 55, at 1569. Cahill cites a number of courts that referenced these rationales in upholding incest laws. See, e.g., In re Tiffany Nicole M,
571 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (citing both the possibility of “genetic
mutation” and the need “to protect children from the abuse of parental authority”); State v. Kaiser, 663 P.2d 839. 843 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (same).
76. See Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57 (developing this argument).
77. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990) (concluding that a high
school principal who threatened to block a student’s graduation unless she
consented to sexual intercourse could not be convicted of the crime of “sexual
intercourse without consent”).
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78. We recognize that some proponents of incest laws may be sincerely motivated by religious views or other comprehensive moral views, but those views, in
a liberal society sensitive to the rights of minorities, are not necessarily views
that a liberal criminal justice system must abide by. We also recognize there
is an important and complicated separate issue of whether any incestuous
marriages should be permitted. Our focus here is on whether currently
criminal conduct should be decriminalized or reformed, and we will restrict
our discussion to that subject.
79. While a sentence enhancement may, to some, signal that one victim seems to
be “worth more” than another victim, we think there is less reason to be worried
about that message since an offender in that context has voluntarily created the
trust relationship, and the breach of it makes the underlying conduct plausbily
more reprehensible from society’s perspective.
80. Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57, at 2468 n.31 (“The likelihood that offspring of very closely related partners (parent-child and siblings) will have a genetic
disease is about 13%, which is much greater than the likelihood that two strangers,
with no family history of the disease, will have a child with such defects, which is
0.1%. Two less closely related partners, such as first cousins, have a slightly greater
than 3% chance of having a child with a genetic defect.”) (citations omitted).
81. Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57, at 2468.
82. As to how these concerns are addressed outside the criminal justice system, we
are more ambivalent. We recognize that some might try to distinguish eugenics
(which might be thought to perfect a given gene pool) from genetics-based fears
about incest, which are trying to avoid harms to future humans, as opposed to
perfecting them. The problem with this distinction is that it assumes a moral
baseline of non-incestuous relationships; if a community had endorsed incestuous relationships historically, then efforts to ban such relationships would be
viewed by that community as “eugenics” by virtue of the goal of trying to improve
the general issue of the community.
83. Indeed, to the extent that incest laws produce sentencing discounts to sexually
abusive family members, the incest regime is complicit in extending a family ties
“benefit” with no adequate justification for under-punishing those who sexually
abuse their dependents.
84. Professor Markel, for instance, holds the view that if someone aged fifteen to
eighteen invites and chooses consensual relations with another person aged fifteen or higher, then that person should be able to engage in that relationship
provided certain (admittedly difficult) conditions are satisfied. For example, a
state could have a policy by which sex education courses would be a prerequisite for sexual activity in the same way that driver education in some jurisdictions is a prerequisite for permissible driving. On this view, all persons under
eighteen wishing to have sex without fear of prosecution would have to secure
a sex-education license, which they could get from a variety of possible private
or public sources. See Posting of Dan Markel to PrawfsBlawg, Is Teen Sex Like
Teen Driving? The Uneasy Case for the Sex-Ed License, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.
com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/is-teen-sex-lik.html (Feb. 15, 2008). The education
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would foster awareness of pregnancy, birth control techniques, genetic risks, disease, and physical and psychological coercion. Additionally, even with such a sexeducation license, adult-minor or minor-minor sex (regardless of consanguinity)
could be presumptively or categorically prohibited when there is a relationship
of asymmetrical dependence or cohabitation or supervisorial relationship in
school, work, or extracurricular activities. Last, in relationships where there is
a substantial age difference, which raises suggestions of coercion, the relationship’s sexual turn would have to be declared in advance to a regulatory agency
(or designated authorities) to certify that these conditions have been satisfied.
Prosecution for statutory rape would be threatened in the absence of compliance.
See also Posting of Dan Markel to PrawfsBlawg, Sex with Minors, Sex Between
Minors, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/sex-with-minors.
html (Feb. 7, 2008); Posting of Dan Markel to PrawfsBlawg, Marriage of Minors,
Marriage Between Minors, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/
marriage-of-min.html (Feb. 8, 2008).
However, one could permit or require the fact finder to infer that coercion is
present in certain circumstances: e.g., does one person serve in a caregiving or
supervisorial role to the other? But that question would cut across family status
bloodlines. For Markel, concerns about medical risks and pregnancy would be
addressed through the use of a sex-ed license, which would help secure a safe
harbor from prosecution.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the constitutionality of laws prohibiting adult incest were called
into question by the Court’s decision in Lawrence); Cahill, supra chap. 4, n. 55, at
1544 (describing statement by Senator Rick Santorum, who asserted that “If the
Supreme Court says you have the right to consensual [gay] sex within your home,
then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the
right to incest, you have the right to adultery. You have the right to do anything.”);
Cass Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage, 55 Sup. Ct. Rev. 27, 60–65 (2003) (discussing the implications of Lawrence for incest laws). The same slippery slope concerns about incest were also
raised by opponents to the legalization of interracial marriage. For a very interesting discussion on that topic, see Cahill, supra chap. 4, n. 55, at 1554–57.
Bigamy is also increasingly on the agenda. See Jeffrey Michael Hayes, Polygamy
Comes out of the Closet: The New Strategy of Polygamy Activists, 3 Stan. J. Civ-R.
Civ-Liberties 99 (2007).
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra chap. 6, n. 86, at 62 (noting it cannot be said that
incest “prohibitions run afoul of some emerging national awareness.”). One
organization, however, is seeking to liberalize cousin marriage. See Cousin
Couples, http://www.cousincouples.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
See, e.g., McDonnell, supra chap. 4, n. 61, at 352–53; Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra
chap. 4, n. 57, at 2465–66.
See Christine McNiece Metteer, Some “Incest” is Harmless Incest: Determining
the Fundamental Right to Marry of Adults Related by Affinity Without Resorting to
State Incest Statutes, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 262 (2000); see also Bratt, supra

Dan Markel-Endnotes.indd 213

2/26/09 7:30:09 PM

214

notes to chapter 6

91.
92.
93.
94.

95.

96.
97.

98.
99.

100.

101.

102.
103.
104.

chap. 6, n. 63. At least one state supreme court has agreed with this general
proposition. See Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1978) (striking down state
statute prohibiting marriage between brother and sister related only by
adoption as unconstitutional).
Robson, supra chap. 5, n. 20, at 762.
Id.
Id. at 764.
For some historical background on American bigamy laws, see generally
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
See Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong,
16 Cornell J. L. Pub. Pol’y 101, 106 (2006) (“The full case has not been made
for criminalization of polygamy, it has been assumed. The harms of polygamy have
been assumed, as have the effects of criminalization. The accepted rationale is
that polygamy will spring up wherever it is permitted, harming women, children,
and the very foundations of free society.”). Sigman’s article and some others provide an exception to this pattern of neglect. See also Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists
out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy
Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 691,
737–57 (2001); Emens, supra chap. 4, n. 68; Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge
of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory, 31 Cap. Univ. L. Rev. 439,
439 (2003).
See Hayes, supra chap. 6, n. 87, at 105.
This was a particular problem with the community of the recently convicted
Warren Jeffs, who married off barely post-pubescent girls in his community
and at the same time effectively banished teenage boys from the community
to “make more girls available for marriage to the elders.” Julian Borger, Hellfire
and Sexual Coercion: The Dark Side of American Polygamist Sects, Guardian,
June 30, 2005, at 15.
See sources cited supra chap. 5, n. 18.
See, e.g., Geoffrey Fattah, Bigamy Law Debated, Deseret News (Salt Lake City),
Feb. 3, 2005, http://deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,600109729,00.html (debating the application of a bigamy law to a man with a “spiritual” third wife).
But see State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 732 (Utah 2006) (holding that the bigamy
statute in Utah covers both state-sanctioned marriages and those that are not
state sanctioned).
See, e.g., Feminist Majority Foundation, Utah: Plural Wife Is First Woman Charged
in Polygamy Case, Feminist Daily News Wire (Oct. 16, 2002), http://feminist.
org/news/newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=7073.
Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 353,
371–74 (2003).
See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 151-55 (considering the various economic
theories which may encourage polygamy).
See Emens, supra chap. 4, n. 68, at 315–17.
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105. See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 152 n. 430; see also Robert Wright, The Moral Animal: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology 96–99 (1994).
106. We presume most people will not be comfortable with this solution. But we’re
not convinced there is a problem of welfare exploitation to solve in the first
place; if there is, this is one possible conclusion among others.
107. The Koran actually instructs Muslim men not to take on more wives than they
can afford to keep in equal comfort. See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 158 n.485
(citing The Qur’an: A New Translation 4:34 (M.A.S. Abdel Haleem trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2004)).
108. It’s important to note that the official Mormon institutions no longer support
or encourage polygamy, but there are communities that are Mormon-inspired
and continue these practices; it is largely on these offshoots that Professor
Strassberg focuses. Strassberg, Crime of Polygamy, supra chap. 6, n. 102, at 354.
109. Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, supra chap. 6, n. 102, at 405–12.
110. Professor Strassberg has also emphasized the harm of polygamous communities to liberal democracies on different grounds. Drawing on a Hegelian
perspective, for example, Strassberg indicated that polygamous marriage cultivates despotism or inhibits the development of liberal values such as equality
among persons. See, e.g., Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance:
Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1501, 1537 (1997)
(noting that monogamous marriage is “peculiarly suited to cultivate the freedom
to pursue particular ends and the freedom of self-governance by rational ethical
principles which must be characteristic of citizens of a free state”). In response,
Professor Sigman persuasively notes that the social science literature does not
“significantly substantiate the theory that polygamy bars the development of
romantic love within a private intimate sphere, that polygamy causes despotism,
or that monogamy causes the development of the liberal state.” Sigman, supra
chap. 6, n. 95, at 176 (examining various studies). From a theoretical perspective,
moreover, we are puzzled why Professor Strassberg would be willing to tolerate
the decriminalization of laws limiting polyfidelity involving mature individuals
if these Hegelian concerns were paramount. See Strassberg, supra chap. 6, n. 102,
at 429 (concluding that there is little evidence to justify bans on polyamory when
it involves mature individuals). Additionally, our sense is that liberal regimes
retain their credibility by reducing the instances in which they use the criminal
law to interfere with the autonomous and consenting choices of the individuals involved. Taking a firm stand against polygamy requires liberal regimes to
abandon their commitment to respect most forms of private ordering in the
absence of obvious and substantial negative externalities.
111. E.g., United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
112. Martha Ertman, The Story of Reynolds: Federal “Hell Hounds” Punishing Mormon
Treason, in Family Law Stories 51 (Carol Sanger ed., 2007); Kerry Abrams,
Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 Colum.
L. Rev. 641 (2005).
113. Historical opposition to polygamy sometimes invoked explicitly racist
rationales, for example, that polygamy was something that was “almost
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exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people,” not something
that was appropriate “among the northern and western nations of Europe.”
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); see also Francis Lieber,
The Mormons: Shall Utah Be Admitted into the Union?, 5 Putnam’s Monthly
225, 234 (1855).
114. It seems that much of the historical American animus against polygamy is
rooted in religious discrimination against the Mormon faith tradition and its
adherents. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, “They Ain’t Whites, They’re Mormons”: An
Illustrated History of Polygamy as Race Treason, available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1270023. Additionally, many Christians traditionally viewed polygamy with disdain and continue to do so today. Sigman,
supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 142-43.
115. Sigman helpfully explains why polygamy may be more marginally abusive to
women but also why these claims are suspect. See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95,
at 172–73. She notes
(1) polygamy invites secrecy, undermining women’s ability to get help if
needed; (2) the structure of polygamy suggests that the husband will not have
sufficient time to devote to each wife or their children; (3) the treatment by
other wives may be abusive; and (4) the types of people who voluntarily
choose polygamy may be attracted to the uneven power dynamic.
However, there is no evidence that polygamy per se creates abuse or
neglect. Having sister wives can be a support network. The status of senior
wives versus junior wives and the relationships among these women vary
between cultures. In fact, by banding together, women sometimes wield
more power to change their husband’s problematic behavior. Yet sometimes
co-wives are perpetrators [of the abuse against women].
Id.
116. Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for Same-Sex
Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 1023, 1039
(2005) (“What these historical details remind us is that gender inequality is a
contingent, not a conceptual, feature of polygamy.”).
117. Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 161–63 (summarizing research explaining the
rareness of polyandry).
118. See id. at 163–64 (“Rather than the gender biased monolith some have made it
out to be, polygyny is a multi-faceted choice of family structure, rooted in the
economic, sociological, cultural, and biological particulars of a given society.”);
see also Remi Clignet & Joyce A. Sween, For a Revisionist Theory of Human Polygyny, 6 Signs 445 (1981) (demonstrating diversity of polygynous marriages).
119. E.g., Strassberg, supra chap. 6, n. 109, at 1589 (“[M]onogamous marriages in
nineteenth-century America were based on the same patriarchal ideas about
women’s nature and gender roles as polygamous Mormon marriages.”).
120. See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 173 nn.595–96 (citing studies); see also
Hayes, supra chap. 6, n. 87, at 107 n.47 (“If there are crimes being committed,
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and underage child brides, that needs to be prosecuted... [But,] what’s the difference between that and other lifestyles with children in them?” (citing Interview
with Nancy Perkins, Reporter, Deseret Morning News (Apr. 12, 2006))).
See Hayes, supra chap. 6, n. 87, at 107 (quoting interview with a wife in
polygamous relationship who reports that “[w]e are labeled as criminals and
treated as criminals for the purpose of [Division of Child and Family Services]
investigations”).
Cf. Janet Elliott et al., CPS Calls Sect Its Largest Case Ever, Houston Chron., Apr. 8,
2008, at A1 (describing the adversarial custody hearings which would begin for
each child found in a polygamous compound).
See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 164.
See id. at 172.
See sources supra chap. 6, n. 9.
See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Democratic Families: ‘The Logic of Congruence’ and
Political Identity, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 145, 162 (2003).
Cf. Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388 (1988) (describing similar options in context
of distribution of death penalty based on race of the victim).
Actually, it is hard to say whether a rule that defaults to decriminalization of
bigamy would be a penalty default rule or a market-mimicking rule. Although
the overwhelming majority of Americans oppose polygamy, the pattern of nonprosecution in some jurisdictions over the years suggests (weakly) that there’s
not much support for enforcing polygamy bans. See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at
140–41 (noting lack of prosecutions over much of the last fifty years and general
apathy among Utah law enforcement to prosecute polygamists); see also Dirk
Johnson, Polygamists Emerge from Secrecy, Seeking Not Just Peace but Respect,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1991, at A22 (“[I]n recent years, as state law enforcement
officials have adopted an unwritten policy of leaving them alone, polygamists
have gone public.”).
Cf. Leah Sears Ward, A Case for Strengthening Marriage, Wash. Post, Oct. 30,
2006 at A17.
AEI Studies in Public Opinion, Attitudes About Homosexuality and Gay
Marriage 51 (July 6, 2004).
See Joanna Grossman, Punishing Adultery In Virginia: A Cheating Husband’s
Guilty Plea Is a Reminder of the Continued Relevance of Adultery, FindLaw, Dec. 3,
2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20031216.html.
Indeed, many states have a multitude of civil law mechanisms that they use
to signal disapproval of adultery and encourage monogamy. In North Carolina,
for example, spousal support laws are used to send very powerful messages: if
a judge finds that the “supporting spouse” engaged in act of “illicit sexual behavior,” the judge must award alimony to the dependent spouse. On the other
hand, if the dependent spouse engaged in sexual misconduct, the judge cannot
award alimony, no matter how destitute the dependent spouse may be. See N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 50-16.3A. North Carolina, along with a few other states, also retains the torts of seduction and alienation of affections, providing an avenue for
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the wronged spouse to obtain recompense through tort law. We take no
position in this paper on the merits of these mechanisms; we simply note
they are available.
133. Some have argued that the United States military actually has an implicitly
gendered approach to prosecuting adultery within courts martial. See Hopkins,
supra chap. 4, n. 80. Because none of us has sufficient understanding of military legal culture, we really can’t say what the military should do in its adultery
regulations. Our general argument here would tend to suggest that the government should not criminalize consensual adult sexual behavior. But because our
framework enables the government to proffer compelling interests to overcome
our presumption against family ties, we can’t be sure how to analyze military
policy in this regard. Our instinct is to be suspicious, but we would defer to
military law experts on this one.
134. See generally Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1758, 1778
n.87, 1779 (2005) (suggesting that perhaps marriage one day could “mov[e] closer to a system of default rules in which couples could structure their own lives,”
for example by choosing to have “reliance or expectation damages” available for
the breach of certain promises).
135. As with our approach to polygamy, it is hard to say whether decriminalization of adultery works to create a penalty default rule or a market-mimicking
default rule. It is a penalty default rule if we assume most people want their
marriages to look more like “covenant marriages,” which require higher entry
and exit costs. See generally Steven L. Nock, Laura Sanchez, Julia C. Wilson, &
James D. Wright, Covenant Marriage Turns Five Years Old, 10 Mich. J. Gender &
L. 169, 170–72 (2003) (describing the terms of covenant marriage and analyzing
satisfaction rates of those who have chosen them). If couples want exclusivity,
the law will force them to take active steps to communicate and discuss that
preference. On the other hand, it may be possible to infer (based on patterns
of non-prosecution for adultery and assuming prosecutorial responsiveness
to majoritarian will) that most people don’t want to have prosecutors enforce
these matters even if they view adultery laws in low regard. In that respect, the
statute serves as a market-mimicking default rule. One flag of caution we want
to raise is that if a jurisdiction adopted a default rule of decriminalization, it has
to be aware of how default rules can be “sticky,” and how such stickiness might
affect the prospect of law’s ability to affect behavior. For example, if we create a
rule that defaults to allowing extramarital sex without any legal stigma, it might
actually encourage that behavior even if the goal of the default rule is simply to
encourage partners to have conversations and agreements about the scope of
their relationship to each other. Of course, this result might occur if we simply
decriminalized adultery without giving the opportunity for partners to secure
promises of exclusivity through marital agreements. On “sticky” default rules,
see generally Ronald J. Mann, Contracts—Only with Consent, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1873 (2004); Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate
Law, 60 SMU L. Rev. 383 (2007).

Dan Markel-Endnotes.indd 218

2/26/09 7:30:15 PM

notes to chapter 6

219

136. We note that Professor Emens, after weighing various costs and benefits, ultimately preferred simple decriminalization of adultery statutes, noting the possibility that these statutes might be unconstitutional after Lawrence. Emens,
supra chap. 4, n. 68. On the particular issue of post-Lawrence constitutionality,
our sense is that if adultery statutes are drafted to be more respectful of the autonomous choices of individuals opting into a regime of regulation to prevent the kinds
of harms that might materialize both to betrayed spouses and to any children
of such a marriage, then it is likely they would survive constitutional scrutiny.
Nonetheless, we too prescind from “contractual criminal law regulation” but
principally for reasons having to do with fairness and externalities.
137. That said, if the sanctions were capped by a sentence of community service
with no collateral consequences, it would dramatically reduce the concern of
a socially costly punishment.
We also note that there are some cases that have invalidated various contracts made between spouses, but the agreements we are discussing here are
antenuptials; those are usually enforced if both parties are informed by counsel
and reflect a basic fairness in exchange between the parties.
138. The family law implications of these proposals for property distribution or
other issues are matters beyond the scope of our criminal law focus here.
However, our liberty-respecting framework for polygamy raises important and
interesting questions about the reach of family ties benefits, such as whether a
person with several spouses should be entitled to spousal privileges with all of
them, etc.
139. The “outside” person (X) is (knowingly or unknowingly) intruding upon the
marital space between Y and Z. Our analysis of what penalty should attach to
X is contingent upon X’s marital status. If X is unmarried, no penalty should
attach, in our view, assuming X is a competent and mature individual. If X is
married, his situation should be contingent upon whether his marital contract
calls for exclusivity.
140. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev.
505, 529-30 (2001) (stating that legislators have a great incentive to appeal to
voters by both generating outcomes and taking symbolic stands).
141. See sources cited supra chap. 4, n. 90.
142. See id.
143. Cf. Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra chap. 2, n. 63 (discussing the use of
alternative sanctions).
144. Maldonado, supra chap. 4, n. 90.
145. See, e.g., Weisberg & Appleton, supra chap. 6, n. 40, at 700–01 (describing
various enforcement mechanisms).
146. David Chambers, Making Fathers Pay: The Enforcement of Child Support 84 (1979). Chambers studied enforcement efforts in Michigan between
1972 and 1975. See also Drew Swank, The National Child Non-Support Epidemic,
2003 Mich. St. DCL L. Rev. 357, 375–78 (2003) (citing the author’s own studies
for proposition that jailing was effective).
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147. See Swank, supra chap. 6, n. 146, at 378.
148. A woman has been jailed for failing to pay child support in at least one case. See
David Stout, In Rare Role Reversal, Mother Is Jailed for a Failure to Pay, N.Y. Times,
July 26, 1995, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE7D9113EF
935A15754C0A963958260.
149. It is critical to remember that in thinking about these burdens from an ex
ante as opposed to an ex post perspective that we be especially mindful of how
gender affects this particular context. Women can choose to have children or to
choose another alternative (adoption/abortion), while men’s options are significantly more limited in this regard. If the mother puts the child up for adoption,
the father will not have to pay child support. But it is difficult for the man to
contract out of his support obligations if the mother makes a unilateral decision
to bring a fetus to term and raise the child herself. Perhaps that is as it should
be—but it is relevant in policy design on subsidiary questions like the jailing of
deadbeat dads.
150. An interesting complication arises in the context of blended families where children may find themselves raised by a number of different primary caregivers.
If a father and stepmother divorce, should the stepmother, assuming she is
financially able, be required to pay child support? We are uncertain—it might
depend on whether there was a prenuptial agreement in some cases. But we all
agree that the fairness of imposing criminal penalties on an individual in this
position seems questionable, and thus the issues raised by blended families are
another reason to favor non-criminal approaches.
151. Cf. Billingslea v. Texas, 780 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Cr. App. 1989) (holding that an adult
child’s failure to seek medical care for ailing live-in parent does not constitute
criminal negligence because there was no statutory duty to act).
152. Rickles-Jordan, supra chap. 4, n. 90, at 199 n.136.

•

Coda

1. We discuss this matter briefly in our Preface to Part II. In her reactions to a prior
draft of Part I, Kate Bloch suggested to us that the privileges may be an effort to
counterbalance the indirect harm and devastation the criminal justice system
imposes on families. We were intrigued by such a suggestion but could find
little evidence that policymakers thought about the privileges this way—and even
if they had, we still had some trouble with the logical nexuses. However, at the
very least, this type of reasoning might support some sentencing discounts, since
lengthy incarceration terms undoubtedly take a large toll on many families.
2. In a recent paper, Steve Sugarman has drawn attention to the ways some governmental welfare policy areas have moved beyond defining the family in traditional
(heteronormative and repronormative) terms. See Stephen D. Sugarman, What Is
a Family? Conflicting Messages from Our Public Programs, 42 Fam. L. Q. 231 (2008).
For the most part, the criminal law is still stuck in the 1950s in its distribution
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of facial burdens and benefits to the institution of the family. We hope that
changes—and soon.
For example, the city of Phoenix has a diversion program for domestic violence
defendants, whereas the city of San Francisco excludes domestic violence defendants from its diversion program. See. e.g., San Francisco Pretrial Diversion Project
Guidelines, available at http://www.sfpretrial.com/eligibilitycriteria.html (excluding domestic violence offenders from a pretrial diversion program) (last visited
Oct. 1, 2008); Domestic Violence Victim Information Center – FAQs, http://phoenix.gov/VICTIMSDV/dvfaq.html (explaining Phoenix’s diversion program) (last
visited Oct. 1, 2008).
See Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence, 47 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1841 (2006).
See id. at 1858.
See id. at 1859.
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering:
A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. Crim L. & Criminology 959, 959
(Summer 2004).
See Colker, supra chap. coda, n. 4, at 1882–83.
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